From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
dave.martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org,
mark.rutland@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
ykaukab@suse.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 08:49:48 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3dfed0e1-9819-ccfd-1024-b6f64f5fbffe@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <af4f1e1e-673d-28e0-909d-f1e85b4d5b45@arm.com>
Hi Julien,
Thanks for taking a look at this!
On 12/13/2018 04:46 AM, Julien Thierry wrote:
>
>
> On 13/12/2018 09:23, Julien Thierry wrote:
>> Hi Jeremy,
>>
>> On 06/12/2018 23:44, Jeremy Linton wrote:
>>> Add a simple state machine which will track whether
>>> all the online cores in a machine are vulnerable.
>>>
>>> Once that is done we have a fairly authoritative view
>>> of the machine vulnerability, which allows us to make a
>>> judgment about machine safety if it hasn't been mitigated.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>> 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>> index 242898395f68..bea9adfef7fa 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>>> @@ -905,6 +905,8 @@ has_useable_cnp(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
>>> return has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
>>> }
>>>
>>> +static enum { A64_MELT_UNSET, A64_MELT_SAFE, A64_MELT_UNKN } __meltdown_safe = A64_MELT_UNSET;
>>> +
>>
>> I'm wondering, do we really need that tri state?
>>
>> Can't we consider that we are safe an move to unsafe/unkown if any cpu
>> during bring up is not in the safe list?
>>
>> The only user of this is cpu_show_meltdown, but I don't imagine it'll
>> get called before unmap_kernel_at_el0() is called for the boot CPU which
>> should initialise that state.
>>
>> Or is there another reason for having that UNSET state?
>>
>
> Ok, I think I get the point of the UNSET as #ifndef
> CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 we don't set the state. But does that mean we
> always fall in the "Unknown" case when we don't build kpti in? Is that
> desirable?
>
> If so, I'd suggest replacing the tri-state with the following change:
>
>
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
>>> +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>>> + char *buf)
>>> +{
>>> + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
>>> + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: KPTI\n");
>>> +
>
> if (!IS_ENABLED(UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0) || !meltdown_safe)
> sprintf(buf, "Unknown\n");
> else
> sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
If I'm understanding what your suggesting:
Isn't this only checking the current core, rather than the whole
machine? IIRC that was the fundamental complaint with the original set.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-13 16:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-06 23:44 [PATCH 0/6] add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 1/6] arm64: kpti: move check for non-vulnerable CPUs to a function Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 9:13 ` Julien Thierry
2018-12-12 14:36 ` Jeremy Linton
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 9:23 ` Julien Thierry
2018-12-13 10:46 ` Julien Thierry
2018-12-12 14:49 ` Jeremy Linton [this message]
2018-12-14 8:55 ` Julien Thierry
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 3/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 4/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 11:09 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-02 22:19 ` Jeremy Linton
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 5/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2018-12-14 10:34 ` Steven Price
2018-12-14 10:36 ` Will Deacon
2018-12-14 10:41 ` Steven Price
2018-12-14 11:28 ` Dave Martin
2018-12-14 11:33 ` Will Deacon
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 6/6] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 12:07 ` [PATCH 0/6] add system vulnerability sysfs entries Dave Martin
2018-12-12 15:48 ` Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 19:26 ` Dave Martin
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-08-07 18:14 [PATCH 0/6] arm64: add support for generic cpu vulnerabilities Mian Yousaf Kaukab
2018-08-07 18:14 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Mian Yousaf Kaukab
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