* [PATCH] KVM: x86: avoid incorrect writes to host MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
@ 2020-01-21 13:48 Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-24 8:00 ` Xiaoyao Li
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2020-01-21 13:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, kvm; +Cc: Jim Mattson
If the guest is configured to have SPEC_CTRL but the host does not
(which is a nonsensical configuration but these are not explicitly
forbidden) then a host-initiated MSR write can write vmx->spec_ctrl
(respectively svm->spec_ctrl) and trigger a #GP when KVM tries to
restore the host value of the MSR. Add a more comprehensive check
for valid bits of SPEC_CTRL, covering host CPUID flags and,
since we are at it and it is more correct that way, guest CPUID
flags too.
For AMD, remove the unnecessary is_guest_mode check around setting
the MSR interception bitmap, so that the code looks the same as
for Intel.
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 9 +++------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 +++----
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index b7c5369c7998..235a7e51de96 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -4324,12 +4324,10 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
return 1;
- /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
- if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+ if (data & ~kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(vcpu))
return 1;
svm->spec_ctrl = data;
-
if (!data)
break;
@@ -4353,13 +4351,12 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
return 1;
-
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
+ return 1;
if (!data)
break;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- break;
set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1);
break;
case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index bdbf27e92851..112d2314231d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1998,12 +1998,10 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
return 1;
- /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
- if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+ if (data & ~kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(vcpu))
return 1;
vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
-
if (!data)
break;
@@ -2037,7 +2035,8 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
return 1;
-
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ return 1;
if (!data)
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 9f24f5d16854..141fb129c6bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10389,6 +10389,28 @@ bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_no_poll);
+bool kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ uint64_t bits = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
+ /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
+ if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+ bits &= ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+ bits &= ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
+
+ if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+ bits &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+ bits &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
+ return bits;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index ab715cee3653..bc38ac695776 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -367,5 +367,6 @@ static inline bool kvm_pat_valid(u64 data)
void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
#endif
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: avoid incorrect writes to host MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
2020-01-21 13:48 [PATCH] KVM: x86: avoid incorrect writes to host MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Paolo Bonzini
@ 2020-01-24 8:00 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-01-24 8:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Xiaoyao Li @ 2020-01-24 8:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paolo Bonzini, linux-kernel, kvm; +Cc: Jim Mattson
On 1/21/2020 9:48 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> If the guest is configured to have SPEC_CTRL but the host does not
> (which is a nonsensical configuration but these are not explicitly
> forbidden) then a host-initiated MSR write can write vmx->spec_ctrl
> (respectively svm->spec_ctrl) and trigger a #GP when KVM tries to
> restore the host value of the MSR. Add a more comprehensive check
> for valid bits of SPEC_CTRL, covering host CPUID flags and,
> since we are at it and it is more correct that way, guest CPUID
> flags too.
>
> For AMD, remove the unnecessary is_guest_mode check around setting
> the MSR interception bitmap, so that the code looks the same as
> for Intel.
>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 9 +++------
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 +++----
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index b7c5369c7998..235a7e51de96 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -4324,12 +4324,10 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
> return 1;
>
> - /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
> - if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
> + if (data & ~kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(vcpu))
> return 1;
>
> svm->spec_ctrl = data;
> -
> if (!data)
> break;
>
> @@ -4353,13 +4351,12 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>
> if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
> return 1;
> -
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
> + return 1;
> if (!data)
> break;
>
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
> - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
> - break;
> set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1);
> break;
> case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index bdbf27e92851..112d2314231d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -1998,12 +1998,10 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> return 1;
>
> - /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
> - if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
> + if (data & ~kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(vcpu))
> return 1;
>
> vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
> -
> if (!data)
> break;
>
> @@ -2037,7 +2035,8 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>
> if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
> return 1;
> -
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> + return 1;
> if (!data)
> break;
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 9f24f5d16854..141fb129c6bf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -10389,6 +10389,28 @@ bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_no_poll);
>
> +bool kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
The return type should be u64.
> +{
> + uint64_t bits = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
> +
> + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
> + if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
> + bits &= ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
> + bits &= ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
> +
> + if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
> + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
> + bits &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
> + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
> + bits &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
> +
> + return bits;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits);
>
> EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
> EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index ab715cee3653..bc38ac695776 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -367,5 +367,6 @@ static inline bool kvm_pat_valid(u64 data)
>
> void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +bool kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> #endif
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: avoid incorrect writes to host MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
2020-01-24 8:00 ` Xiaoyao Li
@ 2020-01-24 8:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2020-01-24 8:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Xiaoyao Li, linux-kernel, kvm; +Cc: Jim Mattson
On 24/01/20 09:00, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>
>> +bool kvm_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> The return type should be u64.
Ugh... Thanks.
Paolo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2020-01-21 13:48 [PATCH] KVM: x86: avoid incorrect writes to host MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-24 8:00 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-01-24 8:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
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