[PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id

[PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id

[Richard Guy Briggs]

The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
in an extended attribute.  It lists all capabilities making the event
really ugly to parse what is happening.  The PATH record correctly
records the setuid bit and owner.  Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
set*id.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
---
 security/commoncap.c |    5 +++--
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 14540bd..8f6bedf 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -594,16 +594,17 @@ skip:
 	/*
 	 * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
 	 *
-	 * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
+	 * We do not bother to audit if 4 things are true:
 	 *   1) cap_effective has all caps
 	 *   2) we are root
 	 *   3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
+	 *   4) we are running a set*id binary
 	 * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
 	 *
 	 * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
 	 * that is interesting information to audit.
 	 */
-	if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
+	if (!is_setid && !cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
 		if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
 		    !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
 		    issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
-- 
1.7.1