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* [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue
@ 2021-03-09 15:13 syzbot
  2021-03-09 15:20 ` Eric Dumazet
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2021-03-09 15:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: davem, jhs, jiri, kuba, linux-kernel, maximmi, netdev,
	syzkaller-bugs, tariqt, xiyou.wangcong

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    38b5133a octeontx2-pf: Fix otx2_get_fecparam()
git tree:       net-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=166288a8d00000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dbc1ca9e55dc1f9f
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b53a709f04722ca12a3c
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=119454ccd00000

The issue was bisected to:

commit d03b195b5aa015f6c11988b86a3625f8d5dbac52
Author: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com>
Date:   Tue Jan 19 12:08:13 2021 +0000

    sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload

bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=13ab12ecd00000
final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=106b12ecd00000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17ab12ecd00000

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+b53a709f04722ca12a3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d03b195b5aa0 ("sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload")

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
PGD 183fe067 P4D 183fe067 PUD 21aef067 PMD 0 
Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 10125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 htb_offload net/sched/sch_htb.c:1011 [inline]
 htb_select_queue+0x17f/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_htb.c:1349
 tc_modify_qdisc+0x44a/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1657
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2348
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2402
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2435
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x466019
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f73f9698188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 0000000000466019
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000004bd067 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
R13: 00007fffefccc11f R14: 00007f73f9698300 R15: 0000000000022000
Modules linked in:
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace e1544e8206616773 ]---
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400


---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.

syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue
  2021-03-09 15:13 [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue syzbot
@ 2021-03-09 15:20 ` Eric Dumazet
  2021-03-10 14:54   ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2021-03-09 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot, davem, jhs, jiri, kuba, linux-kernel, maximmi, netdev,
	syzkaller-bugs, tariqt, xiyou.wangcong



On 3/9/21 4:13 PM, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> syzbot found the following issue on:
> 
> HEAD commit:    38b5133a octeontx2-pf: Fix otx2_get_fecparam()
> git tree:       net-next
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=166288a8d00000
> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dbc1ca9e55dc1f9f
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b53a709f04722ca12a3c
> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=119454ccd00000
> 
> The issue was bisected to:
> 
> commit d03b195b5aa015f6c11988b86a3625f8d5dbac52
> Author: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com>
> Date:   Tue Jan 19 12:08:13 2021 +0000
> 
>     sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload
> 
> bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=13ab12ecd00000
> final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=106b12ecd00000
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17ab12ecd00000
> 
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+b53a709f04722ca12a3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: d03b195b5aa0 ("sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload")
> 
> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
> #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
> #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
> PGD 183fe067 P4D 183fe067 PUD 21aef067 PMD 0 
> Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> CPU: 0 PID: 10125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> RIP: 0010:0x0
> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Call Trace:
>  htb_offload net/sched/sch_htb.c:1011 [inline]
>  htb_select_queue+0x17f/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_htb.c:1349
>  tc_modify_qdisc+0x44a/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1657
>  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
>  netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
>  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
>  netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
>  netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
>  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
>  sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
>  ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2348
>  ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2402
>  __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2435
>  do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> RIP: 0033:0x466019
> Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> RSP: 002b:00007f73f9698188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 0000000000466019
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
> RBP: 00000000004bd067 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
> R13: 00007fffefccc11f R14: 00007f73f9698300 R15: 0000000000022000
> Modules linked in:
> CR2: 0000000000000000
> ---[ end trace e1544e8206616773 ]---
> RIP: 0010:0x0
> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> 
> 
> ---
> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
> 
> syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
> For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
> syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
> 


Hmm... what about this :

diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index f87d07736a1404edcfd17a792321758cd4bdd173..680afb5bfe2294a5531c7aaeed698b95ea3ab20c 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -1651,15 +1651,16 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n,
                        err = -ENOENT;
                }
        } else {
-               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
+               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue = NULL;
 
                if (p && p->ops->cl_ops && p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue)
                        dev_queue = p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue(p, tcm);
-               else if (p)
-                       dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
-               else
-                       dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
-
+               if (!dev_queue) {
+                       if (p)
+                               dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
+                       else
+                               dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
+               }
                q = qdisc_create(dev, dev_queue, p,
                                 tcm->tcm_parent, tcm->tcm_handle,
                                 tca, &err, extack);
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..cc6eccd688701ae00255f07e32fb4b0efbaf45ce 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
@@ -1008,6 +1008,8 @@ static void htb_set_lockdep_class_child(struct Qdisc *q)
 
 static int htb_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_htb_qopt_offload *opt)
 {
+       if (!tc_can_offload(dev) || !dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc)
+               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
        return dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc(dev, TC_SETUP_QDISC_HTB, opt);
 }
 


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue
  2021-03-09 15:20 ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2021-03-10 14:54   ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
  2021-03-10 17:03     ` Eric Dumazet
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Maxim Mikityanskiy @ 2021-03-10 14:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Dumazet, syzbot, davem, jhs, jiri, kuba, linux-kernel,
	maximmi, netdev, syzkaller-bugs, tariqt, xiyou.wangcong

On 2021-03-09 17:20, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/9/21 4:13 PM, syzbot wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> syzbot found the following issue on:
>>
>> HEAD commit:    38b5133a octeontx2-pf: Fix otx2_get_fecparam()
>> git tree:       net-next
>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=166288a8d00000
>> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dbc1ca9e55dc1f9f
>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b53a709f04722ca12a3c
>> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=119454ccd00000
>>
>> The issue was bisected to:
>>
>> commit d03b195b5aa015f6c11988b86a3625f8d5dbac52
>> Author: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com>
>> Date:   Tue Jan 19 12:08:13 2021 +0000
>>
>>      sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload
>>
>> bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=13ab12ecd00000
>> final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=106b12ecd00000
>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17ab12ecd00000
>>
>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>> Reported-by: syzbot+b53a709f04722ca12a3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> Fixes: d03b195b5aa0 ("sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload")
>>
>> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
>> #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
>> #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
>> PGD 183fe067 P4D 183fe067 PUD 21aef067 PMD 0
>> Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
>> CPU: 0 PID: 10125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>> RIP: 0010:0x0
>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
>> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>> Call Trace:
>>   htb_offload net/sched/sch_htb.c:1011 [inline]
>>   htb_select_queue+0x17f/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_htb.c:1349
>>   tc_modify_qdisc+0x44a/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1657
>>   rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
>>   netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
>>   netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
>>   netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
>>   netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
>>   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
>>   sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
>>   ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2348
>>   ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2402
>>   __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2435
>>   do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
>>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
>> RIP: 0033:0x466019
>> Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
>> RSP: 002b:00007f73f9698188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 0000000000466019
>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
>> RBP: 00000000004bd067 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
>> R13: 00007fffefccc11f R14: 00007f73f9698300 R15: 0000000000022000
>> Modules linked in:
>> CR2: 0000000000000000
>> ---[ end trace e1544e8206616773 ]---
>> RIP: 0010:0x0
>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
>> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>
>>
>> ---
>> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
>> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
>> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>>
>> syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
>> For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
>> syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
>>
> 
> 
> Hmm... what about this :
> 
> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
> index f87d07736a1404edcfd17a792321758cd4bdd173..680afb5bfe2294a5531c7aaeed698b95ea3ab20c 100644
> --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
> +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
> @@ -1651,15 +1651,16 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n,
>                          err = -ENOENT;
>                  }
>          } else {
> -               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
> +               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue = NULL;
>   
>                  if (p && p->ops->cl_ops && p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue)
>                          dev_queue = p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue(p, tcm);
> -               else if (p)
> -                       dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
> -               else
> -                       dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
> -
> +               if (!dev_queue) {
> +                       if (p)
> +                               dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
> +                       else
> +                               dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
> +               }
>                  q = qdisc_create(dev, dev_queue, p,
>                                   tcm->tcm_parent, tcm->tcm_handle,
>                                   tca, &err, extack);
> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..cc6eccd688701ae00255f07e32fb4b0efbaf45ce 100644
> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> @@ -1008,6 +1008,8 @@ static void htb_set_lockdep_class_child(struct Qdisc *q)
>   
>   static int htb_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_htb_qopt_offload *opt)
>   {
> +       if (!tc_can_offload(dev) || !dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc)
> +               return -EOPNOTSUPP;

My fault, all calls to htb_offload must be protected by if (q->offload). 
Rather than checking tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc in htb_offload 
every time, I suggest to fix htb_select_queue:

diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
index dff3adf5a915..b23203159996 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
@@ -1340,8 +1340,12 @@ htb_select_queue(struct Qdisc *sch, struct tcmsg 
*tcm)
  {
  	struct net_device *dev = qdisc_dev(sch);
  	struct tc_htb_qopt_offload offload_opt;
+	struct htb_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
  	int err;

+	if (!q->offload)
+		return sch->dev_queue;
+
  	offload_opt = (struct tc_htb_qopt_offload) {
  		.command = TC_HTB_LEAF_QUERY_QUEUE,
  		.classid = TC_H_MIN(tcm->tcm_parent),

htb_init ensures that tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc are checked if 
q->offload is true. Also, we can avoid changing tc_modify_qdisc if 
htb_select_queue mimics its behavior in non-offload mode, as shown above.

There is also a case where htb_select_queue returns NULL on errors, and 
that is handled in qdisc_create (the error message will be "No device 
queue given"), which I think is a sane behavior.

What do you think of this fix? If it fits, I'll send it as a patch.

>          return dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc(dev, TC_SETUP_QDISC_HTB, opt);
>   }
>   
> 


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue
  2021-03-10 14:54   ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
@ 2021-03-10 17:03     ` Eric Dumazet
  2021-03-10 18:55       ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2021-03-10 17:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Maxim Mikityanskiy, Eric Dumazet, syzbot, davem, jhs, jiri, kuba,
	linux-kernel, maximmi, netdev, syzkaller-bugs, tariqt,
	xiyou.wangcong



On 3/10/21 3:54 PM, Maxim Mikityanskiy wrote:
> On 2021-03-09 17:20, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3/9/21 4:13 PM, syzbot wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> syzbot found the following issue on:
>>>
>>> HEAD commit:    38b5133a octeontx2-pf: Fix otx2_get_fecparam()
>>> git tree:       net-next
>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=166288a8d00000
>>> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dbc1ca9e55dc1f9f
>>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b53a709f04722ca12a3c
>>> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=119454ccd00000
>>>
>>> The issue was bisected to:
>>>
>>> commit d03b195b5aa015f6c11988b86a3625f8d5dbac52
>>> Author: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com>
>>> Date:   Tue Jan 19 12:08:13 2021 +0000
>>>
>>>      sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload
>>>
>>> bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=13ab12ecd00000
>>> final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=106b12ecd00000
>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17ab12ecd00000
>>>
>>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>>> Reported-by: syzbot+b53a709f04722ca12a3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>>> Fixes: d03b195b5aa0 ("sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload")
>>>
>>> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
>>> #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
>>> #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
>>> PGD 183fe067 P4D 183fe067 PUD 21aef067 PMD 0
>>> Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
>>> CPU: 0 PID: 10125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
>>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>>> RIP: 0010:0x0
>>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
>>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
>>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
>>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
>>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
>>> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
>>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>> Call Trace:
>>>   htb_offload net/sched/sch_htb.c:1011 [inline]
>>>   htb_select_queue+0x17f/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_htb.c:1349
>>>   tc_modify_qdisc+0x44a/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1657
>>>   rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
>>>   netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
>>>   netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
>>>   netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
>>>   netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
>>>   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
>>>   sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
>>>   ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2348
>>>   ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2402
>>>   __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2435
>>>   do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
>>>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
>>> RIP: 0033:0x466019
>>> Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
>>> RSP: 002b:00007f73f9698188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
>>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 0000000000466019
>>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
>>> RBP: 00000000004bd067 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
>>> R13: 00007fffefccc11f R14: 00007f73f9698300 R15: 0000000000022000
>>> Modules linked in:
>>> CR2: 0000000000000000
>>> ---[ end trace e1544e8206616773 ]---
>>> RIP: 0010:0x0
>>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
>>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
>>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
>>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
>>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
>>> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
>>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>>
>>>
>>> ---
>>> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
>>> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
>>> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>>>
>>> syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
>>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
>>> For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
>>> syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
>>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
>>>
>>
>>
>> Hmm... what about this :
>>
>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
>> index f87d07736a1404edcfd17a792321758cd4bdd173..680afb5bfe2294a5531c7aaeed698b95ea3ab20c 100644
>> --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
>> @@ -1651,15 +1651,16 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n,
>>                          err = -ENOENT;
>>                  }
>>          } else {
>> -               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
>> +               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue = NULL;
>>                    if (p && p->ops->cl_ops && p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue)
>>                          dev_queue = p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue(p, tcm);
>> -               else if (p)
>> -                       dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
>> -               else
>> -                       dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
>> -
>> +               if (!dev_queue) {
>> +                       if (p)
>> +                               dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
>> +                       else
>> +                               dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
>> +               }
>>                  q = qdisc_create(dev, dev_queue, p,
>>                                   tcm->tcm_parent, tcm->tcm_handle,
>>                                   tca, &err, extack);
>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..cc6eccd688701ae00255f07e32fb4b0efbaf45ce 100644
>> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> @@ -1008,6 +1008,8 @@ static void htb_set_lockdep_class_child(struct Qdisc *q)
>>     static int htb_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_htb_qopt_offload *opt)
>>   {
>> +       if (!tc_can_offload(dev) || !dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc)
>> +               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> 
> My fault, all calls to htb_offload must be protected by if (q->offload). Rather than checking tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc in htb_offload every time, I suggest to fix htb_select_queue:
> 
> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> index dff3adf5a915..b23203159996 100644
> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> @@ -1340,8 +1340,12 @@ htb_select_queue(struct Qdisc *sch, struct tcmsg *tcm)
>  {
>      struct net_device *dev = qdisc_dev(sch);
>      struct tc_htb_qopt_offload offload_opt;
> +    struct htb_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
>      int err;
> 
> +    if (!q->offload)
> +        return sch->dev_queue;
> +
>      offload_opt = (struct tc_htb_qopt_offload) {
>          .command = TC_HTB_LEAF_QUERY_QUEUE,
>          .classid = TC_H_MIN(tcm->tcm_parent),
> 
> htb_init ensures that tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc are checked if q->offload is true. Also, we can avoid changing tc_modify_qdisc if htb_select_queue mimics its behavior in non-offload mode, as shown above.
> 
> There is also a case where htb_select_queue returns NULL on errors, and that is handled in qdisc_create (the error message will be "No device queue given"), which I think is a sane behavior.
> 
> What do you think of this fix? If it fits, I'll send it as a patch.


I think that it is not enough, since you overwrite q->offload in htb_init()
even if an error will be provided.

So a malicious user will find its way.

You probably also need this :


diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..d15ee7cf33b34221d09dfc81105dcb6c2b2fd489 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
@@ -1020,6 +1020,7 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
        struct nlattr *tb[TCA_HTB_MAX + 1];
        struct tc_htb_glob *gopt;
        unsigned int ntx;
+       bool offload;
        int err;
 
        qdisc_watchdog_init(&q->watchdog, sch);
@@ -1044,9 +1045,9 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
        if (gopt->version != HTB_VER >> 16)
                return -EINVAL;
 
-       q->offload = nla_get_flag(tb[TCA_HTB_OFFLOAD]);
+       offload = nla_get_flag(tb[TCA_HTB_OFFLOAD]);
 
-       if (q->offload) {
+       if (offload) {
                if (sch->parent != TC_H_ROOT)
                        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
@@ -1060,6 +1061,7 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
                if (!q->direct_qdiscs)
                        return -ENOMEM;
        }
+       q->offload = offload;
 
        err = qdisc_class_hash_init(&q->clhash);
        if (err < 0)

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue
  2021-03-10 17:03     ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2021-03-10 18:55       ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
  2021-03-10 19:39         ` Eric Dumazet
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Maxim Mikityanskiy @ 2021-03-10 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Dumazet, syzbot, davem, jhs, jiri, kuba, linux-kernel,
	maximmi, netdev, syzkaller-bugs, tariqt, xiyou.wangcong

On 2021-03-10 19:03, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/10/21 3:54 PM, Maxim Mikityanskiy wrote:
>> On 2021-03-09 17:20, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 3/9/21 4:13 PM, syzbot wrote:
>>>> Hello,
>>>>
>>>> syzbot found the following issue on:
>>>>
>>>> HEAD commit:    38b5133a octeontx2-pf: Fix otx2_get_fecparam()
>>>> git tree:       net-next
>>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=166288a8d00000
>>>> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dbc1ca9e55dc1f9f
>>>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b53a709f04722ca12a3c
>>>> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=119454ccd00000
>>>>
>>>> The issue was bisected to:
>>>>
>>>> commit d03b195b5aa015f6c11988b86a3625f8d5dbac52
>>>> Author: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com>
>>>> Date:   Tue Jan 19 12:08:13 2021 +0000
>>>>
>>>>       sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload
>>>>
>>>> bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=13ab12ecd00000
>>>> final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=106b12ecd00000
>>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17ab12ecd00000
>>>>
>>>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>>>> Reported-by: syzbot+b53a709f04722ca12a3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>>>> Fixes: d03b195b5aa0 ("sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload")
>>>>
>>>> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
>>>> #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
>>>> #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
>>>> PGD 183fe067 P4D 183fe067 PUD 21aef067 PMD 0
>>>> Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
>>>> CPU: 0 PID: 10125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
>>>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>>>> RIP: 0010:0x0
>>>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>>>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>>>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
>>>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
>>>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
>>>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
>>>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
>>>> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>>>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
>>>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>>> Call Trace:
>>>>    htb_offload net/sched/sch_htb.c:1011 [inline]
>>>>    htb_select_queue+0x17f/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_htb.c:1349
>>>>    tc_modify_qdisc+0x44a/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1657
>>>>    rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
>>>>    netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
>>>>    netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
>>>>    netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
>>>>    netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
>>>>    sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
>>>>    sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
>>>>    ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2348
>>>>    ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2402
>>>>    __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2435
>>>>    do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
>>>>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
>>>> RIP: 0033:0x466019
>>>> Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
>>>> RSP: 002b:00007f73f9698188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
>>>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 0000000000466019
>>>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
>>>> RBP: 00000000004bd067 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>>>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
>>>> R13: 00007fffefccc11f R14: 00007f73f9698300 R15: 0000000000022000
>>>> Modules linked in:
>>>> CR2: 0000000000000000
>>>> ---[ end trace e1544e8206616773 ]---
>>>> RIP: 0010:0x0
>>>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>>>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>>>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
>>>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
>>>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
>>>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
>>>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
>>>> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>>>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
>>>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
>>>> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
>>>> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>>>>
>>>> syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
>>>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
>>>> For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
>>>> syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
>>>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hmm... what about this :
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
>>> index f87d07736a1404edcfd17a792321758cd4bdd173..680afb5bfe2294a5531c7aaeed698b95ea3ab20c 100644
>>> --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
>>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
>>> @@ -1651,15 +1651,16 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n,
>>>                           err = -ENOENT;
>>>                   }
>>>           } else {
>>> -               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
>>> +               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue = NULL;
>>>                     if (p && p->ops->cl_ops && p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue)
>>>                           dev_queue = p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue(p, tcm);
>>> -               else if (p)
>>> -                       dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
>>> -               else
>>> -                       dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
>>> -
>>> +               if (!dev_queue) {
>>> +                       if (p)
>>> +                               dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
>>> +                       else
>>> +                               dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
>>> +               }
>>>                   q = qdisc_create(dev, dev_queue, p,
>>>                                    tcm->tcm_parent, tcm->tcm_handle,
>>>                                    tca, &err, extack);
>>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>> index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..cc6eccd688701ae00255f07e32fb4b0efbaf45ce 100644
>>> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>> @@ -1008,6 +1008,8 @@ static void htb_set_lockdep_class_child(struct Qdisc *q)
>>>      static int htb_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_htb_qopt_offload *opt)
>>>    {
>>> +       if (!tc_can_offload(dev) || !dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc)
>>> +               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>
>> My fault, all calls to htb_offload must be protected by if (q->offload). Rather than checking tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc in htb_offload every time, I suggest to fix htb_select_queue:
>>
>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> index dff3adf5a915..b23203159996 100644
>> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> @@ -1340,8 +1340,12 @@ htb_select_queue(struct Qdisc *sch, struct tcmsg *tcm)
>>   {
>>       struct net_device *dev = qdisc_dev(sch);
>>       struct tc_htb_qopt_offload offload_opt;
>> +    struct htb_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
>>       int err;
>>
>> +    if (!q->offload)
>> +        return sch->dev_queue;
>> +
>>       offload_opt = (struct tc_htb_qopt_offload) {
>>           .command = TC_HTB_LEAF_QUERY_QUEUE,
>>           .classid = TC_H_MIN(tcm->tcm_parent),
>>
>> htb_init ensures that tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc are checked if q->offload is true. Also, we can avoid changing tc_modify_qdisc if htb_select_queue mimics its behavior in non-offload mode, as shown above.
>>
>> There is also a case where htb_select_queue returns NULL on errors, and that is handled in qdisc_create (the error message will be "No device queue given"), which I think is a sane behavior.
>>
>> What do you think of this fix? If it fits, I'll send it as a patch.
> 
> 
> I think that it is not enough, since you overwrite q->offload in htb_init()
> even if an error will be provided.
> 
> So a malicious user will find its way.

I doubt that, because if htb_init returns an error, the qdisc gets 
destroyed immediately (well, after a call to htb_destroy), and I believe 
all these operations are protected by RTNL, so a malicious user has no 
way to insert a call to another callback.

> You probably also need this :

However, I'll likely need something like this anyway, because HTB must 
not call ndo_setup_tc on destroy if it didn't call it on init. It may 
crash in a similar way if ndo_setup_tc is not implemented. Thanks for 
helping me spot that - if you don't mind, I'll base my second patch on 
your code below.

> 
> 
> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..d15ee7cf33b34221d09dfc81105dcb6c2b2fd489 100644
> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
> @@ -1020,6 +1020,7 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
>          struct nlattr *tb[TCA_HTB_MAX + 1];
>          struct tc_htb_glob *gopt;
>          unsigned int ntx;
> +       bool offload;
>          int err;
>   
>          qdisc_watchdog_init(&q->watchdog, sch);
> @@ -1044,9 +1045,9 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
>          if (gopt->version != HTB_VER >> 16)
>                  return -EINVAL;
>   
> -       q->offload = nla_get_flag(tb[TCA_HTB_OFFLOAD]);
> +       offload = nla_get_flag(tb[TCA_HTB_OFFLOAD]);
>   
> -       if (q->offload) {
> +       if (offload) {
>                  if (sch->parent != TC_H_ROOT)
>                          return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>   
> @@ -1060,6 +1061,7 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
>                  if (!q->direct_qdiscs)
>                          return -ENOMEM;
>          }
> +       q->offload = offload;
>   
>          err = qdisc_class_hash_init(&q->clhash);
>          if (err < 0)
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue
  2021-03-10 18:55       ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
@ 2021-03-10 19:39         ` Eric Dumazet
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2021-03-10 19:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Maxim Mikityanskiy, Eric Dumazet, syzbot, davem, jhs, jiri, kuba,
	linux-kernel, maximmi, netdev, syzkaller-bugs, tariqt,
	xiyou.wangcong



On 3/10/21 7:55 PM, Maxim Mikityanskiy wrote:
> On 2021-03-10 19:03, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3/10/21 3:54 PM, Maxim Mikityanskiy wrote:
>>> On 2021-03-09 17:20, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 3/9/21 4:13 PM, syzbot wrote:
>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>
>>>>> syzbot found the following issue on:
>>>>>
>>>>> HEAD commit:    38b5133a octeontx2-pf: Fix otx2_get_fecparam()
>>>>> git tree:       net-next
>>>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=166288a8d00000
>>>>> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dbc1ca9e55dc1f9f
>>>>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b53a709f04722ca12a3c
>>>>> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=119454ccd00000
>>>>>
>>>>> The issue was bisected to:
>>>>>
>>>>> commit d03b195b5aa015f6c11988b86a3625f8d5dbac52
>>>>> Author: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com>
>>>>> Date:   Tue Jan 19 12:08:13 2021 +0000
>>>>>
>>>>>       sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload
>>>>>
>>>>> bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=13ab12ecd00000
>>>>> final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=106b12ecd00000
>>>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17ab12ecd00000
>>>>>
>>>>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>>>>> Reported-by: syzbot+b53a709f04722ca12a3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>>>>> Fixes: d03b195b5aa0 ("sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload")
>>>>>
>>>>> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
>>>>> #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
>>>>> #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
>>>>> PGD 183fe067 P4D 183fe067 PUD 21aef067 PMD 0
>>>>> Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
>>>>> CPU: 0 PID: 10125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
>>>>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>>>>> RIP: 0010:0x0
>>>>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>>>>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>>>>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
>>>>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
>>>>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
>>>>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
>>>>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
>>>>> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>>>>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>>>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
>>>>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>>>> Call Trace:
>>>>>    htb_offload net/sched/sch_htb.c:1011 [inline]
>>>>>    htb_select_queue+0x17f/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_htb.c:1349
>>>>>    tc_modify_qdisc+0x44a/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1657
>>>>>    rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553
>>>>>    netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
>>>>>    netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
>>>>>    netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
>>>>>    netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
>>>>>    sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
>>>>>    sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
>>>>>    ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2348
>>>>>    ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2402
>>>>>    __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2435
>>>>>    do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
>>>>>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
>>>>> RIP: 0033:0x466019
>>>>> Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
>>>>> RSP: 002b:00007f73f9698188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
>>>>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 0000000000466019
>>>>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
>>>>> RBP: 00000000004bd067 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>>>>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
>>>>> R13: 00007fffefccc11f R14: 00007f73f9698300 R15: 0000000000022000
>>>>> Modules linked in:
>>>>> CR2: 0000000000000000
>>>>> ---[ end trace e1544e8206616773 ]---
>>>>> RIP: 0010:0x0
>>>>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
>>>>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
>>>>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000
>>>>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000
>>>>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400
>>>>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40
>>>>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000
>>>>> FS:  00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>>>>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>>>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
>>>>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
>>>>> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
>>>>> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>>>>>
>>>>> syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
>>>>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
>>>>> For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
>>>>> syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
>>>>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hmm... what about this :
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
>>>> index f87d07736a1404edcfd17a792321758cd4bdd173..680afb5bfe2294a5531c7aaeed698b95ea3ab20c 100644
>>>> --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
>>>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
>>>> @@ -1651,15 +1651,16 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n,
>>>>                           err = -ENOENT;
>>>>                   }
>>>>           } else {
>>>> -               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;
>>>> +               struct netdev_queue *dev_queue = NULL;
>>>>                     if (p && p->ops->cl_ops && p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue)
>>>>                           dev_queue = p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue(p, tcm);
>>>> -               else if (p)
>>>> -                       dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
>>>> -               else
>>>> -                       dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
>>>> -
>>>> +               if (!dev_queue) {
>>>> +                       if (p)
>>>> +                               dev_queue = p->dev_queue;
>>>> +                       else
>>>> +                               dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0);
>>>> +               }
>>>>                   q = qdisc_create(dev, dev_queue, p,
>>>>                                    tcm->tcm_parent, tcm->tcm_handle,
>>>>                                    tca, &err, extack);
>>>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>>> index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..cc6eccd688701ae00255f07e32fb4b0efbaf45ce 100644
>>>> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>>> @@ -1008,6 +1008,8 @@ static void htb_set_lockdep_class_child(struct Qdisc *q)
>>>>      static int htb_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_htb_qopt_offload *opt)
>>>>    {
>>>> +       if (!tc_can_offload(dev) || !dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc)
>>>> +               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>
>>> My fault, all calls to htb_offload must be protected by if (q->offload). Rather than checking tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc in htb_offload every time, I suggest to fix htb_select_queue:
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>> index dff3adf5a915..b23203159996 100644
>>> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>>> @@ -1340,8 +1340,12 @@ htb_select_queue(struct Qdisc *sch, struct tcmsg *tcm)
>>>   {
>>>       struct net_device *dev = qdisc_dev(sch);
>>>       struct tc_htb_qopt_offload offload_opt;
>>> +    struct htb_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
>>>       int err;
>>>
>>> +    if (!q->offload)
>>> +        return sch->dev_queue;
>>> +
>>>       offload_opt = (struct tc_htb_qopt_offload) {
>>>           .command = TC_HTB_LEAF_QUERY_QUEUE,
>>>           .classid = TC_H_MIN(tcm->tcm_parent),
>>>
>>> htb_init ensures that tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc are checked if q->offload is true. Also, we can avoid changing tc_modify_qdisc if htb_select_queue mimics its behavior in non-offload mode, as shown above.
>>>
>>> There is also a case where htb_select_queue returns NULL on errors, and that is handled in qdisc_create (the error message will be "No device queue given"), which I think is a sane behavior.
>>>
>>> What do you think of this fix? If it fits, I'll send it as a patch.
>>
>>
>> I think that it is not enough, since you overwrite q->offload in htb_init()
>> even if an error will be provided.
>>
>> So a malicious user will find its way.
> 
> I doubt that, because if htb_init returns an error, the qdisc gets destroyed immediately (well, after a call to htb_destroy), and I believe all these operations are protected by RTNL, so a malicious user has no way to insert a call to another callback.



Yes, but htb_destroy() will crash, as I tried to point out ;)


> 
>> You probably also need this :
> 
> However, I'll likely need something like this anyway, because HTB must not call ndo_setup_tc on destroy if it didn't call it on init. It may crash in a similar way if ndo_setup_tc is not implemented. Thanks for helping me spot that - if you don't mind, I'll base my second patch on your code below.


Sure.

> 
>>
>>
>> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..d15ee7cf33b34221d09dfc81105dcb6c2b2fd489 100644
>> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c
>> @@ -1020,6 +1020,7 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
>>          struct nlattr *tb[TCA_HTB_MAX + 1];
>>          struct tc_htb_glob *gopt;
>>          unsigned int ntx;
>> +       bool offload;
>>          int err;
>>            qdisc_watchdog_init(&q->watchdog, sch);
>> @@ -1044,9 +1045,9 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
>>          if (gopt->version != HTB_VER >> 16)
>>                  return -EINVAL;
>>   -       q->offload = nla_get_flag(tb[TCA_HTB_OFFLOAD]);
>> +       offload = nla_get_flag(tb[TCA_HTB_OFFLOAD]);
>>   -       if (q->offload) {
>> +       if (offload) {
>>                  if (sch->parent != TC_H_ROOT)
>>                          return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>   @@ -1060,6 +1061,7 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
>>                  if (!q->direct_qdiscs)
>>                          return -ENOMEM;
>>          }
>> +       q->offload = offload;
>>            err = qdisc_class_hash_init(&q->clhash);
>>          if (err < 0)
>>
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2021-03-10 19:40 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-03-09 15:13 [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue syzbot
2021-03-09 15:20 ` Eric Dumazet
2021-03-10 14:54   ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
2021-03-10 17:03     ` Eric Dumazet
2021-03-10 18:55       ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
2021-03-10 19:39         ` Eric Dumazet

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