From: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"ardb@kernel.org" <ardb@kernel.org>,
"kraxel@redhat.com" <kraxel@redhat.com>,
"dovmurik@linux.ibm.com" <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"Dhaval.Giani@amd.com" <Dhaval.Giani@amd.com>,
"michael.day@amd.com" <michael.day@amd.com>,
"pavankumar.paluri@amd.com" <pavankumar.paluri@amd.com>,
"David.Kaplan@amd.com" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>,
"Reshma.Lal@amd.com" <Reshma.Lal@amd.com>,
"Jeremy.Powell@amd.com" <Jeremy.Powell@amd.com>,
"sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com"
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
"alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com"
<alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
"thomas.lendacky@amd.com" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"dgilbert@redhat.com" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"dinechin@redhat.com" <dinechin@redhat.com>,
"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
"berrange@redhat.com" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"mst@redhat.com" <mst@redhat.com>,
"tytso@mit.edu" <tytso@mit.edu>,
"jikos@kernel.org" <jikos@kernel.org>,
"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"leon@kernel.org" <leon@kernel.org>,
"richard.weinberger@gmail.com" <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
"lukas@wunner.de" <lukas@wunner.de>,
"jejb@linux.ibm.com" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"cdupontd@redhat.com" <cdupontd@redhat.com>,
"jasowang@redhat.com" <jasowang@redhat.com>,
"sameo@rivosinc.com" <sameo@rivosinc.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
Andrew Bresticker <abrestic@rivosinc.com>,
Rajnesh Kanwal <rkanwal@rivosinc.com>,
Dylan Reid <dylan@rivosinc.com>, Ravi Sahita <ravi@rivosinc.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: security: Confidential computing intro and threat model
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 17:27:48 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <893accb9-e961-a922-8fa7-81a558dee138@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZEmYR0fWl05lGW0d@google.com>
On 4/26/23 4:33 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 26, 2023, Carlos Bilbao wrote:
>> On 4/26/23 2:53 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Wed, Apr 26, 2023, Carlos Bilbao wrote:
>>>> On 4/26/23 10:51 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>>> This document is named confidential-computing.rst, not tdx-and-snp.rst. Not
>>>>> explicitly mentioning SEV doesn't magically warp reality to make descriptions like
>>>>> this one from security/secrets/coco.rst disappear:
>>>>>
>>>>> Introduction
>>>>> ============
>>>>>
>>>>> Confidential Computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted
>>>>> Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs
>>>>> memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.
>>>>>
>>>>> My complaint about this document being too Intel/AMD centric isn't that it doesn't
>>>>> mention other implementations, it's that the doc describes CoCo purely from the
>>>>> narrow viewpoint of Intel TDX and AMD SNP, and to be blunt, reads like a press
>>>>> release and not an objective overview of CoCo.
>>>>
>>>> Be specific about the parts of the document that you feel are too
>>>> AMD/Intel centric, and we will correct them.
>>>
>>> The whole thing? There aren't specific parts that are too SNP/TDX centric, the
>>> entire tone and approach of the document is wrong. As I responded to Dave, I
>>> would feel differently if the document were named tdx-and-snp-threat-model.rst,
>>> but this patch proposes a generic confidential-computing.rst and presents the
>>> SNP+TDX confidential VM use case as if it's the *only* confidential computing use
>>> case.
>>
>> What part of us describing the current Linux kernel threat model or
>> defining basic concepts of confidential computing is SNP/TDX centric?
>>
>> IMHO, simply stating that "the whole thing" is wrong and that you don't
>> like the "tone", is not making a good enough case for us to change
>> anything, including the name of the document.
>
> I honestly don't know how to respond since you are either unable or unwilling to
> see the problems with naming a document "confidential computing" and then talking
> only about one very, very specific flavor of confidential computing as if that is
> the only flavor of confidential computing.
>
> So if you want to push this doc as is, please add my
>
> Nacked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>
Well, the intent was and still is to work with the community to collect
feedback and finish a version were all flavors are represented --see
Motivation section of the draft. But if you are unable or unwilling to
collaborate with us, just please make sure to read whatever is the final
version. I will assume it has your Nacked-By otherwise.
To the rest, please do point out to specific parts you consider to be
AMD/Intel agnostic. We will do our best effort to fix it.
Thanks,
Carlos
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-26 22:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-27 14:18 [PATCH] docs: security: Confidential computing intro and threat model Carlos Bilbao
2023-03-29 10:40 ` Greg KH
2023-03-30 17:32 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-04-22 3:17 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-04-21 21:09 ` Kaplan, David
2023-04-25 13:43 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-04-25 15:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-26 13:32 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-04-26 15:08 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-04-26 15:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-26 19:21 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-04-26 19:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-26 20:15 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-04-26 21:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-26 22:27 ` Carlos Bilbao [this message]
2023-04-27 12:29 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-04-27 14:16 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-04-27 15:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-27 17:59 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-04-26 20:12 ` Dave Hansen
2023-04-26 15:18 ` James Bottomley
2023-04-26 16:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-27 12:43 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-04-27 13:18 ` James Bottomley
2023-04-27 15:47 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-04-27 16:16 ` James Bottomley
2023-04-27 16:46 ` Randy Dunlap
2023-04-27 17:19 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-04-27 18:27 ` James Bottomley
2023-04-27 12:56 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-04-26 15:46 ` Dave Hansen
2023-04-26 16:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-04-27 19:06 ` Peter Gonda
2023-04-27 18:47 ` Peter Gonda
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=893accb9-e961-a922-8fa7-81a558dee138@amd.com \
--to=carlos.bilbao@amd.com \
--cc=David.Kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=Dhaval.Giani@amd.com \
--cc=Jeremy.Powell@amd.com \
--cc=Reshma.Lal@amd.com \
--cc=abrestic@rivosinc.com \
--cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=berrange@redhat.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=cdupontd@redhat.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dgilbert@redhat.com \
--cc=dinechin@redhat.com \
--cc=dovmurik@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=dylan@rivosinc.com \
--cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=jasowang@redhat.com \
--cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=jikos@kernel.org \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=kraxel@redhat.com \
--cc=leon@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=lukas@wunner.de \
--cc=michael.day@amd.com \
--cc=mst@redhat.com \
--cc=pavankumar.paluri@amd.com \
--cc=ravi@rivosinc.com \
--cc=richard.weinberger@gmail.com \
--cc=rkanwal@rivosinc.com \
--cc=sameo@rivosinc.com \
--cc=sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=security@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).