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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2016 18:49:56 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5723F324.9040909@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160429162757.GA1191@char.us.oracle.com>

On 04/29/2016 11:27 AM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 10:12:45AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 04/29/2016 02:17 AM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 05:58:12PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>> Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
>>>> memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
>>>> device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
>>>> initialized to create un-encrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I presume the sme_me_mask does not use the lower 48 bits?
>>
>> The sme_me_mask will actually be bit 47. So, when applied, the address
>> will become a 48-bit address.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ..snip..
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>>> index 7d56d1b..594dc65 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>>>> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
>>>>  
>>>>  #include <linux/init.h>
>>>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
>>>>  
>>>>  #include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>>>>  #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
>>>> @@ -168,6 +170,25 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
>>>>  }
>>>>  
>>>>  /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
>>>> +void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
>>>> +		return;
>>>> +
>>>> +	/* Make SWIOTLB use an unencrypted DMA area */
>>>> +	swiotlb_clear_encryption();
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +unsigned long swiotlb_get_me_mask(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return sme_me_mask;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	sme_set_mem_dec(vaddr, size);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>  void __init *efi_me_early_memremap(resource_size_t paddr,
>>>>  				   unsigned long size)
>>>>  {
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
>>>> index 017fced..121b9de 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
>>>> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose);
>>>>  extern unsigned long swiotlb_nr_tbl(void);
>>>>  unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void);
>>>>  extern int swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs);
>>>> +extern void __init swiotlb_clear_encryption(void);
>>>>  
>>>>  /*
>>>>   * Enumeration for sync targets
>>>> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
>>>> index b3c6e36..1013d1c 100644
>>>> --- a/init/main.c
>>>> +++ b/init/main.c
>>>> @@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ void __init __weak thread_info_cache_init(void)
>>>>  }
>>>>  #endif
>>>>  
>>>> +void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>  /*
>>>>   * Set up kernel memory allocators
>>>>   */
>>>> @@ -597,6 +601,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
>>>>  	 */
>>>>  	locking_selftest();
>>>>  
>>>> +	mem_encrypt_init();
>>>> +
>>>>  #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
>>>>  	if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok &&
>>>>  	    page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) {
>>>
>>> What happens if devices use the bounce buffer before mem_encrypt_init()?
>>
>> The call to mem_encrypt_init is early in the boot process, I may have
>> overlooked something, but what devices would be performing DMA before
>> this?
> 
> I am not saying that you overlooked. Merely wondering if somebody re-orders these
> calls what would happen. It maybe also good to have a comment right before
> mem_encrpyt_init stating what will happen if the device does DMA before the function
> is called.
> 

Ah, ok. Before mem_encrypt_init is called the bounce buffers will be
marked as encrypted in the page tables. The use of the bounce buffers
will not have the memory encryption bit as part of the DMA address so a
device will DMA into memory in the clear. When the bounce buffer is
copied to the original buffer it will be accessed by a virtual address
that has the memory encryption bit set in the page tables. So the
plaintext data that was DMA'd in will be decrypted resulting in invalid
data in the destination buffer.

I'll be sure to add a comment before the call.

Thanks,
Tom

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-04-29 23:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-04-26 22:55 [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:30     ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:58         ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47         ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/18] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for AMD processors Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:05         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:12           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:31             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:34               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:01   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:30       ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 16:41           ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 17:07             ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:12             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:03   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/18] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/18] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/18] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/18] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/18] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 13:43   ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-12 18:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-25 16:09           ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 19:30           ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-26 13:45             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 10:07               ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 16:16                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 12:03                   ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34                     ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 15:16                     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 11:18   ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 18:33     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 13:51       ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-15 13:17         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-17 15:51             ` Matt Fleming
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/18] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/18] x86: Access device tree in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160429071743.GC11592@char.us.oracle.com>
2016-04-29 15:12     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]       ` <20160429162757.GA1191@char.us.oracle.com>
2016-04-29 23:49         ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/18] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-05-01 22:10   ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-03 15:59     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/18] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/18] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/18] x86: Add support to turn on Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:13   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 20:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-02 18:31     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-09 15:13       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 21:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 11:23           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 12:04             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-30  6:13 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2016-05-03 15:55   ` Tom Lendacky

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