From: Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>,
<thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
<wanpengli@tencent.com>, <jmattson@google.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <slp@redhat.com>,
<pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
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<vbabka@suse.cz>, <kirill@shutemov.name>, <ak@linux.intel.com>,
<tony.luck@intel.com>, <marcorr@google.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@google.com>, <dgilbert@redhat.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>,
<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <harald@profian.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@profian.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 20/64] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 12:42:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230117124203.00001961@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221214194056.161492-21-michael.roth@amd.com>
On Wed, 14 Dec 2022 13:40:12 -0600
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>
> When SEV-SNP is enabled globally, a write from the host goes through the
> RMP check. When the host writes to pages, hardware checks the following
> conditions at the end of page walk:
>
> 1. Assigned bit in the RMP table is zero (i.e page is shared).
> 2. If the page table entry that gives the sPA indicates that the target
> page size is a large page, then all RMP entries for the 4KB
> constituting pages of the target must have the assigned bit 0.
> 3. Immutable bit in the RMP table is not zero.
>
Just being curious. AMD APM table 15-37 "RMP Page Assignment Settings" shows
Immuable bit is "don't care" when a page is owned by the hypervisor. The
table 15-39 "RMP Memory Access Checks" shows the hardware will do
"Hypervisor-owned" check for host data write and page table access. I suppose
"Hypervisor-owned" check means HW will check if the RMP entry is configured
according to the table 15-37 (Assign bit = 0, ASID = 0, Immutable = X)
None of them mentions that Immutable bit in the related RMP-entry should
be 1 for hypervisor-owned page.
I can understand 1) 2). Can you explain more about 3)?
> The hardware will raise page fault if one of the above conditions is not
> met. Try resolving the fault instead of taking fault again and again. If
> the host attempts to write to the guest private memory then send the
> SIGBUS signal to kill the process. If the page level between the host and
> RMP entry does not match, then split the address to keep the RMP and host
> page levels in sync.
>
> Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@profian.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@profian.com>
> Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/mm.h | 3 +-
> include/linux/mm_types.h | 3 ++
> mm/memory.c | 10 +++++
> 4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> index f8193b99e9c8..d611051dcf1e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
> #include <asm/kvm_para.h> /* kvm_handle_async_pf */
> #include <asm/vdso.h> /* fixup_vdso_exception() */
> #include <asm/irq_stack.h>
> +#include <asm/sev.h> /* snp_lookup_rmpentry() */
>
> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
> @@ -414,6 +415,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
> pr_cont("PTE %lx", pte_val(*pte));
> out:
> pr_cont("\n");
> +
> return;
> bad:
> pr_info("BAD\n");
> @@ -1240,6 +1242,90 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
> }
> NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_kern_addr_fault);
>
> +enum rmp_pf_ret {
> + RMP_PF_SPLIT = 0,
> + RMP_PF_RETRY = 1,
> + RMP_PF_UNMAP = 2,
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * The goal of RMP faulting routine is really to check whether the
> + * page that faulted should be accessible. That can be determined
> + * simply by looking at the RMP entry for the 4k address being accessed.
> + * If that entry has Assigned=1 then it's a bad address. It could be
> + * because the 2MB region was assigned as a large page, or it could be
> + * because the region is all 4k pages and that 4k was assigned.
> + * In either case, it's a bad access.
> + * There are basically two main possibilities:
> + * 1. The 2M entry has Assigned=1 and Page_Size=1. Then all 511 middle
> + * entries also have Assigned=1. This entire 2M region is a guest page.
> + * 2. The 2M entry has Assigned=0 and Page_Size=0. Then the 511 middle
> + * entries can be anything, this region consists of individual 4k assignments.
> + */
> +static int handle_user_rmp_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
> + unsigned long address)
> +{
> + int rmp_level, level;
> + pgd_t *pgd;
> + pte_t *pte;
> + u64 pfn;
> +
> + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> + pgd += pgd_index(address);
> +
> + pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, address, &level);
> +
> + /*
> + * It can happen if there was a race between an unmap event and
> + * the RMP fault delivery.
> + */
> + if (!pte || !pte_present(*pte))
> + return RMP_PF_UNMAP;
> +
> + /*
> + * RMP page fault handler follows this algorithm:
> + * 1. Compute the pfn for the 4kb page being accessed
> + * 2. Read that RMP entry -- If it is assigned then kill the process
> + * 3. Otherwise, check the level from the host page table
> + * If level=PG_LEVEL_4K then the page is already smashed
> + * so just retry the instruction
> + * 4. If level=PG_LEVEL_2M/1G, then the host page needs to be split
> + */
> +
> + pfn = pte_pfn(*pte);
> +
> + /* If its large page then calculte the fault pfn */
> + if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
> + pfn = pfn | PFN_DOWN(address & (page_level_size(level) - 1));
> +
> + /*
> + * If its a guest private page, then the fault cannot be resolved.
> + * Send a SIGBUS to terminate the process.
> + *
> + * As documented in APM vol3 pseudo-code for RMPUPDATE, when the 2M range
> + * is covered by a valid (Assigned=1) 2M entry, the middle 511 4k entries
> + * also have Assigned=1. This means that if there is an access to a page
> + * which happens to lie within an Assigned 2M entry, the 4k RMP entry
> + * will also have Assigned=1. Therefore, the kernel should see that
> + * the page is not a valid page and the fault cannot be resolved.
> + */
> + if (snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &rmp_level)) {
> + pr_info("Fatal RMP page fault, terminating process, entry assigned for pfn 0x%llx\n",
> + pfn);
> + do_sigbus(regs, error_code, address, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS);
> + return RMP_PF_RETRY;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * The backing page level is higher than the RMP page level, request
> + * to split the page.
> + */
> + if (level > rmp_level)
> + return RMP_PF_SPLIT;
> +
> + return RMP_PF_RETRY;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Handle faults in the user portion of the address space. Nothing in here
> * should check X86_PF_USER without a specific justification: for almost
> @@ -1337,6 +1423,17 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
> if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
> flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
>
> + /*
> + * If its an RMP violation, try resolving it.
> + */
> + if (error_code & X86_PF_RMP) {
> + if (handle_user_rmp_page_fault(regs, error_code, address))
> + return;
> +
> + /* Ask to split the page */
> + flags |= FAULT_FLAG_PAGE_SPLIT;
> + }
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> /*
> * Faults in the vsyscall page might need emulation. The
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 3c84f4e48cd7..2fd8e16d149c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -466,7 +466,8 @@ static inline bool fault_flag_allow_retry_first(enum fault_flag flags)
> { FAULT_FLAG_USER, "USER" }, \
> { FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE, "REMOTE" }, \
> { FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION, "INSTRUCTION" }, \
> - { FAULT_FLAG_INTERRUPTIBLE, "INTERRUPTIBLE" }
> + { FAULT_FLAG_INTERRUPTIBLE, "INTERRUPTIBLE" }, \
> + { FAULT_FLAG_PAGE_SPLIT, "PAGESPLIT" }
>
> /*
> * vm_fault is filled by the pagefault handler and passed to the vma's
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
> index 500e536796ca..06ba34d51638 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
> @@ -962,6 +962,8 @@ typedef struct {
> * mapped R/O.
> * @FAULT_FLAG_ORIG_PTE_VALID: whether the fault has vmf->orig_pte cached.
> * We should only access orig_pte if this flag set.
> + * @FAULT_FLAG_PAGE_SPLIT: The fault was due page size mismatch, split the
> + * region to smaller page size and retry.
> *
> * About @FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY and @FAULT_FLAG_TRIED: we can specify
> * whether we would allow page faults to retry by specifying these two
> @@ -999,6 +1001,7 @@ enum fault_flag {
> FAULT_FLAG_INTERRUPTIBLE = 1 << 9,
> FAULT_FLAG_UNSHARE = 1 << 10,
> FAULT_FLAG_ORIG_PTE_VALID = 1 << 11,
> + FAULT_FLAG_PAGE_SPLIT = 1 << 12,
> };
>
> typedef unsigned int __bitwise zap_flags_t;
> diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
> index f88c351aecd4..e68da7e403c6 100644
> --- a/mm/memory.c
> +++ b/mm/memory.c
> @@ -4996,6 +4996,12 @@ static vm_fault_t handle_pte_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int handle_split_page_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> +{
> + __split_huge_pmd(vmf->vma, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, false, NULL);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * By the time we get here, we already hold the mm semaphore
> *
> @@ -5078,6 +5084,10 @@ static vm_fault_t __handle_mm_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> pmd_migration_entry_wait(mm, vmf.pmd);
> return 0;
> }
> +
> + if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_PAGE_SPLIT)
> + return handle_split_page_fault(&vmf);
> +
> if (pmd_trans_huge(vmf.orig_pmd) || pmd_devmap(vmf.orig_pmd)) {
> if (pmd_protnone(vmf.orig_pmd) && vma_is_accessible(vma))
> return do_huge_pmd_numa_page(&vmf);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-17 10:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 205+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-14 19:39 [PATCH RFC v7 00/64] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 01/64] KVM: Fix memslot boundary condition for large page Michael Roth
2022-12-22 12:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 3:37 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-04 12:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-05 3:34 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-05 4:08 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-05 8:14 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 02/64] KVM: x86: Add KVM_CAP_UNMAPPED_PRIVATE_MEMORY Michael Roth
2022-12-22 12:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-04 17:47 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-05 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-19 13:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-04 12:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-04 17:56 ` Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 03/64] KVM: SVM: Advertise private memory support to KVM Michael Roth
2022-12-23 16:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 2:14 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-05 15:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 18:17 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-13 14:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-20 21:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-02-20 16:18 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-18 0:20 ` Huang, Kai
2023-01-18 21:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 04/64] KVM: x86: Add 'fault_is_private' x86 op Michael Roth
2022-12-29 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 2:42 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-13 14:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-13 15:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-13 18:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 16:22 ` Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 05/64] KVM: x86: Add 'update_mem_attr' " Michael Roth
2022-12-30 11:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 06/64] KVM: x86: Add platform hooks for private memory invalidations Michael Roth
2022-12-30 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 2:27 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-22 12:43 ` Tom Dohrmann
2023-01-26 15:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 07/64] KVM: SEV: Handle KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall Michael Roth
2023-01-13 16:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-13 16:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-16 7:56 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-17 17:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-27 16:35 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-31 14:15 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 08/64] KVM: Move kvm_for_each_memslot_in_hva_range() to be used in SVM Michael Roth
2023-01-13 18:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 09/64] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 10/64] KVM: SEV: Populate private memory fd during LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Michael Roth
2023-01-13 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 17:49 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-17 23:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-02-20 17:54 ` Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 11/64] KVM: SEV: Support private pages in LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Michael Roth
2022-12-22 18:24 ` erbse.13
2022-12-23 11:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-17 23:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-18 8:04 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-02-01 18:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-02 8:09 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 12/64] KVM: SEV: Implement .fault_is_private callback Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 13/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-02-01 18:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 16:26 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 17:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 18:00 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 14/64] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-01-11 14:50 ` Sabin Rapan
2023-01-19 16:26 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-18 15:55 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-19 23:59 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 16:51 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-02 11:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 15/64] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 16/64] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-01-31 21:26 ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-01 17:14 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-01 17:20 ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-02 19:04 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-08 16:30 ` Liam Merwick
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 17/64] x86/mm/pat: Introduce set_memory_p Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 18/64] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 19/64] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 20/64] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address Michael Roth
2023-01-17 10:42 ` Zhi Wang [this message]
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 21/64] x86/fault: fix handle_split_page_fault() to work with memfd backed pages Michael Roth
2022-12-15 1:01 ` Hugh Dickins
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 22/64] x86/fault: Return pfn from dump_pagetable() for SEV-specific fault handling Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 23/64] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault Michael Roth
2023-01-13 22:56 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-13 23:49 ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 24/64] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-01-22 16:09 ` Sabin Rapan
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 25/64] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2022-12-31 15:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-05 22:40 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 22:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-04 12:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-05 22:54 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 22:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 26/64] crypto:ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 27/64] crypto: ccp: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 28/64] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 29/64] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-01-12 20:47 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-13 22:03 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-13 22:42 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-13 22:48 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-12 23:45 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-13 22:34 ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 30/64] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 31/64] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-01-19 7:23 ` Dov Murik
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 32/64] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended attestation report Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 33/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 34/64] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 35/64] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 36/64] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 37/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2022-12-31 14:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-31 14:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-31 15:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-05 23:37 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 23:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-23 22:49 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-26 21:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 38/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-03-15 13:50 ` Peter Gonda
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 39/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-01-11 13:56 ` Tom Dohrmann
2023-01-11 14:04 ` Harald Hoyer
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 40/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2022-12-19 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-12-19 23:24 ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-12-20 14:25 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-11 13:27 ` Sabin Rapan
2023-01-11 23:18 ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 41/64] KVM: X86: Keep the NPT and RMP page level in sync Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 42/64] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 43/64] KVM: SVM: Do not use long-lived GHCB map while setting scratch area Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 44/64] KVM: SVM: Remove the long-lived GHCB host map Michael Roth
2023-01-18 15:27 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-18 18:15 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-20 20:10 ` Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 45/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 46/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 47/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-01-11 14:38 ` Tom Dohrmann
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 48/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 49/64] KVM: SVM: Introduce ops for the post gfn map and unmap Michael Roth
2023-01-11 13:49 ` Sabin Rapan
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 50/64] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 51/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-01-09 3:33 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-09 23:41 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-10 2:28 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-10 8:33 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-11 0:48 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-11 2:01 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-31 1:54 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-31 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-31 20:21 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-31 21:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-31 22:00 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-31 22:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-05-11 23:02 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-05-11 23:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-15 16:45 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-01-31 17:52 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-06 3:13 ` [PATCH kernel] KVM: SVM: Fix SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST to follow the rest of API Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-02-06 21:57 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-07 1:24 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-02-08 21:50 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-19 20:35 ` [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-01-19 20:54 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-19 21:06 ` Dov Murik
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 53/64] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 54/64] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 55/64] KVM: SVM: Add SNP-specific handling for memory attribute updates Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 56/64] KVM: x86/mmu: Generate KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT for implicit conversions for SNP Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 57/64] KVM: SEV: Handle restricted memory invalidations " Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 58/64] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 59/64] ccp: Add support to decrypt the page Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 60/64] KVM: SVM: Sync the GHCB scratch buffer using already mapped ghcb Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 61/64] KVM: SVM: Make VMSAVE target area memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 62/64] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for instance certs Michael Roth
2022-12-22 14:57 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-09 16:55 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-01-09 22:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-10 7:10 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-10 15:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-10 15:23 ` Peter Gonda
2023-01-11 7:26 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-11 6:00 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-11 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-19 18:49 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-01-19 22:18 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 1:40 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 63/64] x86/sev: Document KVM_SEV_SNP_{G,S}ET_CERTS Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 64/64] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2022-12-23 20:33 ` [PATCH RFC v7 00/64] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Borislav Petkov
2023-01-04 17:21 ` Michael Roth
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