From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: pjones@redhat.com, luto@kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
jmorris@namei.org, Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
jforbes@redhat.com, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, jlee@suse.com,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2018 20:18:38 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJuunSCaOHKuwDXkzV8N8V-EeaoBhfg+EkL9VPvX7Dkycdg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1804042148480.1492@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 1:01 PM Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> Now where the disagreement lies is the way how the uid/ring0 aspect is
tied
> to secure boot, which makes it impossible to be useful independent of
> Secure Boot.
It doesn't - you can pass a command line parameter that enables it, or your
bootloader can set the bootparams flag. I don't see a fundamental problem
with offering the opportunity to change it at runtime, other than that some
stuff that was previously initialised may have to be torn down. The reason
for having the UEFI boot stub *optionally* check the secure boot state
itself and make a policy decision (rather than having the signed bootloader
do so) is because the kernel can be launched directly by the firmware.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-04 20:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-30 23:29 [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot David Howells
2018-03-31 0:46 ` James Morris
2018-04-03 0:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 0:59 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 1:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 7:06 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 15:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 15:41 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-03 16:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 16:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 18:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 19:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 18:42 ` Peter Jones
2018-04-04 20:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-04 20:18 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2018-04-05 18:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-06 4:42 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-03 17:16 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 19:49 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 21:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 22:32 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 22:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 22:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 22:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 22:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 23:08 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-03 23:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 14:58 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-04 0:22 ` David Howells
2018-04-05 17:59 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-05 18:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 0:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 9:04 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 0:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 1:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 1:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 4:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 12:57 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 13:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 13:34 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 13:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 13:29 ` Mike Galbraith
2018-04-04 16:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 22:00 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-04 13:33 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 13:52 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 16:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 16:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:46 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-05 0:05 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-05 0:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 13:57 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 16:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 16:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 6:56 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-04 16:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 1:28 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-04 1:30 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-04 1:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 1:36 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-04 0:17 ` Jann Horn
2018-04-04 0:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 8:05 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 14:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 14:44 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 15:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-03 23:56 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:39 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-08 8:23 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-03 23:12 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 20:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 20:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 21:08 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:21 ` Al Viro
2018-04-03 21:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 8:10 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-31 10:20 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 13:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-04-03 21:48 ` James Morris
2018-04-05 17:53 ` Alan Cox
2018-11-21 12:05 ` [PATCH next-lockdown 0/1] debugfs EPERM fix for 'Kernel lockdown for secure boot' patch series Vasily Gorbik
2018-11-21 12:05 ` [PATCH next-lockdown 1/1] debugfs: avoid EPERM when no open file operation defined Vasily Gorbik
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-04-04 2:34 [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-04 4:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 7:44 ` joeyli
2018-04-08 8:07 ` joeyli
2018-04-09 3:40 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-09 8:14 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-04-09 13:55 ` joeyli
2017-10-26 16:37 David Howells
2017-10-26 18:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 19:20 ` James Morris
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