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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
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	<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>,
	<zhi.a.wang@intel.com>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 11/26] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table
Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2023 10:19:39 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231230161954.569267-12-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231230161954.569267-1-michael.roth@amd.com>

From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

The integrity guarantee of SEV-SNP is enforced through the RMP table.
The RMP is used with standard x86 and IOMMU page tables to enforce
memory restrictions and page access rights. The RMP check is enforced as
soon as SEV-SNP is enabled globally in the system. When hardware
encounters an RMP-check failure, it raises a page-fault exception.

If the kernel uses a 2MB directmap mapping to write to an address, and
that 2MB range happens to contain a 4KB page that set to private in the
RMP table, that will also lead to a page-fault exception.

Prevent this by removing pages from the directmap prior to setting them
as private in the RMP table, and then re-adding them to the directmap
when they set back to shared.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index ff9fa0a85a7f..ee182351d93a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -369,14 +369,64 @@ int psmash(u64 pfn)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(psmash);
 
+static int restore_direct_map(u64 pfn, int npages)
+{
+	int i, ret = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+		ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(pfn_to_page(pfn + i));
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (ret)
+		pr_warn("Failed to restore direct map for pfn 0x%llx, ret: %d\n",
+			pfn + i, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int invalidate_direct_map(u64 pfn, int npages)
+{
+	int i, ret = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+		ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(pfn_to_page(pfn + i));
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_warn("Failed to invalidate direct map for pfn 0x%llx, ret: %d\n",
+			pfn + i, ret);
+		restore_direct_map(pfn, i);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int rmpupdate(u64 pfn, struct rmp_state *state)
 {
 	unsigned long paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
-	int ret;
+	int ret, level, npages;
 
 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	level = RMP_TO_PG_LEVEL(state->pagesize);
+	npages = page_level_size(level) / PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the kernel uses a 2MB directmap mapping to write to an address,
+	 * and that 2MB range happens to contain a 4KB page that set to private
+	 * in the RMP table, an RMP #PF will trigger and cause a host crash.
+	 *
+	 * Prevent this by removing pages from the directmap prior to setting
+	 * them as private in the RMP table.
+	 */
+	if (state->assigned && invalidate_direct_map(pfn, npages))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	do {
 		/* Binutils version 2.36 supports the RMPUPDATE mnemonic. */
 		asm volatile(".byte 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x01, 0xFE"
@@ -386,12 +436,16 @@ static int rmpupdate(u64 pfn, struct rmp_state *state)
 	} while (ret == RMPUPDATE_FAIL_OVERLAP);
 
 	if (ret) {
-		pr_err("RMPUPDATE failed for PFN %llx, ret: %d\n", pfn, ret);
+		pr_err("RMPUPDATE failed for PFN %llx, pg_level: %d, ret: %d\n",
+		       pfn, level, ret);
 		dump_rmpentry(pfn);
 		dump_stack();
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
+	if (!state->assigned && restore_direct_map(pfn, npages))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-12-30 16:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-30 16:19 [PATCH v1 00/26] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-31 11:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-31 16:44     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 02/26] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 03/26] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-04 10:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-04 10:58   ` Joerg Roedel
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 04/26] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-04 11:05   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-05 16:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 16:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-08 16:49         ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-08 17:04           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-09 11:56             ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-09 12:29               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-09 12:44                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-14 16:56                   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-04 11:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-04 14:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 19:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 21:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 05/26] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 06/26] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 07/26] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-10  9:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 20:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-10 22:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 11:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-10 15:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:51         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-10 15:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 08/26] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 09/26] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 10/26] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-12 14:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-01-12 19:48   ` [PATCH v1 11/26] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:00   ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-12 20:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:27       ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-15  9:06         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15  9:14           ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-15  9:16           ` Mike Rapoport
2024-01-15  9:20             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-12 20:37         ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-15  9:23           ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-16 16:19           ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 16:50             ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 20:12               ` Mike Rapoport
2024-01-26  1:49                 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 18:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-16 20:22             ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-26  1:35               ` Michael Roth
2024-01-15  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-16 16:21       ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-17  9:34         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15  9:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 12/26] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-15  9:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  1:56     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 13/26] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-15 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15 19:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  2:48     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 14/26] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-17  9:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 15/26] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2024-01-08 10:45   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-09 22:19     ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-10  8:59       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 16/26] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 17/26] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-18 14:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 18/26] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-19 17:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-19 17:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-19 17:48       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 13:29     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 19/26] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 20/26] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2024-01-10 14:59   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-11  0:50     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 21/26] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-21 11:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:03     ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-26 13:38     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 22/26] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-21 11:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:44     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 23/26] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 24/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:32     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 25/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 26/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 13:30     ` Michael Roth

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