From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>, <jmattson@google.com>,
<luto@kernel.org>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
<slp@redhat.com>, <pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
<tobin@ibm.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <vbabka@suse.cz>,
<kirill@shutemov.name>, <ak@linux.intel.com>,
<tony.luck@intel.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@google.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>,
<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>,
<zhi.a.wang@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 15/26] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list
Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2023 10:19:43 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231230161954.569267-16-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231230161954.569267-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Pages are unsafe to be released back to the page-allocator, if they
have been transitioned to firmware/guest state and can't be reclaimed
or transitioned back to hypervisor/shared state. In this case add
them to an internal leaked pages list to ensure that they are not freed
or touched/accessed to cause fatal page faults.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[mdr: relocate to arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index d3ccb7a0c7e9..435ba9bc4510 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address);
int psmash(u64 pfn);
int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, int asid, bool immutable);
int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
+void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
#else
static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, int as
return -ENODEV;
}
static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index ee182351d93a..0f2e1ce241b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@ static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size;
static struct rmpentry *rmptable __ro_after_init;
static u64 rmptable_max_pfn __ro_after_init;
+/* List of pages which are leaked and cannot be reclaimed */
+struct leaked_page {
+ struct page *page;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+
+static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt
@@ -476,3 +487,27 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level)
return rmpupdate(pfn, &state);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared);
+
+void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
+{
+ struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+ struct leaked_page *leak;
+
+ pr_debug("%s: leaking PFN range 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", __func__, pfn, pfn + npages);
+
+ spin_lock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+ while (npages--) {
+ leak = kzalloc(sizeof(*leak), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!leak)
+ goto unlock;
+ leak->page = page;
+ list_add_tail(&leak->list, &snp_leaked_pages_list);
+ dump_rmpentry(pfn);
+ snp_nr_leaked_pages++;
+ pfn++;
+ page++;
+ }
+unlock:
+ spin_unlock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_leak_pages);
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-30 16:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-30 16:19 [PATCH v1 00/26] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-31 11:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-31 16:44 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 02/26] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 03/26] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-04 10:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-04 10:58 ` Joerg Roedel
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 04/26] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-04 11:05 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-05 16:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 16:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-08 16:49 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-08 17:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-09 11:56 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-09 12:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-09 12:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-14 16:56 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-04 11:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-04 14:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 19:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 21:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 05/26] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 06/26] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 07/26] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-10 9:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 20:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-10 22:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 11:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-10 15:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-10 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 08/26] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 09/26] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 10/26] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-12 14:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 11/26] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2024-01-12 19:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:00 ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-12 20:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:27 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-15 9:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15 9:14 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-15 9:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2024-01-15 9:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-12 20:37 ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-15 9:23 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-16 16:19 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 16:50 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 20:12 ` Mike Rapoport
2024-01-26 1:49 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 18:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-16 20:22 ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-26 1:35 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-15 9:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-16 16:21 ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-17 9:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15 9:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 12/26] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-15 9:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 1:56 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 13/26] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-15 11:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15 19:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 2:48 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 14/26] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-17 9:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-01-08 10:45 ` [PATCH v1 15/26] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-09 22:19 ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-10 8:59 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 16/26] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 17/26] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-18 14:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 18/26] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-19 17:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-19 17:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-19 17:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 13:29 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 19/26] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 20/26] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2024-01-10 14:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-11 0:50 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 21/26] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-21 11:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 3:03 ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-26 13:38 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 22/26] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-21 11:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 3:44 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 23/26] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 24/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 3:32 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 25/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 26/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 13:30 ` Michael Roth
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