From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
<linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs
Date: Tue, 3 May 2016 10:59:51 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5728CAF7.7000007@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f37dd7de-23ad-f70f-c32d-a32f116215ce@linux.intel.com>
On 05/01/2016 05:10 PM, Huang, Kai wrote:
>
>
> On 4/27/2016 10:58 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Add support to set the memory encryption enable flag on the APs during
>> realmode initialization. When an AP is started it checks this flag, and
>> if set, enables memory encryption on its core.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 12 ++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 4 ++++
>> arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 14 ++++++++++++++
>> 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> index 94555b4..b73182b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> @@ -349,6 +349,8 @@
>> #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
>> #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2 0xc001001d
>> #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010
>> +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23
>> +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT (1ULL <<
>> MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
>> #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055
>> /* C1E active bits in int pending message */
>> #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> index 9c6b890..e24d2ec 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> @@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
>> #ifndef _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H
>> #define _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Flag bit definitions for use with the flags field of the
>> trampoline header
>> + * when configured for X86_64
>> + */
>> +#define TH_FLAGS_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 0
>> +#define TH_FLAGS_MEM_ENCRYPT (1ULL << TH_FLAGS_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
>
> Would mind change it to a more vendor specific name, such as
> AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT, or SME_MEM_ENCRYPT?
Yup, that can be done.
>
>> +
>> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
>> +
>> #include <linux/types.h>
>> #include <asm/io.h>
>>
>> @@ -38,6 +47,7 @@ struct trampoline_header {
>> u64 start;
>> u64 efer;
>> u32 cr4;
>> + u32 flags;
>> #endif
>> };
>>
>> @@ -61,4 +71,6 @@ extern unsigned char secondary_startup_64[];
>> void reserve_real_mode(void);
>> void setup_real_mode(void);
>>
>> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>> +
>> #endif /* _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> index 85b145c..657532b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> @@ -84,6 +84,10 @@ void __init setup_real_mode(void)
>> trampoline_cr4_features = &trampoline_header->cr4;
>> *trampoline_cr4_features = __read_cr4();
>>
>> + trampoline_header->flags = 0;
>> + if (sme_me_mask)
>> + trampoline_header->flags |= TH_FLAGS_MEM_ENCRYPT;
>> +
>> trampoline_pgd = (u64 *) __va(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
>> trampoline_pgd[0] = init_level4_pgt[pgd_index(__PAGE_OFFSET)].pgd;
>> trampoline_pgd[511] = init_level4_pgt[511].pgd;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> index dac7b20..8d84167 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>> #include <asm/msr.h>
>> #include <asm/segment.h>
>> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>> +#include <asm/realmode.h>
>> #include "realmode.h"
>>
>> .text
>> @@ -109,6 +110,18 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
>> movl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_PE), %eax
>> movl %eax, %cr0
>>
>> + # Check for and enable memory encryption support
>> + movl pa_tr_flags, %eax
>> + bt $TH_FLAGS_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT, pa_tr_flags
>
> pa_tr_flags -> %eax ? Otherwise looks the previous line is useless.
Yes, I overlooked that. I'll take care of it.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Thanks,
> -Kai
>
>> + jnc .Ldone
>> + movl $MSR_K8_SYSCFG, %ecx
>> + rdmsr
>> + bt $MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT, %eax
>> + jc .Ldone
>> + bts $MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT, %eax
>> + wrmsr
>> +.Ldone:
>> +
>> /*
>> * At this point we're in long mode but in 32bit compatibility mode
>> * with EFER.LME = 1, CS.L = 0, CS.D = 1 (and in turn
>> @@ -147,6 +160,7 @@ GLOBAL(trampoline_header)
>> tr_start: .space 8
>> GLOBAL(tr_efer) .space 8
>> GLOBAL(tr_cr4) .space 4
>> + GLOBAL(tr_flags) .space 4
>> END(trampoline_header)
>>
>> #include "trampoline_common.S"
>>
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-03 16:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-26 22:55 [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:58 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/18] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for AMD processors Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:01 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 16:41 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 17:07 ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:03 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/18] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/18] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/18] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/18] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/18] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 13:43 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-12 18:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-25 16:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 19:30 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-26 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 10:07 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 12:03 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 11:18 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 13:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-15 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-17 15:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/18] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/18] x86: Access device tree in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160429071743.GC11592@char.us.oracle.com>
2016-04-29 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160429162757.GA1191@char.us.oracle.com>
2016-04-29 23:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/18] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-05-01 22:10 ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/18] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/18] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/18] x86: Add support to turn on Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 20:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-02 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-09 15:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 21:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 11:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-30 6:13 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2016-05-03 15:55 ` Tom Lendacky
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