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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
	jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
	christina.schimpe@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
	debug@rivosinc.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 34/41] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2023 17:44:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZAtehgwB5/jGL9dC@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230227222957.24501-35-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 02:29:50PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> For the current shadow stack implementation, shadow stacks contents can't
> easily be provisioned with arbitrary data. This property helps apps
> protect themselves better, but also restricts any potential apps that may
> want to do exotic things at the expense of a little security.
> 
> The x86 shadow stack feature introduces a new instruction, WRSS, which
> can be enabled to write directly to shadow stack permissioned memory from

s/permissioned //

By now it is clear that shadow stack memory is a special thing anyway.

> userspace. Allow it to get enabled via the prctl interface.
> 
> Only enable the userspace WRSS instruction, which allows writes to
> userspace shadow stacks from userspace. Do not allow it to be enabled
> independently of shadow stack, as HW does not support using WRSS when
> shadow stack is disabled.
> 
> From a fault handler perspective, WRSS will behave very similar to WRUSS,
> which is treated like a user access from a #PF err code perspective.

...

> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> index 65ec1965cd28..2d3b35c957ad 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> @@ -310,6 +310,17 @@ void msrs_free(struct msr *msrs);
>  int msr_set_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit);
>  int msr_clear_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit);
>  
> +/* Helper that can never get accidentally un-inlined. */
> +#define set_clr_bits_msrl(msr, set, clear)	do {	\

Uff, pls kill this thing.

Our MSR interfaces universe is already insane and arch/x86/lib/msr.c
already has similar attempts to what you're doing here in addition to
all the other gunk in msr.h.

I highly doubt this can't be done the usual way, lemme see...

> +	u64 __val, __new_val, __msr = msr;		\
> +							\
> +	rdmsrl(__msr, __val);				\
> +	__new_val = (__val & ~(clear)) | (set);		\
> +							\
> +	if (__new_val != __val)				\
> +		wrmsrl(__msr, __new_val);		\
> +} while (0)
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
>  int rdmsr_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 *l, u32 *h);
>  int wrmsr_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 l, u32 h);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
> index 7dfd9dc00509..e31495668056 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
> @@ -28,5 +28,6 @@
>  
>  /* ARCH_SHSTK_ features bits */
>  #define ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK		(1ULL <<  0)
> +#define ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS			(1ULL <<  1)
>  
>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> index 0a3decab70ee..009cb3fa0ae5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> @@ -363,6 +363,36 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	unmap_shadow_stack(shstk->base, shstk->size);
>  }
>  
> +static int wrss_control(bool enable)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Only enable wrss if shadow stack is enabled. If shadow stack is not

"WRSS". Insns in all caps pls.

> +	 * enabled, wrss will already be disabled, so don't bother clearing it

Ditto.

> +	 * when disabling.
> +	 */
> +	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
> +		return -EPERM;
> +
> +	/* Already enabled/disabled? */
> +	if (features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS) == enable)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	fpregs_lock_and_load();
> +	if (enable) {
> +		set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_WRSS_EN, 0);
> +		features_set(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
> +	} else {
> +		set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0, CET_WRSS_EN);
> +		features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
> +	}
> +	fpregs_unlock();

Yes, doing it the "usual" way is more readable because it is a common
code pattern which one encounters all around arch/x86/.

Diff ontop:

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 009cb3fa0ae5..914feff26b23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -365,6 +365,8 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 static int wrss_control(bool enable)
 {
+	u64 msrval;
+
 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
@@ -381,13 +383,22 @@ static int wrss_control(bool enable)
 		return 0;
 
 	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+
 	if (enable) {
-		set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_WRSS_EN, 0);
 		features_set(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
+		msrval |= CET_WRSS_EN;
 	} else {
-		set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0, CET_WRSS_EN);
 		features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
+		if (!(msrval & CET_WRSS_EN))
+			goto unlock;
+
+		msrval &= ~CET_WRSS_EN;
 	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+
+unlock:
 	fpregs_unlock();
 
 	return 0;

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2023-03-10 16:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 159+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-27 22:29 [PATCH v7 00/41] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 01/41] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 14:21   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-01 14:38     ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-01 18:07     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 18:32       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-02 16:34         ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-03 22:35           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 16:20             ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-06 16:31               ` Florian Weimer
2023-03-06 18:08                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-07 13:03                   ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-07 14:00                     ` Florian Weimer
2023-03-07 16:14                       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-06 18:05               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 20:31                 ` Liang, Kan
2023-03-02 16:14       ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-02 21:17         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-03 16:30           ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-03 16:57             ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-03 17:39               ` szabolcs.nagy
2023-03-03 17:50                 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-03 17:41             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 02/41] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 03/41] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 04/41] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 05/41] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 06/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 07/41] x86: Move control protection handler to separate file Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 15:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 08/41] x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01 18:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-01 18:14     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-01 18:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 09/41] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 10/41] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 11/41] mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 12/41] s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 13/41] mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-01  7:03   ` Christophe Leroy
2023-03-01  8:16     ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-02 12:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 14/41] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-02 12:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-02 17:01     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 15/41] x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 16/41] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 17/41] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 18/41] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 19/41] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-03 14:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-03 14:39     ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 20/41] x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-03 15:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 21/41] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06  8:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07  1:29     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-07 10:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 10:44         ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-08 22:48           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 17:09   ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 22/41] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 13:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 18:11     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 18:16       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 10:42   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-03-17 17:12   ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-17 17:16     ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-17 17:28       ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-17 17:42         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 19:26           ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 23/41] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 24/41] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 13:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 18:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-03-06 18:33       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-06 18:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-03-07  1:47           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-17 17:05   ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 25/41] x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-06 18:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07  1:10     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 26/41] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-08  8:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:36     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 27/41] x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:54   ` Kees Cook
2023-03-08  9:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:35     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 28/41] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-08 10:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 23:32     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 12:57       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 16:56         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 23:51           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10  1:13             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10  2:03               ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 20:00                 ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 20:27                   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:43                     ` H.J. Lu
2023-03-10 21:01                       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 11:40               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 29/41] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 30/41] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-02 17:34   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-02 21:48     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-08 15:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-08 20:03     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 14:12       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 16:59         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 17:04           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 20:29             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 31/41] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-09 16:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 17:03     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 17:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 32/41] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-09 17:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-09 17:16     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 23:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 33/41] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-02 17:22   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-02 21:21     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 18:55     ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-09 19:39       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-09 21:08         ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-10  0:14           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 21:00             ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-10 21:43               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-16 20:07                 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-14  7:19       ` Mike Rapoport
2023-03-16 19:30         ` Deepak Gupta
2023-03-20 11:35           ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-03-10 16:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 17:12     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:05       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-10 20:19         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-10 20:26           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 34/41] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-10 16:44   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2023-03-10 17:16     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 35/41] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 36/41] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 37/41] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 38/41] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 12:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13  2:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 11:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 16:10         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 17:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13 23:31             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 39/41] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13  2:53     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 40/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2023-03-11 15:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-13  3:04     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-13 11:05       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-27 22:29 ` [PATCH v7 41/41] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe

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