From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 09:36:29 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <672e86f7-86c7-0377-c544-fe52c8d7c1b9@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87sg7792l3.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com>
On 1/11/21 4:42 AM, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> writes:
>
>> Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_setup() when configuring SVM and
>> handle clearing the module params/variable 'sev' and 'sev_es' in
>> sev_hardware_setup(). This allows making said variables static within
>> sev.c and reduces the odds of a collision with guest code, e.g. the guest
>> side of things has already laid claim to 'sev_enabled'.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++++++++
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 15 +--------------
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 --
>> 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> index 0eeb6e1b803d..8ba93b8fa435 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> @@ -27,6 +27,14 @@
>>
>> #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
>>
>> +/* enable/disable SEV support */
>> +static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
>> +module_param(sev, int, 0444);
>> +
>> +/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
>> +static int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
>> +module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
>
> Two stupid questions (and not really related to your patch) for
> self-eduacation if I may:
>
> 1) Why do we rely on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT (which
> sound like it control the guest side of things) to set defaults here?
I thought it was a review comment, but I'm not able to find it now.
Brijesh probably remembers better than me.
>
> 2) It appears to be possible to do 'modprobe kvm_amd sev=0 sev_es=1' and
> this looks like a bogus configuration, should we make an effort to
> validate the correctness upon module load?
This will still result in an overall sev=0 sev_es=0. Is the question just
about issuing a message based on the initial values specified?
Thanks,
Tom
>
>> +
>> static u8 sev_enc_bit;
>> static int sev_flush_asids(void);
>> static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
>> @@ -1249,6 +1257,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>> bool sev_es_supported = false;
>> bool sev_supported = false;
>>
>> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev)
>> + goto out;
>> +
>> /* Does the CPU support SEV? */
>> if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
>> goto out;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> index ccf52c5531fb..f89f702b2a58 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> @@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ module_param(vls, int, 0444);
>> static int vgif = true;
>> module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
>>
>> -/* enable/disable SEV support */
>> -int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
>> -module_param(sev, int, 0444);
>> -
>> -/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
>> -int sev_es = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
>> -module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
>> -
>> bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
>> module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
>>
>> @@ -976,12 +968,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
>> kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
>> }
>>
>> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) && sev) {
>> - sev_hardware_setup();
>> - } else {
>> - sev = false;
>> - sev_es = false;
>> - }
>> + sev_hardware_setup();
>>
>> svm_adjust_mmio_mask();
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
>> index 0fe874ae5498..8e169835f52a 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
>> @@ -408,8 +408,6 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>> #define MSR_CR3_LONG_MBZ_MASK 0xfff0000000000000U
>> #define MSR_INVALID 0xffffffffU
>>
>> -extern int sev;
>> -extern int sev_es;
>> extern bool dump_invalid_vmcb;
>>
>> u32 svm_msrpm_offset(u32 msr);
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-11 15:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-09 0:47 [PATCH 00/13] KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 01/13] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 14:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 18:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 02/13] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 03/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 10:42 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-01-11 15:36 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2021-01-11 16:58 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-01-12 22:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 15:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 05/13] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86/sev: Rename global "sev_enabled" flag to "sev_guest" Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 16:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 17:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 20:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 07/13] KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 16:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 08/13] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 09/13] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 10/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 11/13] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 17:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 20:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 12/13] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09 0:47 ` [PATCH 13/13] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used Sean Christopherson
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