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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
	Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe  <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv6 09/16] x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 14:55:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240124125557.493675-10-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240124125557.493675-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

AMD SEV and Intel TDX guests allocate shared buffers for performing I/O.
This is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and
then converting them to shared using set_memory_decrypted().

On kexec, the second kernel is unaware of which memory has been
converted in this manner. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM. Accessing shared
memory as private is fatal.

Therefore, the memory state must be reset to its original state before
starting the new kernel with kexec.

The process of converting shared memory back to private occurs in two
steps:

- enc_kexec_stop_conversion() stops new conversions.

- enc_kexec_unshare_mem() unshares all existing shared memory, reverting
  it back to private.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/crash.c         |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c        | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c      |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index c9503fe2d13a..3196ff20a29e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct x86_guest {
 	int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
+	void (*enc_kexec_stop_conversion)(bool crash);
+	void (*enc_kexec_unshare_mem)(void);
 };
 
 /**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index b6b044356f1b..6585a5f2c2ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	crash_smp_send_stop();
 
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
+	}
+
 	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index 830425e6d38e..0574d4ad6b41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/objtool.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <acpi/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -716,6 +717,14 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_restart(void)
 
 void native_machine_shutdown(void)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Call enc_kexec_stop_conversion() while all CPUs are still active and
+	 * interrupts are enabled. This will allow all in-flight memory
+	 * conversions to finish cleanly.
+	 */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kexec_in_progress)
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(false);
+
 	/* Stop the cpus and apics */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
 	/*
@@ -752,6 +761,9 @@ void native_machine_shutdown(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	x86_platform.iommu_shutdown();
 #endif
+
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kexec_in_progress)
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
 }
 
 static void __machine_emergency_restart(int emergency)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index f0f54e109eb9..b95206ebc621 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
 static int enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return 0; }
 static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
 static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
+static void enc_kexec_stop_conversion_noop(bool crash) {}
+static void enc_kexec_unshare_mem_noop(void) {}
 static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
 
 struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
@@ -158,6 +160,8 @@ struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
 		.enc_status_change_finish  = enc_status_change_finish_noop,
 		.enc_tlb_flush_required	   = enc_tlb_flush_required_noop,
 		.enc_cache_flush_required  = enc_cache_flush_required_noop,
+		.enc_kexec_stop_conversion = enc_kexec_stop_conversion_noop,
+		.enc_kexec_unshare_mem     = enc_kexec_unshare_mem_noop,
 	},
 };
 
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-24 12:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-24 12:55 [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 01/16] x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 02/16] x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 03/16] cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 04/16] cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 05/16] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 06/16] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 07/16] x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 08/16] x86/tdx: Account shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2024-01-29  7:22   ` [PATCHv6 09/16] x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-29 10:24   ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-29 10:36     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-29 13:09       ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-29 13:34         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 11/16] x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 12/16] x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 13/16] x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 14/16] x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-26 14:08   ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 15/16] x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free() Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-26 14:10   ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-24 12:55 ` [PATCHv6 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-26 14:21   ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-27 18:15     ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-26 20:03   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-01-27 19:35     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-30 13:43 ` [PATCHv6 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-30 13:55   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-30 14:59     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-30 15:15       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-30 14:04   ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-31  7:31   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-31 12:47     ` Baoquan He
2024-01-31 12:58       ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-31 13:07         ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-31 15:23           ` Baoquan He

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