[PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.62 release.
There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:36:59 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.62-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 5.15.62-rc1

Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
    arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature

Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
    kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic

Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
    kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig

Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
    kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions

Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
    btrfs: raid56: don't trust any cached sector in __raid56_parity_recover()

Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
    btrfs: only write the sectors in the vertical stripe which has data stripes

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    x86/ftrace: Use alternative RET encoding

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    x86/ibt,ftrace: Make function-graph play nice

Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
    Revert "x86/ftrace: Use alternative RET encoding"

Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
    ksmbd: fix heap-based overflow in set_ntacl_dacl()

Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
    ksmbd: prevent out of bound read for SMB2_WRITE

Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
    net_sched: cls_route: disallow handle of 0

Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
    tee: add overflow check in register_shm_helper()

Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    io_uring: use original request task for inflight tracking


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                          |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h    |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c   |  11 +---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h  |   9 +++
 arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h     |   3 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h      |   6 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c          |   7 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S       |  19 ++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c |  20 +-----
 drivers/tee/tee_shm.c             |   3 +
 fs/btrfs/raid56.c                 |  74 +++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/io_uring.c                     |   2 +-
 fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c               |   7 +-
 fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c                |  45 +++++++------
 fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c                 | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 fs/ksmbd/smbacl.h                 |   2 +-
 fs/ksmbd/vfs.c                    |   5 ++
 include/linux/kexec.h             |  50 ++++++++++++---
 kernel/kexec_file.c               |  83 +++++++++---------------
 net/sched/cls_route.c             |  10 +++
 20 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 182 deletions(-)

[PATCH 5.15 01/14] io_uring: use original request task for inflight tracking

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

commit 386e4fb6962b9f248a80f8870aea0870ca603e89 upstream.

In prior kernels, we did file assignment always at prep time. This meant
that req->task == current. But after deferring that assignment and then
pushing the inflight tracking back in, we've got the inflight tracking
using current when it should in fact now be using req->task.

Fixup that error introduced by adding the inflight tracking back after
file assignments got modifed.

Fixes: 9cae36a094e7 ("io_uring: reinstate the inflight tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/io_uring.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/io_uring.c
+++ b/fs/io_uring.c
@@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ static void io_req_track_inflight(struct
 {
 	if (!(req->flags & REQ_F_INFLIGHT)) {
 		req->flags |= REQ_F_INFLIGHT;
-		atomic_inc(&current->io_uring->inflight_tracked);
+		atomic_inc(&req->task->io_uring->inflight_tracked);
 	}
 }
 

[PATCH 5.15 02/14] tee: add overflow check in register_shm_helper()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>

commit 573ae4f13f630d6660008f1974c0a8a29c30e18a upstream.

With special lengths supplied by user space, register_shm_helper() has
an integer overflow when calculating the number of pages covered by a
supplied user space memory region.

This causes internal_get_user_pages_fast() a helper function of
pin_user_pages_fast() to do a NULL pointer dereference:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 173 Comm: optee_example_a Not tainted 5.19.0 #11
  Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  pc : internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x474/0xa80
  Call trace:
   internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x474/0xa80
   pin_user_pages_fast+0x24/0x4c
   register_shm_helper+0x194/0x330
   tee_shm_register_user_buf+0x78/0x120
   tee_ioctl+0xd0/0x11a0
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec
   invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114

Fix this by adding an an explicit call to access_ok() in
tee_shm_register_user_buf() to catch an invalid user space address
early.

Fixes: 033ddf12bcf5 ("tee: add register user memory")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Nimish Mishra <neelam.nimish@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Anirban Chakraborty <ch.anirban00727@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Debdeep Mukhopadhyay <debdeep.mukhopadhyay@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/tee/tee_shm.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
@@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+	if (!access_ok((void __user *)addr, length))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
 	mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex);
 	shm->id = idr_alloc(&teedev->idr, shm, 1, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
 	mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex);

[PATCH 5.15 03/14] net_sched: cls_route: disallow handle of 0

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>

commit 02799571714dc5dd6948824b9d080b44a295f695 upstream.

Follows up on:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220809170518.164662-1-cascardo@canonical.com/

handle of 0 implies from/to of universe realm which is not very
sensible.

Lets see what this patch will do:
$sudo tc qdisc add dev $DEV root handle 1:0 prio

//lets manufacture a way to insert handle of 0
$sudo tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1:0 protocol ip prio 100 \
route to 0 from 0 classid 1:10 action ok

//gets rejected...
Error: handle of 0 is not valid.
We have an error talking to the kernel, -1

//lets create a legit entry..
sudo tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1:0 protocol ip prio 100 route from 10 \
classid 1:10 action ok

//what did the kernel insert?
$sudo tc filter ls dev $DEV parent 1:0
filter protocol ip pref 100 route chain 0
filter protocol ip pref 100 route chain 0 fh 0x000a8000 flowid 1:10 from 10
	action order 1: gact action pass
	 random type none pass val 0
	 index 1 ref 1 bind 1

//Lets try to replace that legit entry with a handle of 0
$ sudo tc filter replace dev $DEV parent 1:0 protocol ip prio 100 \
handle 0x000a8000 route to 0 from 0 classid 1:10 action drop

Error: Replacing with handle of 0 is invalid.
We have an error talking to the kernel, -1

And last, lets run Cascardo's POC:
$ ./poc
0
0
-22
-22
-22

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/cls_route.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

--- a/net/sched/cls_route.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_route.c
@@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ static int route4_set_parms(struct net *
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (!nhandle) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replacing with handle of 0 is invalid");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	h1 = to_hash(nhandle);
 	b = rtnl_dereference(head->table[h1]);
 	if (!b) {
@@ -477,6 +482,11 @@ static int route4_change(struct net *net
 	int err;
 	bool new = true;
 
+	if (!handle) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Creating with handle of 0 is invalid");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (opt == NULL)
 		return handle ? -EINVAL : 0;
 

[PATCH 5.15 04/14] ksmbd: prevent out of bound read for SMB2_WRITE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>

commit ac60778b87e45576d7bfdbd6f53df902654e6f09 upstream.

OOB read memory can be written to a file,
if DataOffset is 0 and Length is too large
in SMB2_WRITE request of compound request.

To prevent this, when checking the length of
the data area of SMB2_WRITE in smb2_get_data_area_len(),
let the minimum of DataOffset be the size of
SMB2 header + the size of SMB2_WRITE header.

This bug can lead an oops looking something like:

[  798.008715] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0
[  798.008724] Read of size 252 at addr ffff88800f863e90 by task kworker/0:2/2859
...
[  798.008754] Call Trace:
[  798.008756]  <TASK>
[  798.008759]  dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f
[  798.008764]  print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5cf
[  798.008768]  ? __filemap_get_folio+0x285/0x6d0
[  798.008774]  ? copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0
[  798.008777]  kasan_report+0xaa/0x120
[  798.008781]  ? copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0
[  798.008784]  kasan_check_range+0x100/0x1e0
[  798.008788]  memcpy+0x24/0x60
[  798.008792]  copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xd3d/0x14b0
[  798.008795]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x53/0x160
[  798.008799]  ? iov_iter_get_pages_alloc+0x1590/0x1590
[  798.008803]  ? ext4_write_begin+0xfc0/0xfc0
[  798.008807]  ? current_time+0x72/0x210
[  798.008811]  generic_perform_write+0x2c8/0x530
[  798.008816]  ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x180/0x180
[  798.008820]  ? down_write+0xb4/0x120
[  798.008824]  ? down_write_killable+0x130/0x130
[  798.008829]  ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x137/0x2c0
[  798.008833]  ext4_file_write_iter+0x40b/0x1490
[  798.008837]  ? __fsnotify_parent+0x275/0xb20
[  798.008842]  ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x2c0/0x2c0
[  798.008846]  ? ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2c0/0x2c0
[  798.008851]  __kernel_write+0x3a1/0xa70
[  798.008855]  ? __x64_sys_preadv2+0x160/0x160
[  798.008860]  ? security_file_permission+0x4a/0xa0
[  798.008865]  kernel_write+0xbb/0x360
[  798.008869]  ksmbd_vfs_write+0x27e/0xb90 [ksmbd]
[  798.008881]  ? ksmbd_vfs_read+0x830/0x830 [ksmbd]
[  798.008892]  ? _raw_read_unlock+0x2a/0x50
[  798.008896]  smb2_write+0xb45/0x14e0 [ksmbd]
[  798.008909]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  798.008912]  ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xd0/0xe0
[  798.008916]  ? smb2_read+0x15e0/0x15e0 [ksmbd]
[  798.008927]  ? memcpy+0x4e/0x60
[  798.008931]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x19/0x30
[  798.008934]  ? ksmbd_smb2_check_message+0x16af/0x2350 [ksmbd]
[  798.008946]  ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xe0/0xe0
[  798.008950]  handle_ksmbd_work+0x30e/0x1020 [ksmbd]
[  798.008962]  process_one_work+0x778/0x11c0
[  798.008966]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8e/0xe0
[  798.008970]  worker_thread+0x544/0x1180
[  798.008973]  ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x4/0x4
[  798.008977]  kthread+0x282/0x320
[  798.008982]  ? process_one_work+0x11c0/0x11c0
[  798.008985]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
[  798.008989]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  798.008995]  </TASK>

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-17817
Signed-off-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c |    7 +++++--
 fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c  |    6 ++----
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c
@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ static int smb2_get_data_area_len(unsign
 		*len = le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_read_req *)hdr)->ReadChannelInfoLength);
 		break;
 	case SMB2_WRITE:
-		if (((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset) {
-			*off = le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset);
+		if (((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset ||
+		    ((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->Length) {
+			*off = max_t(unsigned int,
+				     le16_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->DataOffset),
+				     offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer) - 4);
 			*len = le32_to_cpu(((struct smb2_write_req *)hdr)->Length);
 			break;
 		}
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
@@ -6471,10 +6471,8 @@ int smb2_write(struct ksmbd_work *work)
 		    (offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer) - 4)) {
 			data_buf = (char *)&req->Buffer[0];
 		} else {
-			if ((u64)le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset) + length > get_rfc1002_len(req)) {
-				pr_err("invalid write data offset %u, smb_len %u\n",
-				       le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset),
-				       get_rfc1002_len(req));
+			if (le16_to_cpu(req->DataOffset) <
+			    offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer)) {
 				err = -EINVAL;
 				goto out;
 			}

[PATCH 5.15 05/14] ksmbd: fix heap-based overflow in set_ntacl_dacl()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>

commit 8f0541186e9ad1b62accc9519cc2b7a7240272a7 upstream.

The testcase use SMB2_SET_INFO_HE command to set a malformed file attribute
under the label `security.NTACL`. SMB2_QUERY_INFO_HE command in testcase
trigger the following overflow.

[ 4712.003781] ==================================================================
[ 4712.003790] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in build_sec_desc+0x842/0x1dd0 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.003807] Write of size 1060 at addr ffff88801e34c068 by task kworker/0:0/4190

[ 4712.003813] CPU: 0 PID: 4190 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc5 #1
[ 4712.003850] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd]
[ 4712.003867] Call Trace:
[ 4712.003870]  <TASK>
[ 4712.003873]  dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f
[ 4712.003935]  print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5cf
[ 4712.003972]  ? ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr+0x16d/0x500 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.003984]  ? cmp_map_id+0x200/0x200
[ 4712.003988]  ? build_sec_desc+0x842/0x1dd0 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.004000]  kasan_report+0xaa/0x120
[ 4712.004045]  ? build_sec_desc+0x842/0x1dd0 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.004056]  kasan_check_range+0x100/0x1e0
[ 4712.004060]  memcpy+0x3c/0x60
[ 4712.004064]  build_sec_desc+0x842/0x1dd0 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.004076]  ? parse_sec_desc+0x580/0x580 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.004088]  ? ksmbd_acls_fattr+0x281/0x410 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.004099]  smb2_query_info+0xa8f/0x6110 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.004111]  ? psi_group_change+0x856/0xd70
[ 4712.004148]  ? update_load_avg+0x1c3/0x1af0
[ 4712.004152]  ? asym_cpu_capacity_scan+0x5d0/0x5d0
[ 4712.004157]  ? xas_load+0x23/0x300
[ 4712.004162]  ? smb2_query_dir+0x1530/0x1530 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.004173]  ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xe0/0xe0
[ 4712.004179]  handle_ksmbd_work+0x30e/0x1020 [ksmbd]
[ 4712.004192]  process_one_work+0x778/0x11c0
[ 4712.004227]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8e/0xe0
[ 4712.004231]  worker_thread+0x544/0x1180
[ 4712.004234]  ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x4/0x4
[ 4712.004239]  kthread+0x282/0x320
[ 4712.004243]  ? process_one_work+0x11c0/0x11c0
[ 4712.004246]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 4712.004282]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

This patch add the buffer validation for security descriptor that is
stored by malformed SMB2_SET_INFO_HE command. and allocate large
response buffer about SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY file info class.

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-17771
Reviewed-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c |   39 ++++++++++-----
 fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c  |  130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 fs/ksmbd/smbacl.h  |    2 
 fs/ksmbd/vfs.c     |    5 ++
 4 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
@@ -541,9 +541,10 @@ int smb2_allocate_rsp_buf(struct ksmbd_w
 		struct smb2_query_info_req *req;
 
 		req = work->request_buf;
-		if (req->InfoType == SMB2_O_INFO_FILE &&
-		    (req->FileInfoClass == FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION ||
-		     req->FileInfoClass == FILE_ALL_INFORMATION))
+		if ((req->InfoType == SMB2_O_INFO_FILE &&
+		     (req->FileInfoClass == FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION ||
+		      req->FileInfoClass == FILE_ALL_INFORMATION)) ||
+		    req->InfoType == SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY)
 			sz = large_sz;
 	}
 
@@ -2981,7 +2982,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work)
 						goto err_out;
 
 					rc = build_sec_desc(user_ns,
-							    pntsd, NULL,
+							    pntsd, NULL, 0,
 							    OWNER_SECINFO |
 							    GROUP_SECINFO |
 							    DACL_SECINFO,
@@ -3824,6 +3825,15 @@ static int verify_info_level(int info_le
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int smb2_resp_buf_len(struct ksmbd_work *work, unsigned short hdr2_len)
+{
+	int free_len;
+
+	free_len = (int)(work->response_sz -
+		(get_rfc1002_len(work->response_buf) + 4)) - hdr2_len;
+	return free_len;
+}
+
 static int smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len(struct ksmbd_work *work,
 				     unsigned short hdr2_len,
 				     unsigned int out_buf_len)
@@ -3833,9 +3843,7 @@ static int smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len(str
 	if (out_buf_len > work->conn->vals->max_trans_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	free_len = (int)(work->response_sz -
-			 (get_rfc1002_len(work->response_buf) + 4)) -
-		hdr2_len;
+	free_len = smb2_resp_buf_len(work, hdr2_len);
 	if (free_len < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -5087,10 +5095,10 @@ static int smb2_get_info_sec(struct ksmb
 	struct smb_ntsd *pntsd = (struct smb_ntsd *)rsp->Buffer, *ppntsd = NULL;
 	struct smb_fattr fattr = {{0}};
 	struct inode *inode;
-	__u32 secdesclen;
+	__u32 secdesclen = 0;
 	unsigned int id = KSMBD_NO_FID, pid = KSMBD_NO_FID;
 	int addition_info = le32_to_cpu(req->AdditionalInformation);
-	int rc;
+	int rc = 0, ppntsd_size = 0;
 
 	if (addition_info & ~(OWNER_SECINFO | GROUP_SECINFO | DACL_SECINFO |
 			      PROTECTED_DACL_SECINFO |
@@ -5136,11 +5144,14 @@ static int smb2_get_info_sec(struct ksmb
 
 	if (test_share_config_flag(work->tcon->share_conf,
 				   KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR))
-		ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(work->conn, user_ns,
-				       fp->filp->f_path.dentry, &ppntsd);
-
-	rc = build_sec_desc(user_ns, pntsd, ppntsd, addition_info,
-			    &secdesclen, &fattr);
+		ppntsd_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(work->conn, user_ns,
+						     fp->filp->f_path.dentry,
+						     &ppntsd);
+
+	/* Check if sd buffer size exceeds response buffer size */
+	if (smb2_resp_buf_len(work, 8) > ppntsd_size)
+		rc = build_sec_desc(user_ns, pntsd, ppntsd, ppntsd_size,
+				    addition_info, &secdesclen, &fattr);
 	posix_acl_release(fattr.cf_acls);
 	posix_acl_release(fattr.cf_dacls);
 	kfree(ppntsd);
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c
@@ -690,6 +690,7 @@ posix_default_acl:
 static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 			   struct smb_acl *pndacl,
 			   struct smb_acl *nt_dacl,
+			   unsigned int aces_size,
 			   const struct smb_sid *pownersid,
 			   const struct smb_sid *pgrpsid,
 			   struct smb_fattr *fattr)
@@ -703,9 +704,19 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct user_n
 	if (nt_num_aces) {
 		ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)nt_dacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl));
 		for (i = 0; i < nt_num_aces; i++) {
-			memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, le16_to_cpu(ntace->size));
-			size += le16_to_cpu(ntace->size);
-			ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + le16_to_cpu(ntace->size));
+			unsigned short nt_ace_size;
+
+			if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
+				break;
+
+			nt_ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ntace->size);
+			if (nt_ace_size > aces_size)
+				break;
+
+			memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size);
+			size += nt_ace_size;
+			aces_size -= nt_ace_size;
+			ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size);
 			num_aces++;
 		}
 	}
@@ -878,7 +889,7 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace
 /* Convert permission bits from mode to equivalent CIFS ACL */
 int build_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 		   struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, struct smb_ntsd *ppntsd,
-		   int addition_info, __u32 *secdesclen,
+		   int ppntsd_size, int addition_info, __u32 *secdesclen,
 		   struct smb_fattr *fattr)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -938,15 +949,25 @@ int build_sec_desc(struct user_namespace
 
 		if (!ppntsd) {
 			set_mode_dacl(user_ns, dacl_ptr, fattr);
-		} else if (!ppntsd->dacloffset) {
-			goto out;
 		} else {
 			struct smb_acl *ppdacl_ptr;
+			unsigned int dacl_offset = le32_to_cpu(ppntsd->dacloffset);
+			int ppdacl_size, ntacl_size = ppntsd_size - dacl_offset;
+
+			if (!dacl_offset ||
+			    (dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > ppntsd_size))
+				goto out;
+
+			ppdacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)ppntsd + dacl_offset);
+			ppdacl_size = le16_to_cpu(ppdacl_ptr->size);
+			if (ppdacl_size > ntacl_size ||
+			    ppdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl))
+				goto out;
 
-			ppdacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)ppntsd +
-						le32_to_cpu(ppntsd->dacloffset));
 			set_ntacl_dacl(user_ns, dacl_ptr, ppdacl_ptr,
-				       nowner_sid_ptr, ngroup_sid_ptr, fattr);
+				       ntacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl),
+				       nowner_sid_ptr, ngroup_sid_ptr,
+				       fattr);
 		}
 		pntsd->dacloffset = cpu_to_le32(offset);
 		offset += le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size);
@@ -980,24 +1001,31 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *
 	struct smb_sid owner_sid, group_sid;
 	struct dentry *parent = path->dentry->d_parent;
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt);
-	int inherited_flags = 0, flags = 0, i, ace_cnt = 0, nt_size = 0;
-	int rc = 0, num_aces, dacloffset, pntsd_type, acl_len;
+	int inherited_flags = 0, flags = 0, i, ace_cnt = 0, nt_size = 0, pdacl_size;
+	int rc = 0, num_aces, dacloffset, pntsd_type, pntsd_size, acl_len, aces_size;
 	char *aces_base;
 	bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(d_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode);
 
-	acl_len = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, user_ns,
-					 parent, &parent_pntsd);
-	if (acl_len <= 0)
+	pntsd_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, user_ns,
+					    parent, &parent_pntsd);
+	if (pntsd_size <= 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
 	dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(parent_pntsd->dacloffset);
-	if (!dacloffset) {
+	if (!dacloffset || (dacloffset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > pntsd_size)) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_parent_pntsd;
 	}
 
 	parent_pdacl = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)parent_pntsd + dacloffset);
+	acl_len = pntsd_size - dacloffset;
 	num_aces = le32_to_cpu(parent_pdacl->num_aces);
 	pntsd_type = le16_to_cpu(parent_pntsd->type);
+	pdacl_size = le16_to_cpu(parent_pdacl->size);
+
+	if (pdacl_size > acl_len || pdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl)) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_parent_pntsd;
+	}
 
 	aces_base = kmalloc(sizeof(struct smb_ace) * num_aces * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!aces_base) {
@@ -1008,11 +1036,23 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *
 	aces = (struct smb_ace *)aces_base;
 	parent_aces = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)parent_pdacl +
 			sizeof(struct smb_acl));
+	aces_size = acl_len - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
 
 	if (pntsd_type & DACL_AUTO_INHERITED)
 		inherited_flags = INHERITED_ACE;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num_aces; i++) {
+		int pace_size;
+
+		if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
+			break;
+
+		pace_size = le16_to_cpu(parent_aces->size);
+		if (pace_size > aces_size)
+			break;
+
+		aces_size -= pace_size;
+
 		flags = parent_aces->flags;
 		if (!smb_inherit_flags(flags, is_dir))
 			goto pass;
@@ -1057,8 +1097,7 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *
 		aces = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)aces + le16_to_cpu(aces->size));
 		ace_cnt++;
 pass:
-		parent_aces =
-			(struct smb_ace *)((char *)parent_aces + le16_to_cpu(parent_aces->size));
+		parent_aces = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)parent_aces + pace_size);
 	}
 
 	if (nt_size > 0) {
@@ -1153,7 +1192,7 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
 	struct smb_ntsd *pntsd = NULL;
 	struct smb_acl *pdacl;
 	struct posix_acl *posix_acls;
-	int rc = 0, acl_size;
+	int rc = 0, pntsd_size, acl_size, aces_size, pdacl_size, dacl_offset;
 	struct smb_sid sid;
 	int granted = le32_to_cpu(*pdaccess & ~FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE);
 	struct smb_ace *ace;
@@ -1162,37 +1201,33 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
 	struct smb_ace *others_ace = NULL;
 	struct posix_acl_entry *pa_entry;
 	unsigned int sid_type = SIDOWNER;
-	char *end_of_acl;
+	unsigned short ace_size;
 
 	ksmbd_debug(SMB, "check permission using windows acl\n");
-	acl_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, user_ns,
-					  path->dentry, &pntsd);
-	if (acl_size <= 0 || !pntsd || !pntsd->dacloffset) {
-		kfree(pntsd);
-		return 0;
-	}
+	pntsd_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, user_ns,
+					    path->dentry, &pntsd);
+	if (pntsd_size <= 0 || !pntsd)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	dacl_offset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
+	if (!dacl_offset ||
+	    (dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > pntsd_size))
+		goto err_out;
 
 	pdacl = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset));
-	end_of_acl = ((char *)pntsd) + acl_size;
-	if (end_of_acl <= (char *)pdacl) {
-		kfree(pntsd);
-		return 0;
-	}
+	acl_size = pntsd_size - dacl_offset;
+	pdacl_size = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size);
 
-	if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) ||
-	    le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) < sizeof(struct smb_acl)) {
-		kfree(pntsd);
-		return 0;
-	}
+	if (pdacl_size > acl_size || pdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl))
+		goto err_out;
 
 	if (!pdacl->num_aces) {
-		if (!(le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) &&
+		if (!(pdacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) &&
 		    *pdaccess & ~(FILE_READ_CONTROL_LE | FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE)) {
 			rc = -EACCES;
 			goto err_out;
 		}
-		kfree(pntsd);
-		return 0;
+		goto err_out;
 	}
 
 	if (*pdaccess & FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE) {
@@ -1200,11 +1235,16 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
 			DELETE;
 
 		ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl));
+		aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
 		for (i = 0; i < le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) {
+			if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
+				break;
+			ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
+			if (ace_size > aces_size)
+				break;
+			aces_size -= ace_size;
 			granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req);
 			ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ace + le16_to_cpu(ace->size));
-			if (end_of_acl < (char *)ace)
-				goto err_out;
 		}
 
 		if (!pdacl->num_aces)
@@ -1216,7 +1256,15 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
 	id_to_sid(uid, sid_type, &sid);
 
 	ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl));
+	aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
 	for (i = 0; i < le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) {
+		if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
+			break;
+		ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
+		if (ace_size > aces_size)
+			break;
+		aces_size -= ace_size;
+
 		if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) ||
 		    !compare_sids(&sid_unix_NFS_mode, &ace->sid)) {
 			found = 1;
@@ -1226,8 +1274,6 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
 			others_ace = ace;
 
 		ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ace + le16_to_cpu(ace->size));
-		if (end_of_acl < (char *)ace)
-			goto err_out;
 	}
 
 	if (*pdaccess & FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE && found) {
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.h
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.h
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ struct posix_acl_state {
 int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd,
 		   int acl_len, struct smb_fattr *fattr);
 int build_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd,
-		   struct smb_ntsd *ppntsd, int addition_info,
+		   struct smb_ntsd *ppntsd, int ppntsd_size, int addition_info,
 		   __u32 *secdesclen, struct smb_fattr *fattr);
 int init_acl_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt);
 void free_acl_state(struct posix_acl_state *state);
--- a/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c
@@ -1543,6 +1543,11 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(struct ksmbd_
 	}
 
 	*pntsd = acl.sd_buf;
+	if (acl.sd_size < sizeof(struct smb_ntsd)) {
+		pr_err("sd size is invalid\n");
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
 	(*pntsd)->osidoffset = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu((*pntsd)->osidoffset) -
 					   NDR_NTSD_OFFSETOF);
 	(*pntsd)->gsidoffset = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu((*pntsd)->gsidoffset) -

[PATCH 5.15 06/14] Revert "x86/ftrace: Use alternative RET encoding"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>

This reverts commit e54fcb0812faebd147de72bd37ad87cc4951c68c.

This temporarily reverts the backport of upstream commit
1f001e9da6bbf482311e45e48f53c2bd2179e59c. It was not correct to copy the
ftrace stub as it would contain a relative jump to the return thunk which
would not apply to the context where it was being copied to, leading to
ftrace support to be broken.

Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c |    7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
 	} __attribute__((packed));
 };
 
-#define RET_SIZE		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE		1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)
 
 static unsigned long
 create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
@@ -368,10 +368,7 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops
 
 	/* The trampoline ends with ret(q) */
 	retq = (unsigned long)ftrace_stub;
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK))
-		memcpy(ip, text_gen_insn(JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, ip, &__x86_return_thunk), JMP32_INSN_SIZE);
-	else
-		ret = copy_from_kernel_nofault(ip, (void *)retq, RET_SIZE);
+	ret = copy_from_kernel_nofault(ip, (void *)retq, RET_SIZE);
 	if (WARN_ON(ret < 0))
 		goto fail;
 

[PATCH 5.15 07/14] x86/ibt,ftrace: Make function-graph play nice

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit e52fc2cf3f662828cc0d51c4b73bed73ad275fce upstream.

Return trampoline must not use indirect branch to return; while this
preserves the RSB, it is fundamentally incompatible with IBT. Instead
use a retpoline like ROP gadget that defeats IBT while not unbalancing
the RSB.

And since ftrace_stub is no longer a plain RET, don't use it to copy
from. Since RET is a trivial instruction, poke it directly.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154318.347296408@infradead.org
[cascardo: remove ENDBR]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c    |    9 ++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S |   19 +++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -322,12 +322,12 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops
 	unsigned long offset;
 	unsigned long npages;
 	unsigned long size;
-	unsigned long retq;
 	unsigned long *ptr;
 	void *trampoline;
 	void *ip;
 	/* 48 8b 15 <offset> is movq <offset>(%rip), %rdx */
 	unsigned const char op_ref[] = { 0x48, 0x8b, 0x15 };
+	unsigned const char retq[] = { RET_INSN_OPCODE, INT3_INSN_OPCODE };
 	union ftrace_op_code_union op_ptr;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -365,12 +365,7 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops
 		goto fail;
 
 	ip = trampoline + size;
-
-	/* The trampoline ends with ret(q) */
-	retq = (unsigned long)ftrace_stub;
-	ret = copy_from_kernel_nofault(ip, (void *)retq, RET_SIZE);
-	if (WARN_ON(ret < 0))
-		goto fail;
+	memcpy(ip, retq, RET_SIZE);
 
 	/* No need to test direct calls on created trampolines */
 	if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS) {
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(ftrace_graph_call, SYM_L
 
 /*
  * This is weak to keep gas from relaxing the jumps.
- * It is also used to copy the RET for trampolines.
  */
 SYM_INNER_LABEL_ALIGN(ftrace_stub, SYM_L_WEAK)
 	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
@@ -335,7 +334,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(ftrace_graph_caller)
 SYM_FUNC_END(ftrace_graph_caller)
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(return_to_handler)
-	subq  $24, %rsp
+	subq  $16, %rsp
 
 	/* Save the return values */
 	movq %rax, (%rsp)
@@ -347,7 +346,19 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(return_to_handler)
 	movq %rax, %rdi
 	movq 8(%rsp), %rdx
 	movq (%rsp), %rax
-	addq $24, %rsp
-	JMP_NOSPEC rdi
+
+	addq $16, %rsp
+	/*
+	 * Jump back to the old return address. This cannot be JMP_NOSPEC rdi
+	 * since IBT would demand that contain ENDBR, which simply isn't so for
+	 * return addresses. Use a retpoline here to keep the RSB balanced.
+	 */
+	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
+	call .Ldo_rop
+	int3
+.Ldo_rop:
+	mov %rdi, (%rsp)
+	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+	RET
 SYM_FUNC_END(return_to_handler)
 #endif

[PATCH 5.15 08/14] x86/ftrace: Use alternative RET encoding

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 1f001e9da6bbf482311e45e48f53c2bd2179e59c upstream.

Use the return thunk in ftrace trampolines, if needed.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: use memcpy(text_gen_insn) as there is no __text_gen_insn]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
 	} __attribute__((packed));
 };
 
-#define RET_SIZE		1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)
+#define RET_SIZE		(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
 
 static unsigned long
 create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
@@ -365,7 +365,12 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops
 		goto fail;
 
 	ip = trampoline + size;
-	memcpy(ip, retq, RET_SIZE);
+
+	/* The trampoline ends with ret(q) */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK))
+		memcpy(ip, text_gen_insn(JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, ip, &__x86_return_thunk), JMP32_INSN_SIZE);
+	else
+		memcpy(ip, retq, sizeof(retq));
 
 	/* No need to test direct calls on created trampolines */
 	if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS) {

[PATCH 5.15 09/14] btrfs: only write the sectors in the vertical stripe which has data stripes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>

commit bd8f7e627703ca5707833d623efcd43f104c7b3f upstream.

If we have only 8K partial write at the beginning of a full RAID56
stripe, we will write the following contents:

                    0  8K           32K             64K
Disk 1	(data):     |XX|            |               |
Disk 2  (data):     |               |               |
Disk 3  (parity):   |XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX|XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX|

|X| means the sector will be written back to disk.

Note that, although we won't write any sectors from disk 2, but we will
write the full 64KiB of parity to disk.

This behavior is fine for now, but not for the future (especially for
RAID56J, as we waste quite some space to journal the unused parity
stripes).

So here we will also utilize the btrfs_raid_bio::dbitmap, anytime we
queue a higher level bio into an rbio, we will update rbio::dbitmap to
indicate which vertical stripes we need to writeback.

And at finish_rmw(), we also check dbitmap to see if we need to write
any sector in the vertical stripe.

So after the patch, above example will only lead to the following
writeback pattern:

                    0  8K           32K             64K
Disk 1	(data):     |XX|            |               |
Disk 2  (data):     |               |               |
Disk 3  (parity):   |XX|            |               |

Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/raid56.c |   55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
@@ -324,6 +324,9 @@ static void merge_rbio(struct btrfs_raid
 {
 	bio_list_merge(&dest->bio_list, &victim->bio_list);
 	dest->bio_list_bytes += victim->bio_list_bytes;
+	/* Also inherit the bitmaps from @victim. */
+	bitmap_or(dest->dbitmap, victim->dbitmap, dest->dbitmap,
+		  dest->stripe_npages);
 	dest->generic_bio_cnt += victim->generic_bio_cnt;
 	bio_list_init(&victim->bio_list);
 }
@@ -865,6 +868,12 @@ static void rbio_orig_end_io(struct btrf
 
 	if (rbio->generic_bio_cnt)
 		btrfs_bio_counter_sub(rbio->fs_info, rbio->generic_bio_cnt);
+	/*
+	 * Clear the data bitmap, as the rbio may be cached for later usage.
+	 * do this before before unlock_stripe() so there will be no new bio
+	 * for this bio.
+	 */
+	bitmap_clear(rbio->dbitmap, 0, rbio->stripe_npages);
 
 	/*
 	 * At this moment, rbio->bio_list is empty, however since rbio does not
@@ -1197,6 +1206,9 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct b
 	else
 		BUG();
 
+	/* We should have at least one data sector. */
+	ASSERT(bitmap_weight(rbio->dbitmap, rbio->stripe_npages));
+
 	/* at this point we either have a full stripe,
 	 * or we've read the full stripe from the drive.
 	 * recalculate the parity and write the new results.
@@ -1268,6 +1280,11 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct b
 	for (stripe = 0; stripe < rbio->real_stripes; stripe++) {
 		for (pagenr = 0; pagenr < rbio->stripe_npages; pagenr++) {
 			struct page *page;
+
+			/* This vertical stripe has no data, skip it. */
+			if (!test_bit(pagenr, rbio->dbitmap))
+				continue;
+
 			if (stripe < rbio->nr_data) {
 				page = page_in_rbio(rbio, stripe, pagenr, 1);
 				if (!page)
@@ -1292,6 +1309,11 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct b
 
 		for (pagenr = 0; pagenr < rbio->stripe_npages; pagenr++) {
 			struct page *page;
+
+			/* This vertical stripe has no data, skip it. */
+			if (!test_bit(pagenr, rbio->dbitmap))
+				continue;
+
 			if (stripe < rbio->nr_data) {
 				page = page_in_rbio(rbio, stripe, pagenr, 1);
 				if (!page)
@@ -1715,6 +1737,33 @@ static void btrfs_raid_unplug(struct blk
 	run_plug(plug);
 }
 
+/* Add the original bio into rbio->bio_list, and update rbio::dbitmap. */
+static void rbio_add_bio(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio, struct bio *orig_bio)
+{
+	const struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = rbio->fs_info;
+	const u64 orig_logical = orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_sector << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	const u64 full_stripe_start = rbio->bioc->raid_map[0];
+	const u32 orig_len = orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+	const u32 sectorsize = fs_info->sectorsize;
+	u64 cur_logical;
+
+	ASSERT(orig_logical >= full_stripe_start &&
+	       orig_logical + orig_len <= full_stripe_start +
+	       rbio->nr_data * rbio->stripe_len);
+
+	bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, orig_bio);
+	rbio->bio_list_bytes += orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+
+	/* Update the dbitmap. */
+	for (cur_logical = orig_logical; cur_logical < orig_logical + orig_len;
+	     cur_logical += sectorsize) {
+		int bit = ((u32)(cur_logical - full_stripe_start) >>
+			   fs_info->sectorsize_bits) % rbio->stripe_npages;
+
+		set_bit(bit, rbio->dbitmap);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * our main entry point for writes from the rest of the FS.
  */
@@ -1731,9 +1780,8 @@ int raid56_parity_write(struct btrfs_fs_
 		btrfs_put_bioc(bioc);
 		return PTR_ERR(rbio);
 	}
-	bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, bio);
-	rbio->bio_list_bytes = bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
 	rbio->operation = BTRFS_RBIO_WRITE;
+	rbio_add_bio(rbio, bio);
 
 	btrfs_bio_counter_inc_noblocked(fs_info);
 	rbio->generic_bio_cnt = 1;
@@ -2135,8 +2183,7 @@ int raid56_parity_recover(struct btrfs_f
 	}
 
 	rbio->operation = BTRFS_RBIO_READ_REBUILD;
-	bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, bio);
-	rbio->bio_list_bytes = bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+	rbio_add_bio(rbio, bio);
 
 	rbio->faila = find_logical_bio_stripe(rbio, bio);
 	if (rbio->faila == -1) {

[PATCH 5.15 10/14] btrfs: raid56: dont trust any cached sector in __raid56_parity_recover()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>

commit f6065f8edeb25f4a9dfe0b446030ad995a84a088 upstream.

[BUG]
There is a small workload which will always fail with recent kernel:
(A simplified version from btrfs/125 test case)

  mkfs.btrfs -f -m raid5 -d raid5 -b 1G $dev1 $dev2 $dev3
  mount $dev1 $mnt
  xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xee 0 1M" $mnt/file1
  sync
  umount $mnt
  btrfs dev scan -u $dev3
  mount -o degraded $dev1 $mnt
  xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 128M" $mnt/file2
  umount $mnt
  btrfs dev scan
  mount $dev1 $mnt
  btrfs balance start --full-balance $mnt
  umount $mnt

The failure is always failed to read some tree blocks:

  BTRFS info (device dm-4): relocating block group 217710592 flags data|raid5
  BTRFS error (device dm-4): parent transid verify failed on 38993920 wanted 9 found 7
  BTRFS error (device dm-4): parent transid verify failed on 38993920 wanted 9 found 7
  ...

[CAUSE]
With the recently added debug output, we can see all RAID56 operations
related to full stripe 38928384:

  56.1183: raid56_read_partial: full_stripe=38928384 devid=2 type=DATA1 offset=0 opf=0x0 physical=9502720 len=65536
  56.1185: raid56_read_partial: full_stripe=38928384 devid=3 type=DATA2 offset=16384 opf=0x0 physical=9519104 len=16384
  56.1185: raid56_read_partial: full_stripe=38928384 devid=3 type=DATA2 offset=49152 opf=0x0 physical=9551872 len=16384
  56.1187: raid56_write_stripe: full_stripe=38928384 devid=3 type=DATA2 offset=0 opf=0x1 physical=9502720 len=16384
  56.1188: raid56_write_stripe: full_stripe=38928384 devid=3 type=DATA2 offset=32768 opf=0x1 physical=9535488 len=16384
  56.1188: raid56_write_stripe: full_stripe=38928384 devid=1 type=PQ1 offset=0 opf=0x1 physical=30474240 len=16384
  56.1189: raid56_write_stripe: full_stripe=38928384 devid=1 type=PQ1 offset=32768 opf=0x1 physical=30507008 len=16384
  56.1218: raid56_write_stripe: full_stripe=38928384 devid=3 type=DATA2 offset=49152 opf=0x1 physical=9551872 len=16384
  56.1219: raid56_write_stripe: full_stripe=38928384 devid=1 type=PQ1 offset=49152 opf=0x1 physical=30523392 len=16384
  56.2721: raid56_parity_recover: full stripe=38928384 eb=39010304 mirror=2
  56.2723: raid56_parity_recover: full stripe=38928384 eb=39010304 mirror=2
  56.2724: raid56_parity_recover: full stripe=38928384 eb=39010304 mirror=2

Before we enter raid56_parity_recover(), we have triggered some metadata
write for the full stripe 38928384, this leads to us to read all the
sectors from disk.

Furthermore, btrfs raid56 write will cache its calculated P/Q sectors to
avoid unnecessary read.

This means, for that full stripe, after any partial write, we will have
stale data, along with P/Q calculated using that stale data.

Thankfully due to patch "btrfs: only write the sectors in the vertical stripe
which has data stripes" we haven't submitted all the corrupted P/Q to disk.

When we really need to recover certain range, aka in
raid56_parity_recover(), we will use the cached rbio, along with its
cached sectors (the full stripe is all cached).

This explains why we have no event raid56_scrub_read_recover()
triggered.

Since we have the cached P/Q which is calculated using the stale data,
the recovered one will just be stale.

In our particular test case, it will always return the same incorrect
metadata, thus causing the same error message "parent transid verify
failed on 39010304 wanted 9 found 7" again and again.

[BTRFS DESTRUCTIVE RMW PROBLEM]

Test case btrfs/125 (and above workload) always has its trouble with
the destructive read-modify-write (RMW) cycle:

        0       32K     64K
Data1:  | Good  | Good  |
Data2:  | Bad   | Bad   |
Parity: | Good  | Good  |

In above case, if we trigger any write into Data1, we will use the bad
data in Data2 to re-generate parity, killing the only chance to recovery
Data2, thus Data2 is lost forever.

This destructive RMW cycle is not specific to btrfs RAID56, but there
are some btrfs specific behaviors making the case even worse:

- Btrfs will cache sectors for unrelated vertical stripes.

  In above example, if we're only writing into 0~32K range, btrfs will
  still read data range (32K ~ 64K) of Data1, and (64K~128K) of Data2.
  This behavior is to cache sectors for later update.

  Incidentally commit d4e28d9b5f04 ("btrfs: raid56: make steal_rbio()
  subpage compatible") has a bug which makes RAID56 to never trust the
  cached sectors, thus slightly improve the situation for recovery.

  Unfortunately, follow up fix "btrfs: update stripe_sectors::uptodate in
  steal_rbio" will revert the behavior back to the old one.

- Btrfs raid56 partial write will update all P/Q sectors and cache them

  This means, even if data at (64K ~ 96K) of Data2 is free space, and
  only (96K ~ 128K) of Data2 is really stale data.
  And we write into that (96K ~ 128K), we will update all the parity
  sectors for the full stripe.

  This unnecessary behavior will completely kill the chance of recovery.

  Thankfully, an unrelated optimization "btrfs: only write the sectors
  in the vertical stripe which has data stripes" will prevent
  submitting the write bio for untouched vertical sectors.

  That optimization will keep the on-disk P/Q untouched for a chance for
  later recovery.

[FIX]
Although we have no good way to completely fix the destructive RMW
(unless we go full scrub for each partial write), we can still limit the
damage.

With patch "btrfs: only write the sectors in the vertical stripe which
has data stripes" now we won't really submit the P/Q of unrelated
vertical stripes, so the on-disk P/Q should still be fine.

Now we really need to do is just drop all the cached sectors when doing
recovery.

By this, we have a chance to read the original P/Q from disk, and have a
chance to recover the stale data, while still keep the cache to speed up
regular write path.

In fact, just dropping all the cache for recovery path is good enough to
allow the test case btrfs/125 along with the small script to pass
reliably.

The lack of metadata write after the degraded mount, and forced metadata
COW is saving us this time.

So this patch will fix the behavior by not trust any cache in
__raid56_parity_recover(), to solve the problem while still keep the
cache useful.

But please note that this test pass DOES NOT mean we have solved the
destructive RMW problem, we just do better damage control a little
better.

Related patches:

- btrfs: only write the sectors in the vertical stripe
- d4e28d9b5f04 ("btrfs: raid56: make steal_rbio() subpage compatible")
- btrfs: update stripe_sectors::uptodate in steal_rbio

Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/raid56.c |   19 ++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
@@ -2085,9 +2085,12 @@ static int __raid56_parity_recover(struc
 	atomic_set(&rbio->error, 0);
 
 	/*
-	 * read everything that hasn't failed.  Thanks to the
-	 * stripe cache, it is possible that some or all of these
-	 * pages are going to be uptodate.
+	 * Read everything that hasn't failed. However this time we will
+	 * not trust any cached sector.
+	 * As we may read out some stale data but higher layer is not reading
+	 * that stale part.
+	 *
+	 * So here we always re-read everything in recovery path.
 	 */
 	for (stripe = 0; stripe < rbio->real_stripes; stripe++) {
 		if (rbio->faila == stripe || rbio->failb == stripe) {
@@ -2096,16 +2099,6 @@ static int __raid56_parity_recover(struc
 		}
 
 		for (pagenr = 0; pagenr < rbio->stripe_npages; pagenr++) {
-			struct page *p;
-
-			/*
-			 * the rmw code may have already read this
-			 * page in
-			 */
-			p = rbio_stripe_page(rbio, stripe, pagenr);
-			if (PageUptodate(p))
-				continue;
-
 			ret = rbio_add_io_page(rbio, &bio_list,
 				       rbio_stripe_page(rbio, stripe, pagenr),
 				       stripe, pagenr, rbio->stripe_len);

[PATCH 5.15 11/14] kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

commit 65d9a9a60fd71be964effb2e94747a6acb6e7015 upstream.

As requested
(http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ee0q7b92.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org),
this series converts weak functions in kexec to use the #ifdef approach.

Quoting the 3e35142ef99fe ("kexec_file: drop weak attribute from
arch_kexec_apply_relocations[_add]") changelog:

: Since commit d1bcae833b32f1 ("ELF: Don't generate unused section symbols")
: [1], binutils (v2.36+) started dropping section symbols that it thought
: were unused.  This isn't an issue in general, but with kexec_file.c, gcc
: is placing kexec_arch_apply_relocations[_add] into a separate
: .text.unlikely section and the section symbol ".text.unlikely" is being
: dropped.  Due to this, recordmcount is unable to find a non-weak symbol in
: .text.unlikely to generate a relocation record against.

This patch (of 2);

Drop __weak attribute from functions in kexec_file.c:
- arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe()
- arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup()
- arch_kexec_kernel_image_load()
- arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole()
- arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig()

arch_kexec_kernel_image_load() calls into kexec_image_load_default(), so
drop the static attribute for the latter.

arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() is not overridden by any architecture, so
drop the __weak attribute.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1656659357.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2cd7ca1fe4d6bb6ca38e3283c717878388ed6788.1656659357.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h   |    4 ++-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h |    9 +++++++
 arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h    |    3 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h     |    6 +++++
 include/linux/kexec.h            |   44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 kernel/kexec_file.c              |   35 +------------------------------
 6 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -103,7 +103,9 @@ extern const struct kexec_file_ops kexec
 
 struct kimage;
 
-extern int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
+int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
+#define arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup
+
 extern int load_other_segments(struct kimage *image,
 		unsigned long kernel_load_addr, unsigned long kernel_size,
 		char *initrd, unsigned long initrd_len,
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -119,6 +119,15 @@ int setup_purgatory(struct kimage *image
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
 struct kexec_buf;
 
+int arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len);
+#define arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe
+
+int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
+#define arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup
+
+int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
+#define arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole
+
 int load_crashdump_segments_ppc64(struct kimage *image,
 				  struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 int setup_purgatory_ppc64(struct kimage *image, const void *slave_code,
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -92,5 +92,8 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(str
 				     const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
 				     const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
 #define arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add
+
+int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
+#define arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup
 #endif
 #endif /*_S390_KEXEC_H */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -193,6 +193,12 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(str
 				     const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
 				     const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
 #define arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add
+
+void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image);
+#define arch_kexec_kernel_image_load arch_kexec_kernel_image_load
+
+int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
+#define arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup
 #endif
 #endif
 
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -182,21 +182,53 @@ int kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(struc
 				   void *buf, unsigned int size,
 				   bool get_value);
 void *kexec_purgatory_get_symbol_addr(struct kimage *image, const char *name);
+void *kexec_image_load_default(struct kimage *image);
+
+#ifndef arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe
+static inline int
+arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+	return kexec_image_probe_default(image, buf, buf_len);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup
+static inline int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef arch_kexec_kernel_image_load
+static inline void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	return kexec_image_load_default(image);
+}
+#endif
 
-/* Architectures may override the below functions */
-int arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-				  unsigned long buf_len);
-void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image);
-int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
 				 unsigned long buf_len);
 #endif
-int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
+#ifndef arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole
+/**
+ * arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole - Find free memory to place the segments.
+ * @kbuf:                       Parameters for the memory search.
+ *
+ * On success, kbuf->mem will have the start address of the memory region found.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
+ */
+static inline int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
+{
+	return kexec_locate_mem_hole(kbuf);
+}
+#endif
+
 /* Alignment required for elf header segment */
 #define ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN   4096
 
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -62,14 +62,7 @@ int kexec_image_probe_default(struct kim
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/* Architectures can provide this probe function */
-int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					 unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	return kexec_image_probe_default(image, buf, buf_len);
-}
-
-static void *kexec_image_load_default(struct kimage *image)
+void *kexec_image_load_default(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->load)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
@@ -80,11 +73,6 @@ static void *kexec_image_load_default(st
 				 image->cmdline_buf_len);
 }
 
-void * __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
-{
-	return kexec_image_load_default(image);
-}
-
 int kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->cleanup)
@@ -93,11 +81,6 @@ int kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_defaul
 	return image->fops->cleanup(image->image_loader_data);
 }
 
-int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
-{
-	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
-}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
 					  unsigned long buf_len)
@@ -110,8 +93,7 @@ static int kexec_image_verify_sig_defaul
 	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
 }
 
-int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					unsigned long buf_len)
+int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len)
 {
 	return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
 }
@@ -617,19 +599,6 @@ int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_b
 }
 
 /**
- * arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole - Find free memory to place the segments.
- * @kbuf:                       Parameters for the memory search.
- *
- * On success, kbuf->mem will have the start address of the memory region found.
- *
- * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error.
- */
-int __weak arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
-{
-	return kexec_locate_mem_hole(kbuf);
-}
-
-/**
  * kexec_add_buffer - place a buffer in a kexec segment
  * @kbuf:	Buffer contents and memory parameters.
  *

[PATCH 5.15 12/14] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>

commit 689a71493bd2f31c024f8c0395f85a1fd4b2138e upstream.

Before commit 105e10e2cf1c ("kexec_file: drop weak attribute from
functions"), there was already no arch-specific implementation
of arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig. With weak attribute dropped by that
commit, arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig is completely useless. So clean it
up.

Note later patches are dependent on this patch so it should be backported
to the stable tree as well.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: reworded patch description "Note"]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20220714134027.394370-1-coxu@redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/kexec.h |    5 -----
 kernel/kexec_file.c   |   33 +++++++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -206,11 +206,6 @@ static inline void *arch_kexec_kernel_im
 }
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-				 unsigned long buf_len);
-#endif
-
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -81,24 +81,6 @@ int kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_defaul
 	return image->fops->cleanup(image->image_loader_data);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
-					  unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
-		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	}
-
-	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
-}
-
-int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len)
-{
-	return kexec_image_verify_sig_default(image, buf, buf_len);
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * Free up memory used by kernel, initrd, and command line. This is temporary
  * memory allocation which is not needed any more after these buffers have
@@ -141,13 +123,24 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struc
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
+				  unsigned long buf_len)
+{
+	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->verify_sig) {
+		pr_debug("kernel loader does not support signature verification.\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	return image->fops->verify_sig(buf, buf_len);
+}
+
 static int
 kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
-					   image->kernel_buf_len);
+	ret = kexec_image_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
+				     image->kernel_buf_len);
 	if (ret) {
 
 		if (sig_enforce) {

[PATCH 5.15 13/14] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>

commit c903dae8941deb55043ee46ded29e84e97cd84bb upstream.

commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for
signature verify") adds platform keyring support on x86 kexec but not
arm64.

The code in bzImage64_verify_sig uses the keys on the
.builtin_trusted_keys, .machine, if configured and enabled,
.secondary_trusted_keys, also if configured, and .platform keyrings
to verify the signed kernel image as PE file.

Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c |   20 +-------------------
 include/linux/kexec.h             |    7 +++++++
 kernel/kexec_file.c               |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -528,28 +527,11 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loade
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
-		ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-	}
-	return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops = {
 	.probe = bzImage64_probe,
 	.load = bzImage64_load,
 	.cleanup = bzImage64_cleanup,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-	.verify_sig = bzImage64_verify_sig,
+	.verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
 #endif
 };
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
 #include <uapi/linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
 #include <linux/list.h>
@@ -206,6 +207,12 @@ static inline void *arch_kexec_kernel_im
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len);
+#endif
+#endif
+
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struc
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+				      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
+		ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
 				  unsigned long buf_len)
 {

[PATCH 5.15 14/14] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>

commit 0d519cadf75184a24313568e7f489a7fc9b1be3b upstream.

Currently, when loading a kernel image via the kexec_file_load() system
call, arm64 can only use the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring to verify
a signature whereas x86 can use three more keyrings i.e.
.secondary_trusted_keys, .machine and .platform keyrings. For example,
one resulting problem is kexec'ing a kernel image  would be rejected
with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted;
see man kernel_lockdown.7".

This patch set enables arm64 to make use of the same keyrings as x86 to
verify the signature kexec'ed kernel image.

Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 105e10e2cf1c: kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 34d5960af253: kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 83b7bb2d49ae: kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c |   11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/pe.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/image.h>
@@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *i
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
-	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
-				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-}
-#endif
-
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
 	.probe = image_probe,
 	.load = image_load,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-	.verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
+	.verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
 #endif
 };

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[Shuah Khan]

On 8/19/22 9:40 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.62 release.
> There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:36:59 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.62-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Fri, 19 Aug 2022 at 21:11, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.62 release.
> There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:36:59 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.62-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Results from Linaro's test farm.
Following regression found on s390.

> Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>     kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions

The s390 defconfig build failed on stable-rc 5.15 with gcc-11 and clang.


arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c:336:5: error: redefinition of
'arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe'
int arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
    ^
include/linux/kexec.h:190:1: note: previous definition is here
arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
^
1 error generated.


## Build
* kernel: 5.15.62-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-5.15.y
* git commit: b79f9f8ea7ab2be6f724e8cde6db2a3fb057f62e
* git describe: v5.15.61-15-gb79f9f8ea7ab
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.15.y/build/v5.15.61-15-gb79f9f8ea7ab

## Test Regressions (compared to v5.15.61)

* s390, build
  - clang-13-defconfig
  - clang-14-defconfig
  - clang-nightly-defconfig
  - gcc-10-defconfig
  - gcc-11-defconfig
  - gcc-9-defconfig

## No metric Regressions (compared to v5.15.61)

## No test Fixes (compared to v5.15.61)

## No metric Fixes (compared to v5.15.61)

## Test result summary
total: 140859, pass: 124026, fail: 701, skip: 15336, xfail: 796

## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 314 total, 311 passed, 3 failed
* arm64: 77 total, 75 passed, 2 failed
* i386: 65 total, 59 passed, 6 failed
* mips: 50 total, 47 passed, 3 failed
* parisc: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 59 total, 56 passed, 3 failed
* riscv: 27 total, 27 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 26 total, 14 passed, 12 failed
* sh: 26 total, 24 passed, 2 failed
* sparc: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 70 total, 68 passed, 2 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[Bagas Sanjaya]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 538 bytes --]

On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 05:40:16PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.62 release.
> There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 

Successfully cross-compiled for arm64 (bcm2711_defconfig, GCC 10.2.0) and
powerpc (ps3_defconfig, GCC 12.1.0).

Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>

-- 
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 228 bytes --]

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)]

Hi Greg,

On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 05:40:16PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.62 release.
> There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:36:59 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build test (gcc version 11.3.1 20220819):
mips: 62 configs -> no failure
arm: 99 configs -> no failure
arm64: 3 configs -> no failure
x86_64: 4 configs -> no failure
alpha allmodconfig -> no failure
csky allmodconfig -> no failure
powerpc allmodconfig -> no failure
riscv allmodconfig -> no failure
s390 allmodconfig -> fails
xtensa allmodconfig -> no failure

Note:

s390 allmodconfig fails with:

arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c:336:5: error: redefinition of 'arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe'
  336 | int arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
      |     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c:12:
./include/linux/kexec.h:190:1: note: previous definition of 'arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe' with type 'int(struct kimage *, void *, long unsigned int)'
  190 | arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len)
      | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Caused by: 4dc6d49023a0 ("kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions")


Boot test:
x86_64: Booted on my test laptop. No regression.
x86_64: Booted on qemu. No regression. [1]
mips: Booted on ci20 board. No regression. [2]

[1]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1659
[2]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1666

Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk>

--
Regards
Sudip

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Sat, Aug 20, 2022 at 01:57:05PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On Fri, 19 Aug 2022 at 21:11, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.62 release.
> > There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:36:59 +0000.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> >         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.62-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> >         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> 
> Results from Linaro's test farm.
> Following regression found on s390.
> 
> > Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >     kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions
> 
> The s390 defconfig build failed on stable-rc 5.15 with gcc-11 and clang.
> 
> 
> arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c:336:5: error: redefinition of
> 'arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe'
> int arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
>     ^
> include/linux/kexec.h:190:1: note: previous definition is here
> arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
> unsigned long buf_len)
> ^
> 1 error generated.
> 

argh, these kexec patches are such a pain.  I'll go drop them from 5.15
now and push out a -rc2 that hopefully will fix this.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[Ron Economos]

On 8/19/22 8:40 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.62 release.
> There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:36:59 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.62-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).

Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>

Re: [PATCH 5.15 00/14] 5.15.62-rc1 review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 05:40:16PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.62 release.
> There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:36:59 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 159 pass: 157 fail: 2
Failed builds:
	s390:defconfig
	s390:allmodconfig
Qemu test results:
	total: 470 pass: 465 fail: 5
Failed tests:
	s390:defconfig:nolocktests:smp2:net,default:initrd
	s390:defconfig:nolocktests:smp2:virtio-blk-ccw:net,virtio-net-pci:rootfs
	s390:defconfig:nolocktests:smp2:scsi[virtio-ccw]:net,default:rootfs
	s390:defconfig:nolocktests:virtio-pci:net,virtio-net-pci:rootfs
	s390:defconfig:nolocktests:scsi[virtio-pci]:net,default:rootfs

This has been reported already, so I won't go into details.

Note that I did not get this e-mail, even though I am listed in Cc:.
I had to copy it from lore.kernel.org/stable.

Guenter