From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Justin Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>, joeyli <jlee@suse.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2018 09:05:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20736.1522829117@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXZWU1MC8LbLCg7VTVHMqKpXh51amnTjKePRCJ31jRiwg@mail.gmail.com>
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> As far as I can tell, what's really going on here is that there's a
> significant contingent here that wants to prevent Linux from
> chainloading something that isn't Linux.
You have completely the wrong end of the stick. No one has said that or even
implied that. You are alleging dishonesty on our part.
What we *have* said is that *if* we want to pass the secure boot state across
kexec, then we have to make sure that:
(1) no one tampers with the intermediate kernel between boot and kexec
otherwise the secure boot state is effectively invalidated, and
(2) the image that gets kexec'ed is trusted.
Remember: you cannot know (2) if you don't have (1).
And if someone tampers with the aim of breaking, say, Windows, then someone,
e.g. Microsoft, might blacklist the shim.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-04 8:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-30 23:29 [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot David Howells
2018-03-31 0:46 ` James Morris
2018-04-03 0:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 0:59 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 1:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 7:06 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 15:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 15:41 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-03 16:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 16:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 18:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 19:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 18:42 ` Peter Jones
2018-04-04 20:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-04 20:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 18:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-06 4:42 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-03 17:16 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 19:49 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 21:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 22:32 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 22:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 22:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 22:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 22:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 23:08 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-03 23:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 14:58 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-04 0:22 ` David Howells
2018-04-05 17:59 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-05 18:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 0:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 9:04 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 0:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 1:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 1:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 4:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 12:57 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 13:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 13:34 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 13:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 13:29 ` Mike Galbraith
2018-04-04 16:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 22:00 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-04 13:33 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 13:52 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 16:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 16:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:46 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-05 0:05 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-05 0:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 13:57 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 16:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 16:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 6:56 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-04 16:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 1:28 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-04 1:30 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-04 1:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 1:36 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-04 0:17 ` Jann Horn
2018-04-04 0:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 8:05 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-04-04 14:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 14:44 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 15:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-03 23:56 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:39 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-08 8:23 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-03 23:12 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 20:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 20:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 21:08 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:21 ` Al Viro
2018-04-03 21:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 8:10 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-31 10:20 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 13:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-04-03 21:48 ` James Morris
2018-04-05 17:53 ` Alan Cox
2018-11-21 12:05 ` [PATCH next-lockdown 0/1] debugfs EPERM fix for 'Kernel lockdown for secure boot' patch series Vasily Gorbik
2018-11-21 12:05 ` [PATCH next-lockdown 1/1] debugfs: avoid EPERM when no open file operation defined Vasily Gorbik
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-04-04 2:34 [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-04 4:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 7:44 ` joeyli
2018-04-08 8:07 ` joeyli
2018-04-09 3:40 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-09 8:14 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-04-09 13:55 ` joeyli
2017-10-26 16:37 David Howells
2017-10-26 18:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 19:20 ` James Morris
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