linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@openbsd.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com, willy@infradead.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, usama.anjum@collabora.com,
	rdunlap@infradead.org, jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org,
	groeck@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	pedro.falcato@gmail.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Introduce mseal
Date: Thu, 01 Feb 2024 17:26:25 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7481.1706833585@cvs.openbsd.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wjqozic6JuRimXD=RamnJmD6FoaQki7RtNYrezzx_OfOg@mail.gmail.com>

Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:

> and using PROT_SEAL at mmap() time is similarly the same obvious
> notion of "map this, and then seal that mapping".

The usual way is:

    ptr = mmap(NULL, len PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, ...)

    initialize region between ptr, ptr+len

    mprotect(ptr, len, PROT_READ)
    mseal(ptr, len, 0);


Our source tree contains one place where a locking happens very close
to a mmap().

It is the shared-library-linker 'hints file', this is a file that gets
mapped PROT_READ and then we lock it.

It feels like that could be one operation?  It can't be.

        addr = (void *)mmap(0, hsize, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, hfd, 0);
        if (_dl_mmap_error(addr))
                goto bad_hints;

        hheader = (struct hints_header *)addr;
        if (HH_BADMAG(*hheader) || hheader->hh_ehints > hsize)
                goto bad_hints;

	/* couple more error checks */

	mimmutable(addr, hsize);
	close(hfd);
	return (0);
bad_hints:
	munmap(addr, hsize);
	...

See the problem?  It unmaps it if the contents are broken.  So even that
case cannot use something like "PROT_SEAL".

These are not hypotheticals.  I'm grepping an entire Unix kernel and
userland source tree, and I know what 100,000+ applications do.  I found
piece of code that could almost use it, but upon inspection it can't,
and it is obvious why: it is best idiom to allow a programmer to insert
an inspection operation between two disctinct operations, and especially
critical if the 2nd operation cannot be reversed.

Noone needs PROT_SEAL as a shortcut operation in mmap() or mprotect().

Throwing around ideas without proving their use in practice is very
unscientific.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-02  0:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-31 17:50 [PATCH v8 0/4] Introduce mseal jeffxu
2024-01-31 17:50 ` [PATCH v8 1/4] mseal: Wire up mseal syscall jeffxu
2024-01-31 17:50 ` [PATCH v8 2/4] mseal: add " jeffxu
2024-02-01 23:11   ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-02  3:30     ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02  3:54       ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-02  4:03         ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02  4:10           ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-02  4:22             ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-31 17:50 ` [PATCH v8 3/4] selftest mm/mseal memory sealing jeffxu
2024-01-31 17:50 ` [PATCH v8 4/4] mseal:add documentation jeffxu
2024-01-31 19:34 ` [PATCH v8 0/4] Introduce mseal Liam R. Howlett
2024-02-01  1:27   ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-01  1:46     ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-01 16:56       ` Bird, Tim
2024-02-01  1:55     ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-01 20:45     ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-02-01 22:24       ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-02  1:06         ` Greg KH
2024-02-02  3:24           ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02  3:29             ` Linus Torvalds
2024-02-02  3:46               ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02 15:18             ` Greg KH
2024-02-01 22:37       ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-01 22:54         ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-01 23:15           ` Linus Torvalds
2024-02-01 23:43             ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-02  0:26             ` Theo de Raadt [this message]
2024-02-02  3:20             ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02  4:05               ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-02  4:54                 ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02  5:00                   ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-02 17:58                     ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02 18:51                       ` Pedro Falcato
2024-02-02 21:20                         ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-04 19:39                         ` David Laight
2024-02-02 17:05             ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-02 21:02               ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02  3:14       ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02 15:13         ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-02-02 17:24           ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02 19:21             ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-02-02 19:32               ` Theo de Raadt
2024-02-02 20:36                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-02-02 20:57                   ` Jeff Xu
2024-02-02 21:18                   ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-02-02 23:36                     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-02-03  4:45                       ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-02-05 22:13                         ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-02-02 20:14               ` Jeff Xu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=7481.1706833585@cvs.openbsd.org \
    --to=deraadt@openbsd.org \
    --cc=Liam.Howlett@oracle.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=groeck@chromium.org \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jeffxu@chromium.org \
    --cc=jeffxu@google.com \
    --cc=jorgelo@chromium.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=pedro.falcato@gmail.com \
    --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=sroettger@google.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=usama.anjum@collabora.com \
    --cc=willy@infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).