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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	David.Kaplan@amd.com, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 04/22] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for spec_rstack_overflow=off
Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2023 18:19:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <23a121e309d5e880eb35c441d9bdfa642d6d59f4.1692580085.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1692580085.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

If the user has requested no SRSO mitigation, other mitigations can use
the lighter-weight SBPB instead of IBPB.

Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b0ae985aa6a4..10499bcd4e39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2433,7 +2433,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	switch (srso_cmd) {
 	case SRSO_CMD_OFF:
-		return;
+		goto pred_cmd;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
 		if (has_microcode) {
-- 
2.41.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-21  1:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-21  1:18 [PATCH 00/22] SRSO fixes/cleanups Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:18 ` [PATCH 01/22] x86/srso: Fix srso_show_state() side effect Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:42   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21  6:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 16:17     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-22  5:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:18 ` [PATCH 02/22] x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation status Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:42   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21  9:27   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-21 14:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23  5:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23 12:22         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-24  4:24           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-24 22:04             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  6:42               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 13:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86: Support IBPB_BRTYPE and SBPB Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  9:34   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-21 16:23     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21 16:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21 16:46         ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21 16:50           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21 17:05         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24 16:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-24 17:07             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21 16:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21  1:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2023-08-21 14:16   ` [PATCH 04/22] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for spec_rstack_overflow=off Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 16:36     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-22  5:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-22  6:07         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-22 21:59           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  1:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 05/22] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for mitigations=off Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  5:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23 20:55     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23 23:02   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 06/22] x86/srso: Print actual mitigation if requested mitigation isn't possible Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  6:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 07/22] x86/srso: Remove default case in srso_select_mitigation() Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  6:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 08/22] x86/srso: Downgrade retbleed IBPB warning to informational message Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 09/22] x86/srso: Simplify exit paths Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 10/22] x86/srso: Print mitigation for retbleed IBPB case Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-24 21:40     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 11/22] x86/srso: Slight simplification Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 12/22] x86/srso: Remove redundant X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB check Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 13/22] x86/srso: Fix vulnerability reporting for missing microcode Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 14/22] x86/srso: Fix unret validation dependencies Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 15/22] x86/alternatives: Remove faulty optimization Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 16/22] x86/srso: Unexport untraining functions Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:50   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 17/22] x86/srso: Disentangle rethunk-dependent options Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 18/22] x86/rethunk: Use SYM_CODE_START[_LOCAL]_NOALIGN macros Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 19/22] x86/srso: Improve i-cache locality for alias mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 20/22] x86/retpoline: Remove .text..__x86.return_thunk section Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 21/22] x86/nospec: Refactor UNTRAIN_RET[_*] Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 22/22] x86/calldepth: Rename __x86_return_skl() to call_depth_return_thunk() Josh Poimboeuf

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