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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/13] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 12:59:33 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <X/y8NU4hWWKgGrJo@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <89efe8fb-6495-5634-9378-a7dbb57f9d81@amd.com>

On Mon, Jan 11, 2021, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 1/8/21 6:47 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Replace calls to svm_sev_enabled() with direct checks on sev_enabled, or
> > in the case of svm_mem_enc_op, simply drop the call to svm_sev_enabled().
> > This effectively replaces checks against a valid max_sev_asid with checks
> > against sev_enabled.  sev_enabled is forced off by sev_hardware_setup()
> > if max_sev_asid is invalid, all call sites are guaranteed to run after
> > sev_hardware_setup(), and all of the checks care about SEV being fully
> > enabled (as opposed to intentionally handling the scenario where
> > max_sev_asid is valid but SEV enabling fails due to OOM).
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > ---
> >   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +++---
> >   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 -----
> >   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > 
> 
> With CONFIG_KVM=y, CONFIG_KVM_AMD=y and CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m, I get
> the following build warning:

...

> In function ‘bitmap_zero’,
>     inlined from ‘__sev_recycle_asids’ at arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:92:2,
>     inlined from ‘sev_asid_new’ at arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:113:16,
>     inlined from ‘sev_guest_init’ at arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:195:9:
> ./include/linux/bitmap.h:238:2: warning: argument 1 null where non-null expected [-Wnonnull]
>   238 |  memset(dst, 0, len);
>       |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Ah, because that config "silently" disables CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV.  The warning
pops up because svm_sev_enabled() included !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) and
that was enough for the compiler to understand that svm_mem_enc_op() was a nop.

That being said, unless I'm missing something, this is a false positive the
compiler's part, e.g. the warning occurs even if sev_enabled is false be default,
i.e. CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=n.

Anyways, I'm leaning towards "fixing" this by defining sev_enabled and
sev_es_enabled to false if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.  It'd be a worthwhile change to
condition the default values on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV anyways, so it'd kill two
birds with one stone.  Long term, I'm tempted to exporing conditioning all of
sev.c on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y, but there are just enough functions exposed via
svm.h that make me think it wouldn't be worth the effort.

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 1b9174a49b65..7e14514dd083 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)

 /* enable/disable SEV support */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 static bool sev_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
 module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);

 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
 static bool sev_es_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+#else
+#define sev_enabled false
+#define sev_es_enabled false
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */

 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static int sev_flush_asids(void);
@@ -1253,11 +1258,12 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)

 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
        unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
        bool sev_es_supported = false;
        bool sev_supported = false;

-       if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) || !sev_enabled)
+       if (!sev_enabled)
                goto out;

        /* Does the CPU support SEV? */
@@ -1310,6 +1316,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 out:
        sev_enabled = sev_supported;
        sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+#endif
 }

 void sev_hardware_teardown(void)

  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-11 21:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-09  0:47 [PATCH 00/13] KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 01/13] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 14:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 18:07     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 02/13] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 03/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 10:42   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-01-11 15:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 16:58       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-01-12 22:18         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 15:30   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 05/13] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86/sev: Rename global "sev_enabled" flag to "sev_guest" Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 16:02   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 17:58       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 20:28         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 07/13] KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 16:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 08/13] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 09/13] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 10/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 11/13] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 17:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 20:59     ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 12/13] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 13/13] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used Sean Christopherson

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