From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org
Cc: sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
seanjc@google.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
elena.reshetova@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] x86/tdx: Enforce no #VE on private memory accesses
Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 17:12:18 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221028141220.29217-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
As described in 9a22bf6debbf ("x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX
guest"), kernel relies on "no #VE on access to private memory" to keep
guest secure from attacks against syscall gap or NMI entry code.
SEPT_VE_DISABLE TD attribute controls TDX module behaviour on EPT
violation.
The attribute must be set to avoid #VE. Refuse to boot the guest if it
is not.
Kirill A. Shutemov (1):
x86/tdx: Do not allow #VE due to EPT violation on the private memory
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan (1):
x86/tdx: Extract GET_INFO call from get_cc_mask()
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--
2.38.0
next reply other threads:[~2022-10-28 14:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-28 14:12 Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2022-10-28 14:12 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/tdx: Extract GET_INFO call from get_cc_mask() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 15:43 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-28 23:27 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-28 23:59 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-31 4:12 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-31 16:42 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-31 19:19 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-31 19:27 ` Andi Kleen
2022-10-31 19:44 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-31 22:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 14:12 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Do not allow #VE due to EPT violation on the private memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 15:41 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-31 4:07 ` Guorui Yu
2022-10-31 4:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-31 14:22 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-04 22:36 ` Erdem Aktas
2022-11-04 22:50 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 22:53 ` Erdem Aktas
2022-11-07 23:30 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 5:10 ` Guorui Yu
2022-11-07 13:31 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 13:43 ` Guorui Yu
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