From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
christina.schimpe@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
debug@rivosinc.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 01/41] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 14:29:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230227222957.24501-2-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230227222957.24501-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Introduce a new document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v5:
- Literal format tweaks (Bagas Sanjaya)
- Update EOPNOTSUPP text due to unification after comment from (Kees)
- Update 32 bit signal support with new behavior
- Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
- Fix typo
v4:
- Drop clearcpuid piece (Boris)
- Add some info about 32 bit
v3:
- Clarify kernel IBT is supported by the kernel. (Kees, Andrew Cooper)
- Clarify which arch_prctl's can take multiple bits. (Kees)
- Describe ASLR characteristics of thread shadow stacks. (Kees)
- Add exec section. (Andrew Cooper)
- Fix some capitalization (Bagas Sanjaya)
- Update new location of enablement status proc.
- Add info about new user_shstk software capability.
- Add more info about what the kernel pushes to the shadow stack on
signal.
v2:
- Updated to new arch_prctl() API
- Add bit about new proc status
---
Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/shstk.rst | 166 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 167 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/shstk.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
index c73d133fd37c..8ac64d7de4dc 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
mtrr
pat
intel-hfi
+ shstk
iommu
intel_txt
amd-memory-encryption
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/shstk.rst b/Documentation/x86/shstk.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f2e6f323cf68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/shstk.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+======================================================
+Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Shadow Stack
+======================================================
+
+CET Background
+==============
+
+Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is term referring to several
+related x86 processor features that provides protection against control
+flow hijacking attacks. The HW feature itself can be set up to protect
+both applications and the kernel.
+
+CET introduces shadow stack and indirect branch tracking (IBT). Shadow stack
+is a secondary stack allocated from memory and cannot be directly modified by
+applications. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the
+return address to both the normal stack and the shadow stack. Upon
+function return, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it
+to the normal stack copy. If the two differ, the processor raises a
+control-protection fault. IBT verifies indirect CALL/JMP targets are intended
+as marked by the compiler with 'ENDBR' opcodes. Not all CPU's have both Shadow
+Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking. Today in the 64-bit kernel, only userspace
+shadow stack and kernel IBT are supported.
+
+Requirements to use Shadow Stack
+================================
+
+To use userspace shadow stack you need HW that supports it, a kernel
+configured with it and userspace libraries compiled with it.
+
+The kernel Kconfig option is X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK, and it can be disabled
+with the kernel parameter: nousershstk.
+
+To build a user shadow stack enabled kernel, Binutils v2.29 or LLVM v6 or later
+are required.
+
+At run time, /proc/cpuinfo shows CET features if the processor supports
+CET. "user_shstk" means that userspace shadow stack is supported on the current
+kernel and HW.
+
+Application Enabling
+====================
+
+An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF note and can be verified
+from readelf/llvm-readelf output::
+
+ readelf -n <application> | grep -a SHSTK
+ properties: x86 feature: SHSTK
+
+The kernel does not process these applications markers directly. Applications
+or loaders must enable CET features using the interface described in section 4.
+Typically this would be done in dynamic loader or static runtime objects, as is
+the case in GLIBC.
+
+Enabling arch_prctl()'s
+=======================
+
+Elf features should be enabled by the loader using the below arch_prctl's. They
+are only supported in 64 bit user applications.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, unsigned long feature)
+ Enable a single feature specified in 'feature'. Can only operate on
+ one feature at a time.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE, unsigned long feature)
+ Disable a single feature specified in 'feature'. Can only operate on
+ one feature at a time.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK, unsigned long features)
+ Lock in features at their current enabled or disabled status. 'features'
+ is a mask of all features to lock. All bits set are processed, unset bits
+ are ignored. The mask is ORed with the existing value. So any feature bits
+ set here cannot be enabled or disabled afterwards.
+
+The return values are as follows. On success, return 0. On error, errno can
+be::
+
+ -EPERM if any of the passed feature are locked.
+ -ENOTSUPP if the feature is not supported by the hardware or
+ kernel.
+ -EINVAL arguments (non existing feature, etc)
+
+The feature's bits supported are::
+
+ ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK - Shadow stack
+ ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS - WRSS
+
+Currently shadow stack and WRSS are supported via this interface. WRSS
+can only be enabled with shadow stack, and is automatically disabled
+if shadow stack is disabled.
+
+Proc Status
+===========
+To check if an application is actually running with shadow stack, the
+user can read the /proc/$PID/status. It will report "wrss" or "shstk"
+depending on what is enabled. The lines look like this::
+
+ x86_Thread_features: shstk wrss
+ x86_Thread_features_locked: shstk wrss
+
+Implementation of the Shadow Stack
+==================================
+
+Shadow Stack Size
+-----------------
+
+A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory to a fixed size of
+MIN(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). In other words, the shadow stack is allocated to
+the maximum size of the normal stack, but capped to 4 GB. However,
+a compat-mode application's address space is smaller, each of its thread's
+shadow stack size is MIN(1/4 RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB).
+
+Signal
+------
+
+By default, the main program and its signal handlers use the same shadow
+stack. Because the shadow stack stores only return addresses, a large
+shadow stack covers the condition that both the program stack and the
+signal alternate stack run out.
+
+When a signal happens, the old pre-signal state is pushed on the stack. When
+shadow stack is enabled, the shadow stack specific state is pushed onto the
+shadow stack. Today this is only the old SSP (shadow stack pointer), pushed
+in a special format with bit 63 set. On sigreturn this old SSP token is
+verified and restored by the kernel. The kernel will also push the normal
+restorer address to the shadow stack to help userspace avoid a shadow stack
+violation on the sigreturn path that goes through the restorer.
+
+So the shadow stack signal frame format is as follows::
+
+ |1...old SSP| - Pointer to old pre-signal ssp in sigframe token format
+ (bit 63 set to 1)
+ | ...| - Other state may be added in the future
+
+
+32 bit ABI signals are not supported in shadow stack processes. Linux prevents
+32 bit execution while shadow stack is enabled by the allocating shadow stack's
+outside of the 32 bit address space. When execution enters 32 bit mode, either
+via far call or returning to userspace, a #GP is generated by the hardware
+which, will be delivered to the process as a segfault. When transitioning to
+userspace the register's state will be as if the userspace ip being returned to
+caused the segfault.
+
+Fork
+----
+
+The shadow stack's vma has VM_SHADOW_STACK flag set; its PTEs are required
+to be read-only and dirty. When a shadow stack PTE is not RO and dirty, a
+shadow access triggers a page fault with the shadow stack access bit set
+in the page fault error code.
+
+When a task forks a child, its shadow stack PTEs are copied and both the
+parent's and the child's shadow stack PTEs are cleared of the dirty bit.
+Upon the next shadow stack access, the resulting shadow stack page fault
+is handled by page copy/re-use.
+
+When a pthread child is created, the kernel allocates a new shadow stack
+for the new thread. New shadow stack's behave like mmap() with respect to
+ASLR behavior.
+
+Exec
+----
+
+On exec, shadow stack features are disabled by the kernel. At which point,
+userspace can choose to re-enable, or lock them.
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-27 22:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 159+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-27 22:29 [PATCH v7 00/41] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2023-03-01 14:21 ` [PATCH v7 01/41] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-01 14:38 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-01 18:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 18:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-02 16:34 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-03 22:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 16:20 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-06 16:31 ` Florian Weimer
2023-03-06 18:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-07 13:03 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-07 14:00 ` Florian Weimer
2023-03-07 16:14 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-06 18:05 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 20:31 ` Liang, Kan
2023-03-02 16:14 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-02 21:17 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-03 16:30 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-03 16:57 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-03 17:39 ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-03 17:50 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-03 17:41 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 02/41] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 03/41] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 04/41] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 05/41] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 06/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 07/41] x86: Move control protection handler to separate file Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 08/41] x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 18:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-01 18:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 09/41] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 10/41] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 11/41] mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 12/41] s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 13/41] mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 7:03 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-03-01 8:16 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-02 12:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 14/41] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-02 12:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-02 17:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 15/41] x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 16/41] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 17/41] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 18/41] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 19/41] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-03 14:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-03 14:39 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 20/41] x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-03 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 21/41] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 8:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 1:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-07 10:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 10:44 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-08 22:48 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 17:09 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 22/41] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 13:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 18:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 18:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 10:42 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-17 17:12 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-17 17:16 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-17 17:28 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-17 17:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 19:26 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 23/41] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 24/41] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 13:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 18:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-03-06 18:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 18:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-03-07 1:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 17:05 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 25/41] x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 1:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 26/41] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-08 8:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:36 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 27/41] x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2023-03-08 9:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 28/41] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-08 10:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 12:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 16:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 23:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 1:13 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 2:03 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 20:00 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 20:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:43 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 21:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 11:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 29/41] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 30/41] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-02 17:34 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-02 21:48 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-08 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 20:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 14:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 16:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 17:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 20:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 31/41] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-09 16:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 17:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 17:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 32/41] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-09 17:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 17:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 23:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 33/41] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-02 17:22 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-02 21:21 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 18:55 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-09 19:39 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 21:08 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-10 0:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 21:00 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-10 21:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-16 20:07 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-14 7:19 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-03-16 19:30 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-20 11:35 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-10 16:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 17:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 20:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 34/41] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-10 16:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 17:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 35/41] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 36/41] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 37/41] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 38/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 2:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 11:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 16:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 17:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 23:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 39/41] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 2:53 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 40/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 15:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 3:04 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 11:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 41/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
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