[PATCH v2 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[PATCH v2 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Josh Poimboeuf]

v2:
- docs improvements: [Randy, Michael]
- Rename to "mitigations=" [Michael]
- Add cpu_mitigations_off() function wrapper [Michael]
- x86: Simplify logic [Boris]
- powerpc: Fix no_rfi_flush checking bug (use '&&' instead of '||')
- arm64: Rebase onto Jeremy Linton's v7 patches [Will]
- arm64: "kpti command line option" [Steve P]
- arm64: Add nospectre_v2 support

-----------

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
   it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
   vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
  leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
  SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Josh Poimboeuf (5):
  cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option
  x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
  powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
  s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
  arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                |  6 +++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                |  8 ++++-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                |  6 ++--
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c              |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 11 ++++--
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                             |  4 ++-
 include/linux/cpu.h                           | 24 +++++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++
 10 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

-- 
2.17.2

[PATCH v2 1/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Josh Poimboeuf]

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
   it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
   vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
  leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
  SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                           | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index faafdc59104a..3ea92e075c64 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2544,6 +2544,30 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
+			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
+			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
+			options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				This is the default behavior.
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index ae99dde02320..5350357dfbdb 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -188,4 +188,28 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 38890f62f9a8..aed9083f8eac 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2320,3 +2320,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_cmdline);
-- 
2.17.2

Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Borislav Petkov]

On Fri, Apr 12, 2019 at 03:39:28PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
> index 38890f62f9a8..aed9083f8eac 100644
> --- a/kernel/cpu.c
> +++ b/kernel/cpu.c
> @@ -2320,3 +2320,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
>  #endif
>  	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
>  }
> +
> +enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
> +
> +static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)

Forgot the verb: "mitigations_parse_cmdline".

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Josh Poimboeuf]

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 04:13:35PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2019 at 03:39:28PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
> > index 38890f62f9a8..aed9083f8eac 100644
> > --- a/kernel/cpu.c
> > +++ b/kernel/cpu.c
> > @@ -2320,3 +2320,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
> >  #endif
> >  	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
> >  }
> > +
> > +enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
> > +
> > +static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)
> 
> Forgot the verb: "mitigations_parse_cmdline".

Sure.

diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index aed9083f8eac..cf9fea42d8fc 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2323,7 +2323,7 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 
 enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
 
-static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
 {
 	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
 		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
@@ -2334,4 +2334,4 @@ static int __init mitigations_cmdline(char *arg)
 
 	return 0;
 }
-early_param("mitigations", mitigations_cmdline);
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);

[tip:core/speculation] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf]

Commit-ID:  98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429
Author:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:28 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:28 +0200

cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
   it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
   vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
  leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
  SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                             | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                    | 15 +++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 858b6c0b9a15..720ffa9c4e04 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2513,6 +2513,30 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
+			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
+			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
+			options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				This is the default behavior.
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 5041357d0297..2d9c6f4b78f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -187,4 +187,28 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index d1c6d152da89..e70a90634b41 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2279,3 +2279,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);

[PATCH v2 2/5] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Josh Poimboeuf]

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 11 +++++++++--
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                               |  4 +++-
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 3ea92e075c64..3e33bd03441a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2545,15 +2545,20 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
-			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
-			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
-			options.
+			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2561,12 +2566,13 @@
 				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
 				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
 				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
-				This is the default behavior.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
 				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
 				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 2da82eff0eb4..8043a21f36be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -440,7 +440,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -672,7 +673,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -1008,6 +1010,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 5d27172c683f..9c2463bc158f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;
-- 
2.17.2

[tip:core/speculation] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf]

Commit-ID:  d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812
Author:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:29 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:28 +0200

x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 11 +++++++++--
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                               |  4 +++-
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 720ffa9c4e04..779ddeb2929c 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2514,15 +2514,20 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
-			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
-			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
-			options.
+			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2530,12 +2535,13 @@
 				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
 				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
 				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
-				This is the default behavior.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
 				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
 				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 01874d54f4fd..435c078c2948 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -440,7 +440,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -672,7 +673,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -996,6 +998,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 4fee5c3003ed..5890f09bfc19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;

[PATCH v2 3/5] powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Josh Poimboeuf]

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                  | 6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 3e33bd03441a..a03ab62b69af 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2545,7 +2545,7 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
 			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2554,10 +2554,11 @@
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
-				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
index b33bafb8fcea..70568ccbd9fd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
index ba404dd9ce1d..4f49e1a3594c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 
-- 
2.17.2

[tip:core/speculation] powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf]

Commit-ID:  782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9
Author:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:30 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:29 +0200

powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                  | 6 +++---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 779ddeb2929c..ac7150a25a7a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2514,7 +2514,7 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
 			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2523,10 +2523,11 @@
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
-				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
index 9b8631533e02..cdf3e73000e9 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
index 236c1151a3a7..c7ec27ba8926 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 

[PATCH v2 4/5] s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Josh Poimboeuf]

Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Spectre v1 and
Spectre v2.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++--
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c                | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index a03ab62b69af..e84a01d90e92 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2545,7 +2545,7 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
 			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2556,7 +2556,8 @@
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
index bdddaae96559..649135cbedd5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);
 
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
 {
-	if (test_facility(156)) {
+	if (test_facility(156) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		/*
 		 * The machine supports etokens.
 		 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.
-- 
2.17.2

[tip:core/speculation] s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf]

Commit-ID:  0336e04a6520bdaefdb0769d2a70084fa52e81ed
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/0336e04a6520bdaefdb0769d2a70084fa52e81ed
Author:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:31 -0500
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:29 +0200

s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Spectre v1 and
Spectre v2.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4a161805458a5ec88812aac0307ae3908a030fc.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++--
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c                | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index ac7150a25a7a..1ae93872b79f 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2514,7 +2514,7 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
 			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2525,7 +2525,8 @@
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
index bdddaae96559..649135cbedd5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);
 
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
 {
-	if (test_facility(156)) {
+	if (test_facility(156) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		/*
 		 * The machine supports etokens.
 		 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.

[PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Josh Poimboeuf]

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com

 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 6 +++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 8 +++++++-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index e84a01d90e92..79bfc755defe 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
-			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
@@ -2555,11 +2555,13 @@
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
 					       nobp=0 [S390]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index a1f3188c7be0..65bcd7f0cca1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -405,6 +406,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		this_cpu_safe = true;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
 		if (!this_cpu_safe)
@@ -599,7 +603,7 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 	}
 
 	/* forced off */
-	if (__nospectre_v2) {
+	if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 		__hardenbp_enab = false;
 		return false;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 6b7e1556460a..d826b17f7820 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -966,7 +967,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
 		{ /* sentinel */ }
 	};
-	char const *str = "command line option";
+	char const *str = "kpti command line option";
 	bool meltdown_safe;
 
 	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
@@ -988,6 +989,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		__kpti_forced = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) {
+		str = "mitigations=off";
+		__kpti_forced = -1;
+	}
+
 	/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && kaslr_offset() > 0) {
 		if (!__kpti_forced) {
-- 
2.17.2

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Randy Dunlap]

On 4/12/19 1:39 PM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> 
> The default behavior is unchanged.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> ---
> NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
>       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> 
>  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++---
>  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 6 +++++-
>  arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 8 +++++++-
>  3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index e84a01d90e92..79bfc755defe 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@
>  			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
>  
>  	mitigations=
> -			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
> -			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
> +			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
> +			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
>  			arch-independent options, each of which is an
>  			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
>  
> @@ -2555,11 +2555,13 @@
>  				improves system performance, but it may also
>  				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
>  				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
> +					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
>  					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
>  					       nobp=0 [S390]
> -					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
> +					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
>  					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
>  					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
> +					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
>  					       l1tf=off [X86]
>  
>  			auto (default)

Hi,
Do we need to add "ARM64" to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst?


-- 
~Randy

[PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

[Josh Poimboeuf]

Add ARM64 to the legend of architectures.  It's already used in several
places in kernel-parameters.txt.

Suggested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
index b8d0bc07ed0a..0124980dca2d 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ parameter is applicable::
 	APIC	APIC support is enabled.
 	APM	Advanced Power Management support is enabled.
 	ARM	ARM architecture is enabled.
+	ARM64	ARM64 architecture is enabled.
 	AX25	Appropriate AX.25 support is enabled.
 	CLK	Common clock infrastructure is enabled.
 	CMA	Contiguous Memory Area support is enabled.
-- 
2.17.2

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

[Randy Dunlap]

On 4/12/19 8:56 PM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Add ARM64 to the legend of architectures.  It's already used in several
> places in kernel-parameters.txt.
> 
> Suggested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
> index b8d0bc07ed0a..0124980dca2d 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
> @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ parameter is applicable::
>  	APIC	APIC support is enabled.
>  	APM	Advanced Power Management support is enabled.
>  	ARM	ARM architecture is enabled.
> +	ARM64	ARM64 architecture is enabled.
>  	AX25	Appropriate AX.25 support is enabled.
>  	CLK	Common clock infrastructure is enabled.
>  	CMA	Contiguous Memory Area support is enabled.
> 


Thanks.

-- 
~Randy

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

[Jonathan Corbet]

On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 22:56:21 -0500
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:

> Add ARM64 to the legend of architectures.  It's already used in several
> places in kernel-parameters.txt.
> 
> Suggested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

It looks like nobody has picked this up...so I've applied it.

Thanks,

jon

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

[Will Deacon]

On Fri, May 03, 2019 at 06:37:56AM -0600, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 22:56:21 -0500
> Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> > Add ARM64 to the legend of architectures.  It's already used in several
> > places in kernel-parameters.txt.
> > 
> > Suggested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> 
> It looks like nobody has picked this up...so I've applied it.

It's queued and tagged in the arm64 tree, which should also be in next!

Will

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

[Jonathan Corbet]

On Fri, 3 May 2019 13:39:40 +0100
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:

> > It looks like nobody has picked this up...so I've applied it.  
> 
> It's queued and tagged in the arm64 tree, which should also be in next!

Just looked again, I still don't see it there.  Josh's mitigations= change
is there, but not this one.  In any case, I've unapplied it, so it's all
yours.

Thanks,

jon

Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Add ARM64 to kernel-parameters.rst

[Will Deacon]

On Fri, May 03, 2019 at 06:47:19AM -0600, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
> On Fri, 3 May 2019 13:39:40 +0100
> Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> 
> > > It looks like nobody has picked this up...so I've applied it.  
> > 
> > It's queued and tagged in the arm64 tree, which should also be in next!
> 
> Just looked again, I still don't see it there.  Josh's mitigations= change
> is there, but not this one.  In any case, I've unapplied it, so it's all
> yours.

Weird... I see it in -next as 4ad499c94264:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=4ad499c94264a2ee05aacc518b9bde658318e510

Will

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Thomas Gleixner]

On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:

> Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> 
> The default behavior is unchanged.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> ---
> NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
>       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com

So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
merge window.

Thanks,

	tglx

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Josh Poimboeuf]

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 09:26:13PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> 
> > Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> > with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> > v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> > 
> > The default behavior is unchanged.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
> >       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> 
> So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
> tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
> which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
> merge window.

Sounds good to me (though I guess it's up to the arm64 maintainers how
they want to handle the dependencies).

-- 
Josh

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Will Deacon]

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 09:26:13PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> 
> > Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> > with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> > v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> > 
> > The default behavior is unchanged.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
> >       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> 
> So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
> tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
> which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
> merge window.

Yes, that would work for us, cheers. I should get to Jeremy's latest version
next week and I'm certainly planning to get them queued up for 5.2.

Will

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Will Deacon]

Hi Thomas,

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 09:26:13PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> 
> > Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> > with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> > v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> > 
> > The default behavior is unchanged.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
> >       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> 
> So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
> tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
> which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
> merge window.

I'm assuming that this refers to the core/speculation branch in tip:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/log/?h=core/speculation

but please can you confirm that I'm good to pull that into arm64?

Cheers,

Will

Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Thomas Gleixner]

On Wed, 24 Apr 2019, Will Deacon wrote:

> Hi Thomas,
> 
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 09:26:13PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > 
> > > Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> > > with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> > > v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> > > 
> > > The default behavior is unchanged.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > > ---
> > > NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
> > >       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> > 
> > So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
> > tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
> > which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
> > merge window.
> 
> I'm assuming that this refers to the core/speculation branch in tip:
> 
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/log/?h=core/speculation
> 
> but please can you confirm that I'm good to pull that into arm64?

Yes. It's all yours :)

Thanks,

	tglx

Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

[Jiri Kosina]

On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:

> v2:
> - docs improvements: [Randy, Michael]
> - Rename to "mitigations=" [Michael]
> - Add cpu_mitigations_off() function wrapper [Michael]
> - x86: Simplify logic [Boris]
> - powerpc: Fix no_rfi_flush checking bug (use '&&' instead of '||')
> - arm64: Rebase onto Jeremy Linton's v7 patches [Will]
> - arm64: "kpti command line option" [Steve P]
> - arm64: Add nospectre_v2 support
> 
> -----------
> 
> Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
> bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
> complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
> architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
> have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
> 
> Most users fall into a few basic categories:
> 
> a) they want all mitigations off;
> 
> b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
>    it's vulnerable; or
> 
> c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
>    vulnerable.
> 
> Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
> aggregation of existing options:
> 
> - mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
> 
> - mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
>   leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
> 
> - mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
>   SMT if needed by a mitigation.
> 
> Josh Poimboeuf (5):
>   cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option
>   x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
>   powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
>   s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
>   arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

Thanks,

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs