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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 14:00:56 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6db51d45-e17a-38dd-131d-e43132c55dfb@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YqizrTCk460kov/X@google.com>

On 6/14/22 11:13, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 14, 2022, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 6/14/22 10:43, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jun 14, 2022, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>> s/Brijesh/Michael
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Mar 07, 2022, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>>> The encryption attribute for the .bss..decrypted section is cleared in the
>>>>> initial page table build. This is because the section contains the data
>>>>> that need to be shared between the guest and the hypervisor.
>>>>>
>>>>> When SEV-SNP is active, just clearing the encryption attribute in the
>>>>> page table is not enough. The page state need to be updated in the RMP
>>>>> table.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>    arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>>>>>    1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>>>>> index 83514b9827e6..656d2f3e2cf0 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>>>>> @@ -143,7 +143,20 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp, pmdv
>>>>>    	if (sme_get_me_mask()) {
>>>>>    		vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted;
>>>>>    		vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_bss_decrypted;
>>>>> +
>>>>>    		for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
>>>>> +			/*
>>>>> +			 * On SNP, transition the page to shared in the RMP table so that
>>>>> +			 * it is consistent with the page table attribute change.
>>>>> +			 *
>>>>> +			 * __start_bss_decrypted has a virtual address in the high range
>>>>> +			 * mapping (kernel .text). PVALIDATE, by way of
>>>>> +			 * early_snp_set_memory_shared(), requires a valid virtual
>>>>> +			 * address but the kernel is currently running off of the identity
>>>>> +			 * mapping so use __pa() to get a *currently* valid virtual address.
>>>>> +			 */
>>>>> +			early_snp_set_memory_shared(__pa(vaddr), __pa(vaddr), PTRS_PER_PMD);
>>>>
>>>> This breaks SME on Rome and Milan when compiling with clang-13.  I haven't been
>>>> able to figure out exactly what goes wrong.  printk isn't functional at this point,
>>>> and interactive debug during boot on our test systems is beyond me.  I can't even
>>>> verify that the bug is specific to clang because the draconian build system for our
>>>> test systems apparently is stuck pointing at gcc-4.9.
>>>>
>>>> I suspect the issue is related to relocation and/or encrypting memory, as skipping
>>>> the call to early_snp_set_memory_shared() if SNP isn't active masks the issue.
>>>> I've dug through the assembly and haven't spotted a smoking gun, e.g. no obvious
>>>> use of absolute addresses.
>>>>
>>>> Forcing a VM through the same path doesn't fail.  I can't test an SEV guest at the
>>>> moment because INIT_EX is also broken.
>>>
>>> The SEV INIT_EX was a PEBKAC issue.  An SEV guest boots just fine with a clang-built
>>> kernel, so either it's a finnicky relocation issue or something specific to SME.
>>
>> I just built and booted 5.19-rc2 with clang-13 and SME enabled without issue:
>>
>> [    4.118226] Memory Encryption Features active: AMD SME
> 
> Phooey.
> 
>> Maybe something with your kernel config? Can you send me your config?
> 
> Attached.  If you can't repro, I'll find someone on our end to work on this.

I was able to repro. It dies in the cc_platform_has() code, where it is
trying to do an indirect jump based on the attribute (actually in the
amd_cc_platform_has() which I think has been optimized in):

bool cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
{
ffffffff81002140:       55                      push   %rbp
ffffffff81002141:       48 89 e5                mov    %rsp,%rbp
         switch (vendor) {
ffffffff81002144:       8b 05 c6 e9 3a 01       mov    0x13ae9c6(%rip),%eax        # ffffffff823b0b10 <vendor>
ffffffff8100214a:       83 f8 03                cmp    $0x3,%eax
ffffffff8100214d:       74 25                   je     ffffffff81002174 <cc_platform_has+0x34>
ffffffff8100214f:       83 f8 02                cmp    $0x2,%eax
ffffffff81002152:       74 2f                   je     ffffffff81002183 <cc_platform_has+0x43>
ffffffff81002154:       83 f8 01                cmp    $0x1,%eax
ffffffff81002157:       75 26                   jne    ffffffff8100217f <cc_platform_has+0x3f>
         switch (attr) {
ffffffff81002159:       83 ff 05                cmp    $0x5,%edi
ffffffff8100215c:       77 21                   ja     ffffffff8100217f <cc_platform_has+0x3f>
ffffffff8100215e:       89 f8                   mov    %edi,%eax
ffffffff81002160:       ff 24 c5 c0 01 00 82    jmp    *-0x7dfffe40(,%rax,8)

This last line is what causes the reset. I'm guessing that the jump isn't
valid at this point because we are running in identity mapped mode and not
with a kernel virtual address at this point.

Trying to see what the difference was between your config and mine, the
indirect jump lead me to check the setting of CONFIG_RETPOLINE. Your config
did not have it enabled, so I set CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, and with that, the
kernel boots successfully. With retpolines, the code is completely different
around here:

bool cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
{
ffffffff81001f30:       55                      push   %rbp
ffffffff81001f31:       48 89 e5                mov    %rsp,%rbp
         switch (vendor) {
ffffffff81001f34:       8b 05 26 8f 37 01       mov    0x1378f26(%rip),%eax        # ffffffff8237ae60 <vendor>
ffffffff81001f3a:       83 f8 03                cmp    $0x3,%eax
ffffffff81001f3d:       74 29                   je     ffffffff81001f68 <cc_platform_has+0x38>
ffffffff81001f3f:       83 f8 02                cmp    $0x2,%eax
ffffffff81001f42:       74 33                   je     ffffffff81001f77 <cc_platform_has+0x47>
ffffffff81001f44:       83 f8 01                cmp    $0x1,%eax
ffffffff81001f47:       75 2a                   jne    ffffffff81001f73 <cc_platform_has+0x43>
ffffffff81001f49:       31 c0                   xor    %eax,%eax
         switch (attr) {
ffffffff81001f4b:       83 ff 02                cmp    $0x2,%edi
ffffffff81001f4e:       7f 2f                   jg     ffffffff81001f7f <cc_platform_has+0x4f>
ffffffff81001f50:       85 ff                   test   %edi,%edi
ffffffff81001f52:       74 47                   je     ffffffff81001f9b <cc_platform_has+0x6b>
ffffffff81001f54:       83 ff 01                cmp    $0x1,%edi
ffffffff81001f57:       74 5b                   je     ffffffff81001fb4 <cc_platform_has+0x84>
ffffffff81001f59:       83 ff 02                cmp    $0x2,%edi
ffffffff81001f5c:       75 08                   jne    ffffffff81001f66 <cc_platform_has+0x36>
                 return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
ffffffff81001f5e:       8a 05 44 3f 64 01       mov    0x1643f44(%rip),%al        # ffffffff82645ea8 <sev_status>
ffffffff81001f64:       24 01                   and    $0x1,%al
         case CC_VENDOR_HYPERV:
                 return hyperv_cc_platform_has(attr);
         default:
                 return false;
         }
}
ffffffff81001f66:       5d                      pop    %rbp
ffffffff81001f67:       c3                      ret
         switch (attr) {
ffffffff81001f68:       83 ff 07                cmp    $0x7,%edi
ffffffff81001f6b:       73 06                   jae    ffffffff81001f73 <cc_platform_has+0x43>
ffffffff81001f6d:       40 f6 c7 01             test   $0x1,%dil
ffffffff81001f71:       eb 07                   jmp    ffffffff81001f7a <cc_platform_has+0x4a>
ffffffff81001f73:       31 c0                   xor    %eax,%eax
}
ffffffff81001f75:       5d                      pop    %rbp
ffffffff81001f76:       c3                      ret
         return attr == CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT;
ffffffff81001f77:       83 ff 02                cmp    $0x2,%edi
ffffffff81001f7a:       0f 94 c0                sete   %al
}
ffffffff81001f7d:       5d                      pop    %rbp
ffffffff81001f7e:       c3                      ret
         switch (attr) {
.
.
.

I'm not sure if there's a way to remove the jump table optimization for
the arch/x86/coco/core.c file when retpolines aren't configured.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Thanks!

  reply	other threads:[~2022-06-14 19:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 129+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-07 21:33 [PATCH v12 00/46] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 01/46] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and VMPL " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 02/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 18:27   ` [PATCH v12 2.1/46] " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 18:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-08  9:09     ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 03/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 04/46] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 05/46] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 06/46] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 07/46] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier during boot tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 08/46] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 09/46] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 10/46] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Define the Linux-specific " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 11/46] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 12/46] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 13/46] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 14/46] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Check the VMPL level tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 15/46] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 16/46] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 17/46] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 18/46] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/kernel: Mark the .bss..decrypted section as shared in the " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-06-14  0:46   ` [PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in " Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 15:43     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 16:01       ` Tom Lendacky
2022-06-14 16:13         ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-14 19:00           ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2022-06-14 19:52             ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-16 16:17               ` Tom Lendacky
2022-06-16 16:41                 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-01 16:51                   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-07 20:43                     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 20/46] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 21/46] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05  0:24   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-05 16:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-04-05 19:41       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08  9:09   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 23/46] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 24/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 25/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 26/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 27/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 28/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2022-04-06 21:19   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-04-07 14:47     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-07 14:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-07-17  5:08       ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 30/46] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 31/46] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID " Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-03-10 14:51   ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-10 21:25     ` Michael Roth
2022-03-11 17:06       ` Joerg Roedel
2022-03-14 17:34         ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-17 13:11           ` Boris Petkov
2022-03-17 20:20             ` Peter Gonda
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 33/46] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 34/46] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 35/46] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 36/46] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map() Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 37/46] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 38/46] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 39/46] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 40/46] x86/sev: add sev=debug cmdline option to dump SNP CPUID table Brijesh Singh
2022-03-25  9:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Add a sev= cmdline option tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 41/46] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 42/46] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 43/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-04-18 16:42     ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2022-04-18 17:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-18 17:40         ` Tom Lendacky
2022-04-18 21:18           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-08-24 18:01   ` [PATCH v12 43/46] " Dionna Amalie Glaze
2022-08-24 19:28     ` Peter Gonda
2022-08-25 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2022-08-25 20:09         ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 44/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 45/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2022-03-07 21:33 ` [PATCH v12 46/46] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-03-14 15:37   ` Peter Gonda
2022-04-08  9:08   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2022-03-07 21:53 ` [PATCH v12 43.1/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh

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