[PATCH 1/2] mm: fix null-ptr-deref in kswapd_is_running()

[PATCH 1/2] mm: fix null-ptr-deref in kswapd_is_running()

[Kefeng Wang]

The kswapd_run/stop() will set pgdat->kswapd to NULL, which
could race with kswapd_is_running() in kcompactd(),

kswapd_run/stop()	kcompactd()
			  kswapd_is_running()
				if (pgdat->kswapd) // load non-NULL pgdat->kswapd
  pgdat->kswapd = NULL
				task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd) // Null pointer derefence

The KASAN report the null-ptr-deref shown below,

  vmscan: Failed to start kswapd on node 0
  ...
  BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in kcompactd+0x440/0x504
  Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000024 by task kcompactd0/37

  CPU: 0 PID: 37 Comm: kcompactd0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE     5.10.60 #1
  Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x394
   show_stack+0x34/0x4c
   dump_stack+0x158/0x1e4
   __kasan_report+0x138/0x140
   kasan_report+0x44/0xdc
   __asan_load8+0x94/0xd0
   kcompactd+0x440/0x504
   kthread+0x1a4/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

For race between kswapd_run() and kcompactd(), adding a temporary value
when create a kthread, and only set it to pgdat->kswapd if kthread_run()
return successful task_struct to fix the issue.

For race between kswapd_stop() and kcompactd(), let's call kcompactd_stop()
before kswapd_stop() to fix the issue.

Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
---
 mm/memory_hotplug.c | 2 +-
 mm/vmscan.c         | 8 +++++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/memory_hotplug.c b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
index fad6d1f2262a..2fd45ccbce45 100644
--- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
+++ b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
@@ -1940,8 +1940,8 @@ int __ref offline_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
 
 	node_states_clear_node(node, &arg);
 	if (arg.status_change_nid >= 0) {
-		kswapd_stop(node);
 		kcompactd_stop(node);
+		kswapd_stop(node);
 	}
 
 	writeback_set_ratelimit();
diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c
index b2b1431352dc..08c6497f76c3 100644
--- a/mm/vmscan.c
+++ b/mm/vmscan.c
@@ -4642,16 +4642,18 @@ unsigned long shrink_all_memory(unsigned long nr_to_reclaim)
 void kswapd_run(int nid)
 {
 	pg_data_t *pgdat = NODE_DATA(nid);
+	struct task_struct *t;
 
 	if (pgdat->kswapd)
 		return;
 
-	pgdat->kswapd = kthread_run(kswapd, pgdat, "kswapd%d", nid);
-	if (IS_ERR(pgdat->kswapd)) {
+	t = kthread_run(kswapd, pgdat, "kswapd%d", nid);
+	if (IS_ERR(t)) {
 		/* failure at boot is fatal */
 		BUG_ON(system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING);
 		pr_err("Failed to start kswapd on node %d\n", nid);
-		pgdat->kswapd = NULL;
+	} else {
+		pgdat->kswapd = t;
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.35.3

[PATCH 2/2] mm: slince possible data races about pgdat->kswapd

[Kefeng Wang]

The pgdat->kswapd could be accessed concurrently by kswapd_run() and
kcompactd(), it don't be protected by any lock, which could leads to
data races, adding READ/WRITE_ONCE() to slince it.

Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
---
 mm/compaction.c | 4 +++-
 mm/vmscan.c     | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c
index 640fa76228dd..aa1cfe47f046 100644
--- a/mm/compaction.c
+++ b/mm/compaction.c
@@ -1983,7 +1983,9 @@ static inline bool is_via_compact_memory(int order)
 
 static bool kswapd_is_running(pg_data_t *pgdat)
 {
-	return pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
+	struct task_struct *t = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd);
+
+	return t && task_is_running(t);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c
index 08c6497f76c3..65b19ca8c8ee 100644
--- a/mm/vmscan.c
+++ b/mm/vmscan.c
@@ -4644,7 +4644,7 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
 	pg_data_t *pgdat = NODE_DATA(nid);
 	struct task_struct *t;
 
-	if (pgdat->kswapd)
+	if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd))
 		return;
 
 	t = kthread_run(kswapd, pgdat, "kswapd%d", nid);
@@ -4653,7 +4653,7 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
 		BUG_ON(system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING);
 		pr_err("Failed to start kswapd on node %d\n", nid);
 	} else {
-		pgdat->kswapd = t;
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd, t);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -4663,11 +4663,11 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
  */
 void kswapd_stop(int nid)
 {
-	struct task_struct *kswapd = NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd;
+	struct task_struct *kswapd = READ_ONCE(NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd);
 
 	if (kswapd) {
 		kthread_stop(kswapd);
-		NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd = NULL;
+		WRITE_ONCE(NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd, NULL);
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.35.3

Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm: fix null-ptr-deref in kswapd_is_running()

[David Hildenbrand]

On 24.08.22 09:19, Kefeng Wang wrote:
> The kswapd_run/stop() will set pgdat->kswapd to NULL, which
> could race with kswapd_is_running() in kcompactd(),
> 
> kswapd_run/stop()	kcompactd()
> 			  kswapd_is_running()
> 				if (pgdat->kswapd) // load non-NULL pgdat->kswapd
>   pgdat->kswapd = NULL
> 				task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd) // Null pointer derefence
> 
> The KASAN report the null-ptr-deref shown below,
> 
>   vmscan: Failed to start kswapd on node 0
>   ...
>   BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in kcompactd+0x440/0x504
>   Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000024 by task kcompactd0/37
> 
>   CPU: 0 PID: 37 Comm: kcompactd0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE     5.10.60 #1
>   Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
>   Call trace:
>    dump_backtrace+0x0/0x394
>    show_stack+0x34/0x4c
>    dump_stack+0x158/0x1e4
>    __kasan_report+0x138/0x140
>    kasan_report+0x44/0xdc
>    __asan_load8+0x94/0xd0
>    kcompactd+0x440/0x504
>    kthread+0x1a4/0x1f0
>    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
> 
> For race between kswapd_run() and kcompactd(), adding a temporary value
> when create a kthread, and only set it to pgdat->kswapd if kthread_run()
> return successful task_struct to fix the issue.
> 
> For race between kswapd_stop() and kcompactd(), let's call kcompactd_stop()
> before kswapd_stop() to fix the issue.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
> ---
>  mm/memory_hotplug.c | 2 +-
>  mm/vmscan.c         | 8 +++++---
>  2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/memory_hotplug.c b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
> index fad6d1f2262a..2fd45ccbce45 100644
> --- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
> +++ b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
> @@ -1940,8 +1940,8 @@ int __ref offline_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
>  
>  	node_states_clear_node(node, &arg);
>  	if (arg.status_change_nid >= 0) {
> -		kswapd_stop(node);
>  		kcompactd_stop(node);
> +		kswapd_stop(node);
>  	}

This looks just fragile to randomly break again in the future when
people work on this code without being aware of this condition. Or once
with other (future?) kswapd_is_running() users. We at least need some
comment explaining that the order here matters and why.

But I do wonder if we can't handle it in a cleaner, more obvious, way.

kswapd_start()/kswapd_stop() should have a proper way to synchronize
with kswapd_is_running(). Just the matter of finding a suitable locking
primitive :)

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

Re: [PATCH 2/2] mm: slince possible data races about pgdat->kswapd

[David Hildenbrand]

On 24.08.22 09:19, Kefeng Wang wrote:
> The pgdat->kswapd could be accessed concurrently by kswapd_run() and
> kcompactd(), it don't be protected by any lock, which could leads to
> data races, adding READ/WRITE_ONCE() to slince it.

Okay, I think this patch here makes it clearer that we really just want
proper synchronization instead of hacking around it.

What speaks against protecting pgdat->kswapd this using some proper
locking primitive?

> 
> Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
> ---
>  mm/compaction.c | 4 +++-
>  mm/vmscan.c     | 8 ++++----
>  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c
> index 640fa76228dd..aa1cfe47f046 100644
> --- a/mm/compaction.c
> +++ b/mm/compaction.c
> @@ -1983,7 +1983,9 @@ static inline bool is_via_compact_memory(int order)
>  
>  static bool kswapd_is_running(pg_data_t *pgdat)
>  {
> -	return pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
> +	struct task_struct *t = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd);
> +
> +	return t && task_is_running(t);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c
> index 08c6497f76c3..65b19ca8c8ee 100644
> --- a/mm/vmscan.c
> +++ b/mm/vmscan.c
> @@ -4644,7 +4644,7 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
>  	pg_data_t *pgdat = NODE_DATA(nid);
>  	struct task_struct *t;
>  
> -	if (pgdat->kswapd)
> +	if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd))
>  		return;
>  
>  	t = kthread_run(kswapd, pgdat, "kswapd%d", nid);
> @@ -4653,7 +4653,7 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
>  		BUG_ON(system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING);
>  		pr_err("Failed to start kswapd on node %d\n", nid);
>  	} else {
> -		pgdat->kswapd = t;
> +		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd, t);
>  	}
>  }
>  
> @@ -4663,11 +4663,11 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
>   */
>  void kswapd_stop(int nid)
>  {
> -	struct task_struct *kswapd = NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd;
> +	struct task_struct *kswapd = READ_ONCE(NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd);
>  
>  	if (kswapd) {
>  		kthread_stop(kswapd);
> -		NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd = NULL;
> +		WRITE_ONCE(NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd, NULL);
>  	}
>  }
>  


-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

Re: [PATCH 2/2] mm: slince possible data races about pgdat->kswapd

[Kefeng Wang]

On 2022/8/24 16:24, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 24.08.22 09:19, Kefeng Wang wrote:
>> The pgdat->kswapd could be accessed concurrently by kswapd_run() and
>> kcompactd(), it don't be protected by any lock, which could leads to
>> data races, adding READ/WRITE_ONCE() to slince it.
> Okay, I think this patch here makes it clearer that we really just want
> proper synchronization instead of hacking around it.
>
> What speaks against protecting pgdat->kswapd this using some proper
> locking primitive?

So add a new lock into struct pglist_data to protect pgdat->kswapd，other

option, thanks.

>> Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>   mm/compaction.c | 4 +++-
>>   mm/vmscan.c     | 8 ++++----
>>   2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c
>> index 640fa76228dd..aa1cfe47f046 100644
>> --- a/mm/compaction.c
>> +++ b/mm/compaction.c
>> @@ -1983,7 +1983,9 @@ static inline bool is_via_compact_memory(int order)
>>   
>>   static bool kswapd_is_running(pg_data_t *pgdat)
>>   {
>> -	return pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
>> +	struct task_struct *t = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd);
>> +
>> +	return t && task_is_running(t);
>>   }
>>   
>>   /*
>> diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c
>> index 08c6497f76c3..65b19ca8c8ee 100644
>> --- a/mm/vmscan.c
>> +++ b/mm/vmscan.c
>> @@ -4644,7 +4644,7 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
>>   	pg_data_t *pgdat = NODE_DATA(nid);
>>   	struct task_struct *t;
>>   
>> -	if (pgdat->kswapd)
>> +	if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd))
>>   		return;
>>   
>>   	t = kthread_run(kswapd, pgdat, "kswapd%d", nid);
>> @@ -4653,7 +4653,7 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
>>   		BUG_ON(system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING);
>>   		pr_err("Failed to start kswapd on node %d\n", nid);
>>   	} else {
>> -		pgdat->kswapd = t;
>> +		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd, t);
>>   	}
>>   }
>>   
>> @@ -4663,11 +4663,11 @@ void kswapd_run(int nid)
>>    */
>>   void kswapd_stop(int nid)
>>   {
>> -	struct task_struct *kswapd = NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd;
>> +	struct task_struct *kswapd = READ_ONCE(NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd);
>>   
>>   	if (kswapd) {
>>   		kthread_stop(kswapd);
>> -		NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd = NULL;
>> +		WRITE_ONCE(NODE_DATA(nid)->kswapd, NULL);
>>   	}
>>   }
>>   
>

Re: [PATCH 2/2] mm: slince possible data races about pgdat->kswapd

[Kefeng Wang]

On 2022/8/24 16:24, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 24.08.22 09:19, Kefeng Wang wrote:
>> The pgdat->kswapd could be accessed concurrently by kswapd_run() and
>> kcompactd(), it don't be protected by any lock, which could leads to
>> data races, adding READ/WRITE_ONCE() to slince it.
> Okay, I think this patch here makes it clearer that we really just want
> proper synchronization instead of hacking around it.
>
> What speaks against protecting pgdat->kswapd this using some proper
> locking primitive?

as comments about kswapd in struct pglist_data,  pgdat->kswapd should be

protected by mem_hotplug_begin/done(), how about this way?

diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c
index 640fa76228dd..62018f35242a 100644
--- a/mm/compaction.c
+++ b/mm/compaction.c
@@ -1983,7 +1983,13 @@ static inline bool is_via_compact_memory(int order)

  static bool kswapd_is_running(pg_data_t *pgdat)
  {
-       return pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
+       bool running;
+
+       mem_hotplug_begin();
+       running = pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
+       mem_hotplug_end();
+
+       return running;
  }

Re: [PATCH 2/2] mm: slince possible data races about pgdat->kswapd

[David Hildenbrand]

On 25.08.22 04:34, Kefeng Wang wrote:
> 
> On 2022/8/24 16:24, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 24.08.22 09:19, Kefeng Wang wrote:
>>> The pgdat->kswapd could be accessed concurrently by kswapd_run() and
>>> kcompactd(), it don't be protected by any lock, which could leads to
>>> data races, adding READ/WRITE_ONCE() to slince it.
>> Okay, I think this patch here makes it clearer that we really just want
>> proper synchronization instead of hacking around it.
>>
>> What speaks against protecting pgdat->kswapd this using some proper
>> locking primitive?
> 
> as comments about kswapd in struct pglist_data,  pgdat->kswapd should be
> 
> protected by mem_hotplug_begin/done(), how about this way?
> 
> diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c
> index 640fa76228dd..62018f35242a 100644
> --- a/mm/compaction.c
> +++ b/mm/compaction.c
> @@ -1983,7 +1983,13 @@ static inline bool is_via_compact_memory(int order)
> 
>   static bool kswapd_is_running(pg_data_t *pgdat)
>   {
> -       return pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
> +       bool running;
> +
> +       mem_hotplug_begin();
> +       running = pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
> +       mem_hotplug_end();
> +
> +       return running;
>   }

I'd much rather just use a dedicated lock that does not involve memory
hotplug.


-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

Re: [PATCH 2/2] mm: slince possible data races about pgdat->kswapd

[Kefeng Wang]

On 2022/8/25 16:22, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 25.08.22 04:34, Kefeng Wang wrote:
>> On 2022/8/24 16:24, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>> On 24.08.22 09:19, Kefeng Wang wrote:
>>>> The pgdat->kswapd could be accessed concurrently by kswapd_run() and
>>>> kcompactd(), it don't be protected by any lock, which could leads to
>>>> data races, adding READ/WRITE_ONCE() to slince it.
>>> Okay, I think this patch here makes it clearer that we really just want
>>> proper synchronization instead of hacking around it.
>>>
>>> What speaks against protecting pgdat->kswapd this using some proper
>>> locking primitive?
>> as comments about kswapd in struct pglist_data,  pgdat->kswapd should be
>>
>> protected by mem_hotplug_begin/done(), how about this way?
>>
>> diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c
>> index 640fa76228dd..62018f35242a 100644
>> --- a/mm/compaction.c
>> +++ b/mm/compaction.c
>> @@ -1983,7 +1983,13 @@ static inline bool is_via_compact_memory(int order)
>>
>>    static bool kswapd_is_running(pg_data_t *pgdat)
>>    {
>> -       return pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
>> +       bool running;
>> +
>> +       mem_hotplug_begin();
>> +       running = pgdat->kswapd && task_is_running(pgdat->kswapd);
>> +       mem_hotplug_end();
>> +
>> +       return running;
>>    }
> I'd much rather just use a dedicated lock that does not involve memory
> hotplug.

The issue only occurred due memory hotplug, without mem-hotplug,

the kswapd won't stop or re-run, there is no above issue too, add a new

lock would be duplicated, but the scope of protection is smaller, I could

repost with new lock if no more comment.

>
>