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From: peter enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] selinux: Add denied trace with permssion filter
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 17:06:11 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <59fa190f-37c0-79f3-ea46-8f821d820e1c@sony.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRGaE4FwE8iXo_zeAPdimE9ryMR+r4Jcq=ZpF_2aTJxzQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 8/26/20 4:45 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 10:34 AM peter enderborg
> <peter.enderborg@sony.com> wrote:
>> On 8/26/20 3:42 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 9:23 AM Peter Enderborg
>>> <peter.enderborg@sony.com> wrote:
>>>> This adds tracing of all denies. They are grouped with trace_seq for
>>>> each audit.
>>>>
>>>> A filter can be inserted with a write to it's filter section.
>>>>
>>>> echo "permission==\"entrypoint\"" > events/avc/selinux_denied/filter
>>>>
>>>> A output will be like:
>>>>           runcon-1046  [002] .N..   156.351738: selinux_denied:
>>>>           trace_seq=2 result=-13
>>>>           scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.
>>>>           c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0
>>>>           tclass=file permission=entrypoint
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>  include/trace/events/avc.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>  security/selinux/avc.c     | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>  2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>> My most significant comment is that I don't think we want, or need,
>>> two trace points in the avc_audit_post_callback() function.  Yes, I
>>> understand they are triggered slightly differently, but from my
>>> perspective there isn't enough difference between the two tracepoints
>>> to warrant including both.  However, while the tracepoints may be
>> We tried that but that was problematic too.
> My apologies if I was on that thread, but can you remind me why it was
> a problem?  Why can't we use a single tracepoint to capture the AVC
> information?

The problem is parsing the event.

https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/18/842

https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/21/526

and the "single list" version

https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/17/1346

With this patch we follow standard message format so no plugin should be needed.


>> Having partly overlapping traces is not unheard off.  Check
>> compaction.c where we have a     trace_mm_compaction_begin
>> and a more detailed trace_mm_compaction_migratepages.
>> (And a  trace_mm_compaction_end)
> It may not be unique to SELinux, but that doesn't mean I like it :)
>
> One of my concerns with adding tracepoints is that the code would get
> littered with tracepoints; I accepted that it the AVC decision
> codepath was an obvious place for one, so we added a tracepoint.
> Having two tracepoints here is getting awfully close to my original
> fears.
>
>>> redundant in my mind, this new event does do the permission lookup in
>>> the kernel so that the contexts/class/permissions are all available as
>>> a string which is a good thing.
>>>
>>> Without going into the details, would the tracing folks be okay with
>>> doing something similar with the existing selinux_audited tracepoint?
>>> It's extra work in the kernel, but since it would only be triggered
>>> when the tracepoint was active it seems bearable to me.
>> I think the method for expanding lists is what we tried first on
>> suggestion from Steven Rostedt.  Maybe we can do a trace_event
>> from a TP_prink but that would be recursive.
> Wait, why would you be adding a trace event to a trace event, or am I
> misunderstanding you?
>
> All I was talking about was adding the permission resolution code to
> the already existing SELinux AVC tracepoint.
>


  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-26 15:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-17 17:07 [PATCH v3 0/3] selinux: add detailed tracepoint on audited events Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] selinux: add " Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-18 14:31   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-18 14:36   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] selinux: add permission names to trace event Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-17 20:13   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-17 20:29     ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-18 16:09       ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-19 13:11         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21  2:31           ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-21 12:29             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 13:19               ` Paul Moore
2020-08-21 13:39                 ` peter enderborg
     [not found]                 ` <CA+zpnLfNjDwxgoG2p3W8YfXxYVQDum4Eh_MJQvKP4rGLqsqACA@mail.gmail.com>
2020-08-21 13:46                   ` Paul Moore
2020-08-17 20:16   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-18  8:11     ` peter enderborg
2020-08-18 12:13       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21  2:22         ` Paul Moore
2020-08-21  5:53           ` peter enderborg
2020-08-21 12:14           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 13:10             ` Paul Moore
     [not found]               ` <20200824132252.31261-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com>
2020-08-24 13:22                 ` [RFC PATCH] selinux: Add denied trace with permssion filter Peter Enderborg
2020-08-26 13:42                   ` Paul Moore
2020-08-26 14:34                     ` peter enderborg
2020-08-26 14:45                       ` Paul Moore
2020-08-26 15:06                         ` peter enderborg [this message]
2020-08-27 13:30                           ` Paul Moore
2020-08-27 14:04                             ` peter enderborg
2020-08-31 14:16                               ` Paul Moore
2020-08-31 14:19                                 ` Robert Judy
2020-08-31 14:24                                   ` Paul Moore
2020-08-31 15:34                                 ` peter enderborg
2020-09-01 15:31                                   ` Paul Moore
2020-09-01 17:18                                     ` peter enderborg
2020-09-18  1:47                                       ` Steven Rostedt

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