From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com,
peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com,
rientjes@google.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com,
bp@alien8.de, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name,
ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
dgilbert@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, harald@profian.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 02:33:18 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <385016f9-e948-4f7f-8db3-24a0c0543b3d@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <119075dd-5f3e-a393-f543-6cdfd34cd337@amd.com>
On 1/9/2023 8:28 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>
>
> On 10/1/23 10:41, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>> On 1/8/2023 9:33 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>> On 15/12/22 06:40, Michael Roth wrote:
>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>>
>>>> Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest
>>>> Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP guest to
>>>> make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the
>>>> SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.
>>>>
>>>> The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with the
>>>> difference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed through
>>>> the SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver
>>>> provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM to get
>>>> both the report and certificate data at once.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 185
>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +
>>>> 2 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>> index 5f2b2092cdae..18efa70553c2 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>> @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm,
>>>> struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>> if (ret)
>>>> goto e_free;
>>>> + mutex_init(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>> ret = sev_snp_init(&argp->error, false);
>>>> } else {
>>>> ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
>>>> @@ -2051,23 +2052,34 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm
>>>> *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
>>>> */
>>>> static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct
>>>> kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>> {
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>> struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {};
>>>> - void *context;
>>>> + void *context, *certs_data;
>>>> int rc;
>>>> + /* Allocate memory used for the certs data in SNP guest request */
>>>> + certs_data = kzalloc(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>> + if (!certs_data)
>>>> + return NULL;
>>>> +
>>>> /* Allocate memory for context page */
>>>> context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>> if (!context)
>>>> - return NULL;
>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>> data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);
>>>> rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE,
>>>> &data, &argp->error);
>>>> - if (rc) {
>>>> - snp_free_firmware_page(context);
>>>> - return NULL;
>>>> - }
>>>> + if (rc)
>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>> +
>>>> + sev->snp_certs_data = certs_data;
>>>> return context;
>>>> +
>>>> +e_free:
>>>> + snp_free_firmware_page(context);
>>>> + kfree(certs_data);
>>>> + return NULL;
>>>> }
>>>> static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
>>>> @@ -2653,6 +2665,8 @@ static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm
>>>> *kvm)
>>>> snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
>>>> sev->snp_context = NULL;
>>>> + kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
>>>> +
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>> @@ -3174,6 +3188,8 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct
>>>> vcpu_svm *svm, u64 *exit_code)
>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES:
>>>> case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC:
>>>> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>>>> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>>>> break;
>>>> default:
>>>> reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
>>>> @@ -3396,6 +3412,149 @@ static int snp_complete_psc(struct kvm_vcpu
>>>> *vcpu)
>>>> return 1;
>>>> }
>>>> +static unsigned long snp_setup_guest_buf(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data,
>>>> + gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>> + kvm_pfn_t req_pfn, resp_pfn;
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>> +
>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(req_gpa, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(resp_gpa,
>>>> PAGE_SIZE))
>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
>>>> +
>>>> + req_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(req_gpa));
>>>> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(req_pfn))
>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>> +
>>>> + resp_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(resp_gpa));
>>>> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(resp_pfn))
>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (rmp_make_private(resp_pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true))
>>>> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>> +
>>>> + data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
>>>> + data->req_paddr = __sme_set(req_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>> + data->res_paddr = __sme_set(resp_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static void snp_cleanup_guest_buf(struct sev_data_snp_guest_request
>>>> *data, unsigned long *rc)
>>>> +{
>>>> + u64 pfn = __sme_clr(data->res_paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> + int ret;
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = snp_page_reclaim(pfn);
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static void snp_handle_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t
>>>> req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request data = {0};
>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>> + unsigned long rc;
>>>> + int err;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>> +
>>>> + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>> +
>>>> + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &data, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>>>> + if (rc)
>>>> + goto unlock;
>>>> +
>>>> + rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &data, &err);
>>>
>>>
>>> This one goes via sev_issue_cmd_external_user() and uses sev-fd...
>>>
>>>> + if (rc)
>>>> + /* use the firmware error code */
>>>> + rc = err;
>>>> +
>>>> + snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&data, &rc);
>>>> +
>>>> +unlock:
>>>> + mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>> +
>>>> +e_fail:
>>>> + svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>> gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0};
>>>> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>> + unsigned long data_npages;
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>> + unsigned long rc, err;
>>>> + u64 data_gpa;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>> +
>>>> + data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
>>>> + data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) {
>>>> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>> + goto e_fail;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>> +
>>>> + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>>>> + if (rc)
>>>> + goto unlock;
>>>> +
>>>> + rc = snp_guest_ext_guest_request(&req, (unsigned
>>>> long)sev->snp_certs_data,
>>>> + &data_npages, &err);
>>>
>>> but this one does not and jump straight to
>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c ignoring sev->fd. Why different? Can
>>> these two be unified? sev_issue_cmd_external_user() only checks if fd
>>> is /dev/sev which is hardly useful.
>>>
>>> "[PATCH RFC v7 32/64] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended
>>> attestation report" added this one.
>>
>> SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST additionally returns a certificate blob and
>> that's why it goes through the CCP driver interface
>> snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used to get both the report and
>> certificate data/blob at the same time.
>
> True. I thought though that this calls for extending sev_issue_cmd() to
> take care of these extra parameters rather than just skipping the sev->fd.
>
>
>> All the FW API calls on the KVM side go through sev_issue_cmd() and
>> sev_issue_cmd_external_user() interfaces and that i believe uses
>> sev->fd more of as a sanity check.
>
> Does not look like it:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c?h=v6.2-rc3#n1290
>
>
> ===
> int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
> void *data, int *error)
> {
> if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
> return -EBADF;
>
> return sev_do_cmd(cmd, data, error);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_issue_cmd_external_user);
> ===
>
> The only "more" is that it requires sev->fd to be a valid open fd, what
> is the value in that? I may easily miss the bigger picture here. Thanks,
>
>
Have a look at following functions in drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:
sev_dev_init() and sev_misc_init().
static int sev_misc_init(struct sev_device *sev)
{
struct device *dev = sev->dev;
int ret;
/*
* SEV feature support can be detected on multiple devices but
* the SEV FW commands must be issued on the master. During
* probe, we do not know the master hence we create /dev/sev on
* the first device probe.
* sev_do_cmd() finds the right master device to which to issue
* the command to the firmware.
*/
...
...
Hence, sev_issue_cmd_external_user() needs to ensure that the correct
device (master device) is being operated upon and that's why there is
the check for file operations matching sev_fops as below :
int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
void *data, int *error)
{
if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
return -EBADF;
..
..
Essentially, sev->fd is the misc. device created for the master PSP
device on which the SEV/SNP firmware commands are issued, hence,
sev_issue_cmd() uses sev->fd.
Thanks,
Ashish
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-10 8:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 205+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-14 19:39 [PATCH RFC v7 00/64] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 01/64] KVM: Fix memslot boundary condition for large page Michael Roth
2022-12-22 12:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 3:37 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-04 12:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-05 3:34 ` Chao Peng
2023-01-05 4:08 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-05 8:14 ` Chao Peng
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 02/64] KVM: x86: Add KVM_CAP_UNMAPPED_PRIVATE_MEMORY Michael Roth
2022-12-22 12:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-04 17:47 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-05 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-19 13:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-04 12:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-04 17:56 ` Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 03/64] KVM: SVM: Advertise private memory support to KVM Michael Roth
2022-12-23 16:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 2:14 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-05 15:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 18:17 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-13 14:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-20 21:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-02-20 16:18 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-18 0:20 ` Huang, Kai
2023-01-18 21:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 04/64] KVM: x86: Add 'fault_is_private' x86 op Michael Roth
2022-12-29 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 2:42 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-13 14:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-13 15:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-13 18:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 16:22 ` Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 05/64] KVM: x86: Add 'update_mem_attr' " Michael Roth
2022-12-30 11:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 06/64] KVM: x86: Add platform hooks for private memory invalidations Michael Roth
2022-12-30 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05 2:27 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-22 12:43 ` Tom Dohrmann
2023-01-26 15:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-14 19:39 ` [PATCH RFC v7 07/64] KVM: SEV: Handle KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall Michael Roth
2023-01-13 16:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-13 16:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-16 7:56 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-17 17:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-27 16:35 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-31 14:15 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 08/64] KVM: Move kvm_for_each_memslot_in_hva_range() to be used in SVM Michael Roth
2023-01-13 18:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 09/64] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 10/64] KVM: SEV: Populate private memory fd during LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Michael Roth
2023-01-13 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 17:49 ` Michael Roth
2023-01-17 23:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-02-20 17:54 ` Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 11/64] KVM: SEV: Support private pages in LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Michael Roth
2022-12-22 18:24 ` erbse.13
2022-12-23 11:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-17 23:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-18 8:04 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-02-01 18:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-02 8:09 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 12/64] KVM: SEV: Implement .fault_is_private callback Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 13/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-02-01 18:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 16:26 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 17:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 18:00 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 14/64] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-01-11 14:50 ` Sabin Rapan
2023-01-19 16:26 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-18 15:55 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-19 23:59 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 16:51 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-02 11:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 15/64] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 16/64] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-01-31 21:26 ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-01 17:14 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-01 17:20 ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-02 19:04 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-08 16:30 ` Liam Merwick
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 17/64] x86/mm/pat: Introduce set_memory_p Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 18/64] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 19/64] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 20/64] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address Michael Roth
2023-01-17 10:42 ` Zhi Wang
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 21/64] x86/fault: fix handle_split_page_fault() to work with memfd backed pages Michael Roth
2022-12-15 1:01 ` Hugh Dickins
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 22/64] x86/fault: Return pfn from dump_pagetable() for SEV-specific fault handling Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 23/64] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault Michael Roth
2023-01-13 22:56 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-13 23:49 ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 24/64] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-01-22 16:09 ` Sabin Rapan
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 25/64] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2022-12-31 15:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-05 22:40 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 22:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-04 12:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-05 22:54 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 22:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 26/64] crypto:ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 27/64] crypto: ccp: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 28/64] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 29/64] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-01-12 20:47 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-13 22:03 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-13 22:42 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-13 22:48 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-12 23:45 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-13 22:34 ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 30/64] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 31/64] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-01-19 7:23 ` Dov Murik
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 32/64] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended attestation report Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 33/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 34/64] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 35/64] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 36/64] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 37/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2022-12-31 14:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-31 14:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-31 15:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-05 23:37 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 23:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-23 22:49 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-26 21:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 38/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-03-15 13:50 ` Peter Gonda
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 39/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-01-11 13:56 ` Tom Dohrmann
2023-01-11 14:04 ` Harald Hoyer
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 40/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2022-12-19 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-12-19 23:24 ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-12-20 14:25 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-11 13:27 ` Sabin Rapan
2023-01-11 23:18 ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 41/64] KVM: X86: Keep the NPT and RMP page level in sync Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 42/64] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 43/64] KVM: SVM: Do not use long-lived GHCB map while setting scratch area Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 44/64] KVM: SVM: Remove the long-lived GHCB host map Michael Roth
2023-01-18 15:27 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-18 18:15 ` Alper Gun
2023-01-20 20:10 ` Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 45/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 46/64] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 47/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-01-11 14:38 ` Tom Dohrmann
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 48/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 49/64] KVM: SVM: Introduce ops for the post gfn map and unmap Michael Roth
2023-01-11 13:49 ` Sabin Rapan
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 50/64] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 51/64] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-01-09 3:33 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-09 23:41 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-10 2:28 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-10 8:33 ` Kalra, Ashish [this message]
2023-01-11 0:48 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-11 2:01 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-31 1:54 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-31 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-31 20:21 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-31 21:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-31 22:00 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-31 22:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-05-11 23:02 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-05-11 23:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-15 16:45 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-01-31 17:52 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-06 3:13 ` [PATCH kernel] KVM: SVM: Fix SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST to follow the rest of API Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-02-06 21:57 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-07 1:24 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-02-08 21:50 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-19 20:35 ` [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-01-19 20:54 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-19 21:06 ` Dov Murik
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 53/64] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 54/64] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 55/64] KVM: SVM: Add SNP-specific handling for memory attribute updates Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 56/64] KVM: x86/mmu: Generate KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT for implicit conversions for SNP Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 57/64] KVM: SEV: Handle restricted memory invalidations " Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 58/64] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 59/64] ccp: Add support to decrypt the page Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 60/64] KVM: SVM: Sync the GHCB scratch buffer using already mapped ghcb Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 61/64] KVM: SVM: Make VMSAVE target area memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 62/64] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for instance certs Michael Roth
2022-12-22 14:57 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-09 16:55 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-01-09 22:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-10 7:10 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-10 15:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-10 15:23 ` Peter Gonda
2023-01-11 7:26 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-11 6:00 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-11 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-01-19 18:49 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-01-19 22:18 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-01-20 1:40 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 63/64] x86/sev: Document KVM_SEV_SNP_{G,S}ET_CERTS Michael Roth
2022-12-14 19:40 ` [PATCH RFC v7 64/64] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2022-12-23 20:33 ` [PATCH RFC v7 00/64] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Borislav Petkov
2023-01-04 17:21 ` Michael Roth
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