From: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
To: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
marc.zyngier@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, ykaukab@suse.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
shankerd@codeaurora.org, dave.martin@arm.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass
Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2018 10:41:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <96ac8a3f-9c03-9ad9-e148-5f3422c51075@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181214103644.GB1872@edgewater-inn.cambridge.arm.com>
On 14/12/2018 10:36, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 10:34:31AM +0000, Steven Price wrote:
>> On 06/12/2018 23:44, Jeremy Linton wrote:
>>> From: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@suse.de>
>>>
>>> Return status based no ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature.
>> ^^ on
>>
>>> Return string "Unknown" in case CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD is
>>> disabled or arch workaround2 is not available
>>> in the firmware.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@suse.de>
>>> [Added SSBS logic]
>>> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>> index 6505c93d507e..8aeb5ca38db8 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>> @@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>>> ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
>>> return false;
>>>
>>> + /* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
>>> case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
>>> pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
>>> ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
>>> @@ -828,4 +829,31 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
>>> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
>>> +{
>>> + /*
>>> + * Two assumptions: First, get_ssbd_state() reflects the worse case
>>> + * for hetrogenous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its
>> ^^^^ SSBD
>>> + * supported by all cores.
>>> + */
>>> + switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
>>> + case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
>>> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
>>> +
>>> + case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
>>> + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
>>> + if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
>>> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
>>> + return sprintf(buf,
>>> + "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n");
>>
>> NIT: To me this reads as the mitigation is disabled. Can we call it
>> "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" (with a capital 'D' and without the
>> 'd at the end)?
>
> Whilst I agree that the strings are reasonably confusing (especially when
> you pile on the double-negatives all the way up the stack!), we really
> have no choice but to follow x86's lead with these strings.
>
> I don't think it's worth forking the ABI in an attempt to make this clearer.
Ah, sorry I hadn't checked the x86 string - yes we should match that.
Steve
> Will
>
> _______________________________________________
> linux-arm-kernel mailing list
> linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
> http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-14 10:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-06 23:44 [PATCH 0/6] add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 1/6] arm64: kpti: move check for non-vulnerable CPUs to a function Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 9:13 ` Julien Thierry
2018-12-12 14:36 ` Jeremy Linton
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 9:23 ` Julien Thierry
2018-12-13 10:46 ` Julien Thierry
2018-12-12 14:49 ` Jeremy Linton
2018-12-14 8:55 ` Julien Thierry
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 3/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 4/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 11:09 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-02 22:19 ` Jeremy Linton
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 5/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2018-12-14 10:34 ` Steven Price
2018-12-14 10:36 ` Will Deacon
2018-12-14 10:41 ` Steven Price [this message]
2018-12-14 11:28 ` Dave Martin
2018-12-14 11:33 ` Will Deacon
2018-12-06 23:44 ` [PATCH 6/6] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 12:07 ` [PATCH 0/6] add system vulnerability sysfs entries Dave Martin
2018-12-12 15:48 ` Jeremy Linton
2018-12-13 19:26 ` Dave Martin
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-08-07 18:14 [PATCH 0/6] arm64: add support for generic cpu vulnerabilities Mian Yousaf Kaukab
2018-08-07 18:14 ` [PATCH 5/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Mian Yousaf Kaukab
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