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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.18 42/47] random: convert to using fops->read_iter()
Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:50:22 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220527084808.267747499@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220527084801.223648383@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

commit 1b388e7765f2eaa137cf5d92b47ef5925ad83ced upstream.

This is a pre-requisite to wiring up splice() again for the random
and urandom drivers. It also allows us to remove the INT_MAX check in
getrandom(), because import_single_range() applies capping internally.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[Jason: rewrote get_random_bytes_user() to simplify and also incorporate
 additional suggestions from Al.]
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |   65 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -446,13 +446,13 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
-static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *ubuf, size_t len)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
-	size_t block_len, left, ret = 0;
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
-	u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	size_t ret = 0, copied;
 
-	if (!len)
+	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -466,30 +466,22 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi
 	 * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
 	 * the user directly.
 	 */
-	if (len <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
-		ret = len - copy_to_user(ubuf, &chacha_state[4], len);
+	if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
+		ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, iter);
 		goto out_zero_chacha;
 	}
 
 	for (;;) {
-		chacha20_block(chacha_state, output);
+		chacha20_block(chacha_state, block);
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
 
-		block_len = min_t(size_t, len, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		left = copy_to_user(ubuf, output, block_len);
-		if (left) {
-			ret += block_len - left;
+		copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+		ret += copied;
+		if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
 			break;
-		}
 
-		ubuf += block_len;
-		ret += block_len;
-		len -= block_len;
-		if (!len)
-			break;
-
-		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
 		if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
 			if (signal_pending(current))
 				break;
@@ -497,7 +489,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi
 		}
 	}
 
-	memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output));
+	memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
 out_zero_chacha:
 	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
 	return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
@@ -1265,6 +1257,10 @@ static void __cold try_to_generate_entro
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
 {
+	struct iov_iter iter;
+	struct iovec iov;
+	int ret;
+
 	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1275,19 +1271,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (len > INT_MAX)
-		len = INT_MAX;
-
 	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
-		int ret;
-
 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 		if (unlikely(ret))
 			return ret;
 	}
-	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
+
+	ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		return ret;
+	return get_random_bytes_user(&iter);
 }
 
 static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
@@ -1331,8 +1326,7 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file
 	return (ssize_t)len;
 }
 
-static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
-			    size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
 	static int maxwarn = 10;
 
@@ -1348,23 +1342,22 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file
 			++urandom_warning.missed;
 		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
 			--maxwarn;
-			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
-				  current->comm, len);
+			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n",
+				  current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter));
 		}
 	}
 
-	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
 }
 
-static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
-			   size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 	if (ret != 0)
 		return ret;
-	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
 }
 
 static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
@@ -1426,7 +1419,7 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct
 }
 
 const struct file_operations random_fops = {
-	.read = random_read,
+	.read_iter = random_read_iter,
 	.write = random_write,
 	.poll = random_poll,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
@@ -1436,7 +1429,7 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops
 };
 
 const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
-	.read = urandom_read,
+	.read_iter = urandom_read_iter,
 	.write = random_write,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-27  8:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-27  8:49 [PATCH 5.18 00/47] 5.18.1-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 01/47] lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/47] HID: amd_sfh: Add support for sensor discovery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/47] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/47] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/47] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/47] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/47] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/47] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/47] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/47] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/47] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 12/47] riscv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 13/47] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 14/47] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 15/47] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 16/47] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 17/47] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 18/47] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.18 19/47] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 20/47] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 21/47] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 22/47] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 23/47] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 24/47] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 25/47] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 26/47] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 27/47] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 28/47] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 29/47] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 30/47] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 31/47] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 32/47] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 33/47] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 34/47] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 35/47] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 36/47] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 37/47] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 38/47] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 39/47] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 40/47] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 41/47] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 43/47] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 44/47] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 45/47] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 46/47] ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.18 47/47] ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 22:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/47] 5.18.1-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28  1:53 ` Justin Forbes
2022-05-28  2:24 ` Ron Economos
2022-05-28  2:50 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-05-28 11:16 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-05-28 13:39 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-05-29  2:48 ` Fox Chen

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