From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
bristot@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, cyphar@cyphar.com,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, alexl@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
bmasney@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 12:34:50 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202301271234.8E4A4ED@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <167482213665.546991.3626486119597692007.b4-ty@kernel.org>
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 01:31:13PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> From: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
>
>
> On Fri, 20 Jan 2023 11:25:11 +0100, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
> > This patch adds a new prctl called PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE which allows
> > processes to hide their own /proc/*/exe file. When this prctl is
> > used, every access to /proc/*/exe for the calling process will
> > fail with ENOENT.
> >
> > This is useful for preventing issues like CVE-2019-5736, where an
> > attacker can gain host root access by overwriting the binary
> > in OCI runtimes through file-descriptor mishandling in containers.
> >
> > [...]
>
> Only needed for privileged sandboxes. The userspace mitigations Aleksa
> and I did for the CVE in all affected runtimes back then are nifty but
> complicated. The patch is a decent compromise.
> Picking up this prctl() for now,
>
> [1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl
> commit: 673301182d473ef61a98c292cf64650c73117172
> [2/2] selftests: add tests for prctl(SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE)
> commit: bafa339eda3f79d567386e1fae59bb0537156c96
Thanks! I'm late to the party, but I came to the same conclusion as you
did. :)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-27 20:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-20 10:25 [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-20 10:25 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests: add tests for prctl(SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE) Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-20 16:05 ` Brian Masney
2023-01-23 18:41 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl Colin Walters
2023-01-23 19:21 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-23 22:07 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-23 22:54 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-23 23:14 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-24 1:53 ` Aleksa Sarai
2023-01-24 7:29 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-25 15:28 ` Aleksa Sarai
2023-01-25 16:30 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-29 13:59 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-29 16:58 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-29 18:12 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-30 9:53 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-30 10:06 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-30 21:52 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-31 14:17 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-02-25 0:27 ` Andrei Vagin
2023-02-28 14:19 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-26 8:25 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-24 19:17 ` Andrei Vagin
2023-01-27 12:31 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-27 20:34 ` Kees Cook [this message]
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