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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.18 39/47] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages
Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:50:19 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220527084807.748552055@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220527084801.223648383@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit 560181c27b582557d633ecb608110075433383af upstream.

Much of random.c is devoted to initializing the rng and accounting for
when a sufficient amount of entropy has been added. In a perfect world,
this would all happen during init, and so we could mark these functions
as __init. But in reality, this isn't the case: sometimes the rng only
finishes initializing some seconds after system init is finished.

For this reason, at the moment, a whole host of functions that are only
used relatively close to system init and then never again are intermixed
with functions that are used in hot code all the time. This creates more
cache misses than necessary.

In order to pack the hot code closer together, this commit moves the
initialization functions that can't be marked as __init into
.text.unlikely by way of the __cold attribute.

Of particular note is moving credit_init_bits() into a macro wrapper
that inlines the crng_ready() static branch check. This avoids a
function call to a nop+ret, and most notably prevents extra entropy
arithmetic from being computed in mix_interrupt_randomness().

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |   46 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
 
-static void crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work)
+static void __cold crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	static_branch_enable(&crng_is_ready);
 }
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
  * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
  *	    -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
  */
-int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret = -EALREADY;
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int register_random_ready_notifier(struc
 /*
  * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
  */
-int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret;
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ int unregister_random_ready_notifier(str
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
+static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
@@ -187,15 +187,9 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo
 }
 
 #define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
-	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_)
-
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller)
-{
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) || crng_ready())
-		return;
-	printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
-			func_name, caller, crng_init);
-}
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
+		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+				__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
 
 
 /*********************************************************************
@@ -614,7 +608,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
  * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
  * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
  */
-int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	/*
 	 * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
@@ -789,13 +783,15 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
 	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
 }
 
-static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
+#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits)
+
+static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
 {
 	static struct execute_work set_ready;
 	unsigned int new, orig, add;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if (crng_ready() || !bits)
+	if (!bits)
 		return;
 
 	add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
@@ -979,7 +975,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random
  * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
  * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
  */
-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
+void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	if (trust_bootloader)
@@ -995,7 +991,7 @@ static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(vmfork_cha
  * don't credit it, but we do immediately force a reseed after so
  * that it's used by the crng posthaste.
  */
-void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len)
+void __cold add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len)
 {
 	add_device_randomness(unique_vm_id, len);
 	if (crng_ready()) {
@@ -1008,13 +1004,13 @@ void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *u
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_vmfork_randomness);
 #endif
 
-int register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+int __cold register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
 	return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&vmfork_chain, nb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_random_vmfork_notifier);
 
-int unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+int __cold unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 {
 	return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&vmfork_chain, nb);
 }
@@ -1059,7 +1055,7 @@ static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4],
  * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
  * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
  */
-int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	/*
 	 * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
@@ -1214,7 +1210,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 	if (in_hardirq())
 		this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1;
 	else
-		credit_init_bits(bits);
+		_credit_init_bits(bits);
 }
 
 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
@@ -1242,7 +1238,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
 
-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
 {
 	struct timer_rand_state *state;
 
@@ -1271,7 +1267,7 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk
  *
  * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
  */
-static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+static void __cold entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 {
 	credit_init_bits(1);
 }
@@ -1280,7 +1276,7 @@ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_l
  * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
  * generate enough entropy with timing noise
  */
-static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
+static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void)
 {
 	struct {
 		unsigned long entropy;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-27  8:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-27  8:49 [PATCH 5.18 00/47] 5.18.1-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 01/47] lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/47] HID: amd_sfh: Add support for sensor discovery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/47] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/47] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/47] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/47] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/47] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/47] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/47] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/47] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/47] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 12/47] riscv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 13/47] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 14/47] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 15/47] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 16/47] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 17/47] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 18/47] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 19/47] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 20/47] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 21/47] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 22/47] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 23/47] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 24/47] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 25/47] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 26/47] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 27/47] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 28/47] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 29/47] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 30/47] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 31/47] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 32/47] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 33/47] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 34/47] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 35/47] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 36/47] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 37/47] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 38/47] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 40/47] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 41/47] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 42/47] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 43/47] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 44/47] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 45/47] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 46/47] ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 47/47] ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 22:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/47] 5.18.1-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28  1:53 ` Justin Forbes
2022-05-28  2:24 ` Ron Economos
2022-05-28  2:50 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-05-28 11:16 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-05-28 13:39 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-05-29  2:48 ` Fox Chen

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