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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nathaniel McCallum <nathaniel@profian.com>,
	Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT
	AND 64-BIT))
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2.1 18/30] x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization
Date: Fri,  4 Mar 2022 11:35:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220304093524.397485-18-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220304093524.397485-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>

Before an enclave is initialized the enclave's memory range is unknown.
The enclave's memory range is learned at the time it is created via the
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl() where the provided memory range is
obtained from an earlier mmap() of /dev/sgx_enclave. After an enclave
is initialized its memory can be mapped into user space (mmap()) from
where it can be entered at its defined entry points.

With the enclave's memory range known after it is initialized there is
no reason why it should be possible to map memory outside this range.

Lock down access to the initialized enclave's memory range by denying
any attempt to map memory outside its memory range.

Locking down the memory range also makes adding pages to an initialized
enclave more efficient. Pages are added to an initialized enclave by
accessing memory that belongs to the enclave's memory range but not yet
backed by an enclave page. If it is possible for user space to map
memory that does not form part of the enclave then an access to this
memory would eventually fail. Failures range from a prompt general
protection fault if the access was an ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the
enclave, or a page fault via the vDSO if it was another access from
within the enclave, or a SIGBUS (also resulting from a page fault) if
the access was from outside the enclave.

Disallowing invalid memory to be mapped in the first place avoids
preventable failures.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index 9602b6db831b..f775995a75e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -402,6 +402,11 @@ int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
 
 	XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(start));
 
+	/* Disallow mapping outside enclave's address range. */
+	if (test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) &&
+	    (start < encl->base || end > encl->base + encl->size))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	/*
 	 * Disallow READ_IMPLIES_EXEC tasks as their VMA permissions might
 	 * conflict with the enclave page permissions.
-- 
2.35.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-04  9:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-04  9:34 [RFC PATCH v2.1 01/30] x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 02/30] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 03/30] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 04/30] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 05/30] Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 06/30] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 07/30] x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 08/30] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 09/30] x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask() Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 10/30] x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 11/30] x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 12/30] x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 13/30] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 14/30] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-09  8:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-09  9:35     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-09 16:59       ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-09 19:10         ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-09 23:35         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-09 23:42           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-10  0:11             ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-10  0:10           ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-10  2:02             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 15/30] selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 16/30] selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page " Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 17/30] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 19/30] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 20/30] x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 21/30] x86/sgx: Support complete page removal Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 22/30] Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 23/30] selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 24/30] selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 25/30] selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 26/30] selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 27/30] selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 28/30] selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 29/30] x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 30/30] selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:40 ` [RFC PATCH v2.1 01/30] x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04  9:41   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 19:04 ` Dave Hansen

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