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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	tursulin@ursulin.net, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	acme@kernel.org, alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com,
	jolsa@redhat.com, namhyung@kernel.org, maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/5] perf: Per PMU access controls (paranoid setting)
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 14:44:04 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47c60dc1-47ed-ca31-cc3d-d26a1b00d19a@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1810020832430.32062@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>


Hello,

On 02.10.2018 9:40, Thomas Gleixner wrote:

<SNIP>

> 
> Not only the user group, it really should do the full security checks which
> are done on open().

I expect it is already implemented by some internal kernel API so that 
it could be reused.

> 
>>    b) then traditional checks against perf_event_pranoid content are applied;
> 
> Hmm, not sure about that because that might be conflicting.

Well, possible contradictions could be converged to some reasonable point 
during technical review stage.

Current perf_event_paranoid semantics is still required for PMUs 
that are governed by global setting at /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid.

<SNIP>

>> 4. Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst file is introduced that:
> 
>      0) Better documentation of /proc/sys/kernel/perf_even_paranoid

Exactly. perf_event_open man7 [1] requires update as well, however 
this is not a part of kernel source tree so these docs changes are 
to be mailed TO: mtk.manpages@gmail.com and CC: linux-api@vger.kernel.org.

Thanks,
Alexey

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-02 11:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-19 12:27 [RFC 0/5] perf: Per PMU access controls (paranoid setting) Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 1/5] perf: Move some access checks later in perf_event_open Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 2/5] perf: Pass pmu pointer to perf_paranoid_* helpers Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 3/5] perf: Allow per PMU access control Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-27 20:15   ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-28  8:57     ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 4/5] perf Documentation: Document the per PMU perf_event_paranoid interface Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 5/5] tools/perf: Add support for per-PMU access control Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-28 10:26 ` [RFC 0/5] perf: Per PMU access controls (paranoid setting) Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-28 13:22   ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-28 14:02     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-28 14:56       ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-28 15:23         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-28 15:45       ` Alexey Budankov
2018-09-28 18:20         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-28 20:45           ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-29  6:19             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-01  6:25           ` Alexey Budankov
2018-09-28 15:12     ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 22:02       ` Jann Horn
2018-10-01  6:27         ` Alexey Budankov
2018-09-28 16:41   ` Mark Rutland
2018-09-28 17:23     ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-28 17:40       ` Mark Rutland
2018-09-28 20:49         ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-28 20:54           ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 20:59             ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-28 21:22               ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 21:27                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-10-01  6:25                   ` Alexey Budankov
2018-10-01 16:11                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-01 16:15                       ` Jann Horn
2018-10-01 20:51                       ` Alexey Budankov
2018-10-02  6:40                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-02 11:44                           ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2018-10-03 17:01                         ` Jann Horn
2018-10-04 17:11                           ` Alexey Budankov
2018-09-29  6:30               ` Thomas Gleixner

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