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* [PATCH v4] KVM: SVM: Override default MMIO mask if memory encryption is enabled
@ 2020-01-09 23:42 Tom Lendacky
  0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2020-01-09 23:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm, linux-kernel
  Cc: Paolo Bonzini, Sean Christopherson, Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li,
	Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel, Brijesh Singh

The KVM MMIO support uses bit 51 as the reserved bit to cause nested page
faults when a guest performs MMIO. The AMD memory encryption support uses
a CPUID function to define the encryption bit position. Given this, it is
possible that these bits can conflict.

Use svm_hardware_setup() to override the MMIO mask if memory encryption
support is enabled. Various checks are performed to ensure that the mask
is properly defined and rsvd_bits() is used to generate the new mask (as
was done prior to the change that necessitated this patch).

Fixes: 28a1f3ac1d0c ("kvm: x86: Set highest physical address bits in non-present/reserved SPTEs")
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

---

Changes in v4:
- Use an MMIO mask of all zeroes if no reserved bits are available.
- Use the PT_PRESENT_MASK define instead of hardcoding the bit
  position.

Changes in v3:
- Add additional checks to ensure there are no conflicts between the
  encryption bit position and physical address setting.
- Use rsvd_bits() generated mask (as was previously used) instead of
  setting a single bit.

Changes in v2:
- Use of svm_hardware_setup() to override MMIO mask rather than adding an
  override callback routine.
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 122d4ce3b1ab..9612364267fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1307,6 +1307,47 @@ static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * The default MMIO mask is a single bit (excluding the present bit),
+ * which could conflict with the memory encryption bit. Check for
+ * memory encryption support and override the default MMIO mask if
+ * memory encryption is enabled.
+ */
+static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void)
+{
+	unsigned int enc_bit, mask_bit;
+	u64 msr, mask;
+
+	/* If there is no memory encryption support, use existing mask */
+	if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) < 0x8000001f)
+		return;
+
+	/* If memory encryption is not enabled, use existing mask */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
+	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		return;
+
+	enc_bit = cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) & 0x3f;
+	mask_bit = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
+
+	/* Increment the mask bit if it is the same as the encryption bit */
+	if (enc_bit == mask_bit)
+		mask_bit++;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the mask bit location is below 52, then some bits above the
+	 * physical addressing limit will always be reserved, so use the
+	 * rsvd_bits() function to generate the mask. This mask, along with
+	 * the present bit, will be used to generate a page fault with
+	 * PFER.RSV = 1.
+	 *
+	 * If the mask bit location is 52 (or above), then clear the mask.
+	 */
+	mask = (mask_bit < 52) ? rsvd_bits(mask_bit, 51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK);
+}
+
 static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
@@ -1361,6 +1402,8 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 		}
 	}
 
+	svm_adjust_mmio_mask();
+
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
 		if (r)
-- 
2.17.1


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