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* [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT
@ 2021-11-15 18:16 Alistair Delva
  2021-11-15 18:40 ` Bart Van Assche
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Alistair Delva @ 2021-11-15 18:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov, Bart Van Assche, Serge Hallyn, Jens Axboe,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Paul Moore, selinux, linux-security-module,
	kernel-team, stable

Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following
SELinux denial:

avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
     scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability
     permissive=0

Init is PID 0 running as root, so it already has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. For
better compatibility with older SEPolicy, check ADMIN before NICE.

Fixes: 9d3a39a5f1e4 ("block: grant IOPRIO_CLASS_RT to CAP_SYS_NICE")
Signed-off-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14+
---
v2: added comment requested by Jens
 block/ioprio.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/block/ioprio.c b/block/ioprio.c
index 0e4ff245f2bf..313c14a70bbd 100644
--- a/block/ioprio.c
+++ b/block/ioprio.c
@@ -69,7 +69,14 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)
 
 	switch (class) {
 		case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
-			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			/*
+			 * Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+			 * which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security
+			 * modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check
+			 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for
+			 * possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission.
+			 */
+			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
 				return -EPERM;
 			fallthrough;
 			/* rt has prio field too */
-- 
2.34.0.rc1.387.gb447b232ab-goog


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT
  2021-11-15 18:16 [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT Alistair Delva
@ 2021-11-15 18:40 ` Bart Van Assche
  2021-11-15 19:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
  2021-11-15 21:37 ` Jens Axboe
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Bart Van Assche @ 2021-11-15 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alistair Delva, linux-kernel
  Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov, Serge Hallyn, Jens Axboe, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
	Paul Moore, selinux, linux-security-module, kernel-team, stable

On 11/15/21 10:16 AM, Alistair Delva wrote:
> Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following
> SELinux denial:
> 
> avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
>       scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability
>       permissive=0
> 
> Init is PID 0 running as root, so it already has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. For
> better compatibility with older SEPolicy, check ADMIN before NICE.
> 
> Fixes: 9d3a39a5f1e4 ("block: grant IOPRIO_CLASS_RT to CAP_SYS_NICE")
> Signed-off-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
> Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kernel-team@android.com
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14+
> ---
> v2: added comment requested by Jens
>   block/ioprio.c | 9 ++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/block/ioprio.c b/block/ioprio.c
> index 0e4ff245f2bf..313c14a70bbd 100644
> --- a/block/ioprio.c
> +++ b/block/ioprio.c
> @@ -69,7 +69,14 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)
>   
>   	switch (class) {
>   		case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
> -			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +			/*
> +			 * Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> +			 * which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security
> +			 * modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check
> +			 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for
> +			 * possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission.
> +			 */
> +			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
>   				return -EPERM;
>   			fallthrough;
>   			/* rt has prio field too */
> 

Are there any other SELinux policies (Fedora?) that need to be verified?

Anyway:

Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT
  2021-11-15 18:16 [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT Alistair Delva
  2021-11-15 18:40 ` Bart Van Assche
@ 2021-11-15 19:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
  2021-11-15 21:37 ` Jens Axboe
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2021-11-15 19:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alistair Delva
  Cc: linux-kernel, Khazhismel Kumykov, Bart Van Assche, Serge Hallyn,
	Jens Axboe, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Paul Moore, selinux,
	linux-security-module, kernel-team, stable, john.johansen

On Mon, Nov 15, 2021 at 06:16:55PM +0000, Alistair Delva wrote:
> Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following
> SELinux denial:
> 
> avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
>      scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability
>      permissive=0
> 
> Init is PID 0 running as root, so it already has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. For
> better compatibility with older SEPolicy, check ADMIN before NICE.
> 
> Fixes: 9d3a39a5f1e4 ("block: grant IOPRIO_CLASS_RT to CAP_SYS_NICE")
> Signed-off-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
> Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

This won't harm anything, so

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

but questions below.

> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kernel-team@android.com
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14+
> ---
> v2: added comment requested by Jens
>  block/ioprio.c | 9 ++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/block/ioprio.c b/block/ioprio.c
> index 0e4ff245f2bf..313c14a70bbd 100644
> --- a/block/ioprio.c
> +++ b/block/ioprio.c
> @@ -69,7 +69,14 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)
>  
>  	switch (class) {
>  		case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
> -			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +			/*
> +			 * Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> +			 * which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security

What do you mean, implicitly allowed for pid 0?  Can you point to where
that happens?

> +			 * modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check
> +			 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for
> +			 * possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission.
> +			 */
> +			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
>  				return -EPERM;

But whichever one comes first can cause an avc denial message.  It seems
like we need a new capable() primitive which supports multiple bits,
when more than one can authorize an action, and which emits an audit
message only if all bits are missing.

>  			fallthrough;
>  			/* rt has prio field too */
> -- 
> 2.34.0.rc1.387.gb447b232ab-goog

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT
  2021-11-15 18:16 [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT Alistair Delva
  2021-11-15 18:40 ` Bart Van Assche
  2021-11-15 19:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2021-11-15 21:37 ` Jens Axboe
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Jens Axboe @ 2021-11-15 21:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, Alistair Delva
  Cc: linux-security-module, stable, Paul Moore, kernel-team, selinux,
	Khazhismel Kumykov, Serge Hallyn, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
	Bart Van Assche

On Mon, 15 Nov 2021 18:16:55 +0000, Alistair Delva wrote:
> Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following
> SELinux denial:
> 
> avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
>      scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability
>      permissive=0
> 
> [...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT
      commit: 94c4b4fd25e6c3763941bdec3ad54f2204afa992

Best regards,
-- 
Jens Axboe



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2021-11-16  1:02 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2021-11-15 18:16 [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT Alistair Delva
2021-11-15 18:40 ` Bart Van Assche
2021-11-15 19:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-11-15 21:37 ` Jens Axboe

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