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From: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
To: pmladek@suse.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, senozhatsky@chromium.org,
	andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jane.chu@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 13:16:11 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221017191611.2577466-1-jane.chu@oracle.com> (raw)

While debugging a separate issue, it was found that an invalid string
pointer could very well contain a non-canical address, such as
0x7665645f63616465. In that case, this line of defense isn't enough
to protect the kernel from crashing due to general protection fault

	if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
                return "(efault)";

So instead, use kern_addr_valid() to validate the string pointer.

Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
---
 lib/vsprintf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index c414a8d9f1ea..2e8a9efc7c12 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ static const char *check_pointer_msg(const void *ptr)
 	if (!ptr)
 		return "(null)";
 
-	if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
+	if (!kern_addr_valid((unsigned long)ptr))
 		return "(efault)";
 
 	return NULL;
-- 
2.18.4


             reply	other threads:[~2022-10-17 19:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-17 19:16 Jane Chu [this message]
2022-10-17 19:25 ` [PATCH] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-17 19:31   ` Jane Chu
2022-10-18 12:45     ` Petr Mladek
2022-10-18 18:56       ` Jane Chu
2022-10-18 19:28         ` Randy Dunlap
2022-10-18 19:58           ` Jane Chu
2022-10-18 20:07         ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-18 20:30           ` Jane Chu
2022-10-18 20:49             ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-19 10:43               ` Haakon Bugge
2022-10-19 11:25                 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-19 18:36               ` Jane Chu
2022-10-19 19:26                 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-19 20:16                   ` Jane Chu
2022-10-20  7:44               ` Petr Mladek
2022-10-20  9:18                 ` Petr Mladek
2022-10-20 13:57                 ` Andy Shevchenko

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