From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 06/24] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:59:19 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155856.487572808@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155856.295480966@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream.
The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
the same sentence.
Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
the config that provides that.
Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
using the firmware.
- Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+ Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-09 15:59 [PATCH 4.9 00/24] 4.9.306-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/24] x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/24] x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:58 ` Ben Hutchings
2022-03-09 22:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/24] x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/24] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/24] Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/24] x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/24] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/24] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/24] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/24] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/24] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/24] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/24] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/24] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/24] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/24] arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/24] arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/24] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/24] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/24] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/24] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/24] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/24] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/24] 4.9.306-rc1 review Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 19:18 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-10 3:32 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10 11:41 ` Pavel Machek
2022-03-10 11:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 20:26 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 3:45 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10 11:39 ` Pavel Machek
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