From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nathaniel McCallum <nathaniel@profian.com>,
Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org (open list:KERNEL SELFTEST
FRAMEWORK), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2.1 16/30] selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page permission changes
Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 11:35:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220304093524.397485-16-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220304093524.397485-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Kernel should not allow permission changes on TCS pages. Add test to
confirm this behavior.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
index aec3355d2ace..ea5f2e064687 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
@@ -121,6 +121,24 @@ static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name)
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * Return the offset in the enclave where the TCS segment can be found.
+ * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS.
+ */
+static off_t encl_get_tcs_offset(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (i == 0 && seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
+ return seg->offset;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
/*
* Return the offset in the enclave where the data segment can be found.
* The first RW segment loaded is the TCS, skip that to get info on the
@@ -567,6 +585,62 @@ TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions)
EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
}
+/*
+ * Modifying permissions of TCS page should not be possible.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_permissions)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm ioc;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed
+ * commands.
+ */
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* ret == -1 */
+ if (errno_save == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()");
+ else if (errno_save == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to make TCS page read-only. This is not allowed and
+ * should be prevented by the kernel.
+ */
+ secinfo.flags = PROT_READ;
+ ioc.offset = encl_get_tcs_offset(&self->encl);
+ ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EINVAL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
/*
* Enclave page permission test.
*
--
2.35.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-04 9:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-04 9:34 [RFC PATCH v2.1 01/30] x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 02/30] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 03/30] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 04/30] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 05/30] Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 06/30] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 07/30] x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 08/30] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 09/30] x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask() Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 10/30] x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 11/30] x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 12/30] x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 13/30] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 14/30] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-09 8:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-09 9:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-09 16:59 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-09 19:10 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-09 23:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-09 23:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-10 0:11 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-10 0:10 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-10 2:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 15/30] selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 17/30] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 18/30] x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 19/30] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 20/30] x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 21/30] x86/sgx: Support complete page removal Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 22/30] Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 23/30] selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 24/30] selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 25/30] selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 26/30] selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 27/30] selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 28/30] selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 29/30] x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 30/30] selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:40 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 01/30] x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 9:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 19:04 ` Dave Hansen
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