From: valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Warn the user when they could overflow mapcount
Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2018 12:58:42 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <24367.1518112722@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez2-MTJ2YrS5fPZi19RY6P_6NWuK1U5CcQpJ25=xrGSy_A@mail.gmail.com>
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On Thu, 08 Feb 2018 03:56:26 +0100, Jann Horn said:
> I wouldn't be too surprised if there are more 32-bit overflows that
> start being realistic once you put something on the order of terabytes
> of memory into one machine, given that refcount_t is 32 bits wide -
> for example, the i_count. See
> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=809 for an
> example where, given a sufficiently high RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, it was
> possible to overflow a 32-bit refcounter on a system with just ~32GiB
> of free memory (minimum required to store 2^32 64-bit pointers).
>
> On systems with RAM on the order of terabytes, it's probably a good
> idea to turn on refcount hardening to make issues like that
> non-exploitable for now.
I have at least 10 systems across the hall that have 3T of RAM on them
across our various HPC clusters. So this is indeed no longer a hypothetical
issue.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-08 17:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-08 2:11 [RFC] Warn the user when they could overflow mapcount Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-08 2:56 ` Jann Horn
2018-02-08 4:04 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-08 17:58 ` valdis.kletnieks [this message]
2018-02-08 18:05 ` Daniel Micay
2018-02-08 18:56 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-08 19:33 ` Daniel Micay
2018-02-08 19:42 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-08 19:48 ` Daniel Micay
2018-02-08 20:21 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-08 21:37 ` [RFC] Limit mappings to ten per page per process Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-09 4:26 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-02-14 13:51 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-14 14:05 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-02-09 1:47 ` [RFC] Warn the user when they could overflow mapcount Daniel Micay
2018-02-08 3:18 ` Tobin C. Harding
2018-02-08 4:06 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-02 21:26 ` [RFC] Handle mapcount overflows Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-02 22:03 ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-05-01 14:41 ` Jann Horn
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