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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>, x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	David.Kaplan@amd.com, Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/22] x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation status
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 10:27:50 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <26a3421e-3a88-b326-4c4f-abdaa2262852@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <caf4d0a1233ccc1c33f4ff8d3fe302c9289f4bea.1692580085.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

On 21/08/2023 2:18 am, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> index 7eca6a8abbb1..b08af929135d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -766,6 +766,15 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  
>  	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT))
>  		smp_num_siblings = ((cpuid_ebx(0x8000001e) >> 8) & 0xff) + 1;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) {

This patch is necessary but not sufficient to fix the bugs.  There needs
to be a !cpu_has_hypervisor in here.

Linux must not probe microcode when virtualised.  What it may see
instantaneously on boot (owing to MSR_PRED_CMD being fully passed
through) is not accurate for the lifetime of the VM.

And yes, sucks for you if you're under an unaware hypervisor, but you've
already lost in that case anyway...

~Andrew

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-21  9:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-21  1:18 [PATCH 00/22] SRSO fixes/cleanups Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:18 ` [PATCH 01/22] x86/srso: Fix srso_show_state() side effect Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:42   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21  6:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 16:17     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-22  5:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:18 ` [PATCH 02/22] x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation status Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:42   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21  9:27   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2023-08-21 14:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23  5:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23 12:22         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-24  4:24           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-24 22:04             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  6:42               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 13:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86: Support IBPB_BRTYPE and SBPB Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  9:34   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-21 16:23     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21 16:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21 16:46         ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21 16:50           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21 17:05         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24 16:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-24 17:07             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21 16:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 04/22] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for spec_rstack_overflow=off Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21 14:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 16:36     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-22  5:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-22  6:07         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-22 21:59           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  1:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 05/22] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for mitigations=off Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  5:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23 20:55     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23 23:02   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 06/22] x86/srso: Print actual mitigation if requested mitigation isn't possible Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  6:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 07/22] x86/srso: Remove default case in srso_select_mitigation() Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  6:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 08/22] x86/srso: Downgrade retbleed IBPB warning to informational message Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 09/22] x86/srso: Simplify exit paths Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 10/22] x86/srso: Print mitigation for retbleed IBPB case Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-24 21:40     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 11/22] x86/srso: Slight simplification Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 12/22] x86/srso: Remove redundant X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB check Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 13/22] x86/srso: Fix vulnerability reporting for missing microcode Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 14/22] x86/srso: Fix unret validation dependencies Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 15/22] x86/alternatives: Remove faulty optimization Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 16/22] x86/srso: Unexport untraining functions Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:50   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 17/22] x86/srso: Disentangle rethunk-dependent options Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 18/22] x86/rethunk: Use SYM_CODE_START[_LOCAL]_NOALIGN macros Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 19/22] x86/srso: Improve i-cache locality for alias mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 20/22] x86/retpoline: Remove .text..__x86.return_thunk section Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 21/22] x86/nospec: Refactor UNTRAIN_RET[_*] Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 22/22] x86/calldepth: Rename __x86_return_skl() to call_depth_return_thunk() Josh Poimboeuf

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