From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Guorui Yu <GuoRui.Yu@linux.alibaba.com>, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
david@redhat.com, elena.reshetova@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
seanjc@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Do not allow #VE due to EPT violation on the private memory
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 07:22:36 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4bfcd256-b926-9b1c-601c-efcff0d16605@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b5d04a6c-79b4-bbdc-b613-6958d9f75d53@linux.alibaba.com>
On 10/30/22 21:07, Guorui Yu wrote:
> We have encountered similar problems on SEV-ES, here are their fixes
> on Kernel [1] and OVMF[2].
SEV-ES and TDX are very different beasts in this area.
> Instead of enforcing the ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE in TDX guest kernel, I
> think the fix should also include necessary check on the MMIO path of
> the #VE routine.
Instead?
Without ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE, a #VE can occur on basically any
instruction. We call those kinds of exceptions "paranoid entry" points.
They need special handling like the NMI or #MC handlers.
I'd be happy to look at a patch that does the MMIO path check *and*
turns the #VE handler into a robust entry point.
Bonus points if you can do ~5 lines of C like the approach in this thread.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-31 14:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-28 14:12 [PATCH 0/2] x86/tdx: Enforce no #VE on private memory accesses Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 14:12 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/tdx: Extract GET_INFO call from get_cc_mask() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 15:43 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-28 23:27 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-28 23:59 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-31 4:12 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-31 16:42 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-31 19:19 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-31 19:27 ` Andi Kleen
2022-10-31 19:44 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-31 22:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 14:12 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Do not allow #VE due to EPT violation on the private memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 15:41 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-31 4:07 ` Guorui Yu
2022-10-31 4:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-31 14:22 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2022-11-04 22:36 ` Erdem Aktas
2022-11-04 22:50 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 22:53 ` Erdem Aktas
2022-11-07 23:30 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 5:10 ` Guorui Yu
2022-11-07 13:31 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 13:43 ` Guorui Yu
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