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From: "Colin Walters" <walters@verbum.org>
To: "Giuseppe Scrivano" <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
	"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	bristot@redhat.com, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Alexander Larsson" <alexl@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	bmasney@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl
Date: Sun, 29 Jan 2023 08:59:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ceac106b-ddac-4ee6-bfdf-1505cc699eaa@app.fastmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871qnibmqa.fsf@redhat.com>



On Wed, Jan 25, 2023, at 11:30 AM, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
> 
> After reading some comments on the LWN.net article, I wonder if
> PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE should apply to CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user
> namespace or if in this case root should keep the privilege to inspect
> the binary of a process.  If a container runs with that many privileges
> then it has already other ways to damage the host anyway.

Right, that's what I was trying to express with the "make it work the same as map_files".  Hiding the entry entirely even for initial-namespace-root (real root) seems like it's going to potentially confuse profiling/tracing/debugging tools for no good reason.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-29 14:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-20 10:25 [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-20 10:25 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests: add tests for prctl(SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE) Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-20 16:05   ` Brian Masney
2023-01-23 18:41 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl Colin Walters
2023-01-23 19:21   ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-23 22:07     ` Colin Walters
2023-01-23 22:54       ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-23 23:14         ` Colin Walters
2023-01-24  1:53 ` Aleksa Sarai
2023-01-24  7:29   ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-25 15:28     ` Aleksa Sarai
2023-01-25 16:30       ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-29 13:59         ` Colin Walters [this message]
2023-01-29 16:58           ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-29 18:12             ` Colin Walters
2023-01-30  9:53               ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-30 10:06                 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-30 21:52                   ` Colin Walters
2023-01-31 14:17                   ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-02-25  0:27                   ` Andrei Vagin
2023-02-28 14:19                     ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-26  8:25       ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-24 19:17   ` Andrei Vagin
2023-01-27 12:31 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-27 20:34   ` Kees Cook

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