* KASAN: use-after-free Read in corrupted
@ 2018-05-13 8:56 syzbot
2018-05-13 9:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2018-05-13 8:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, gregkh, hmclauchlan, linux-kernel, linux-mm, pombredanne,
syzkaller-bugs, tglx
Hello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: 427fbe89261d Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/p..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=148eb017800000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=fcce42b221691ff9
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3417712847e7219a60ee
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
syzkaller repro:https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1770c477800000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14ecdbc7800000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+3417712847e7219a60ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
CPU: 0 PID: 4564 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #44
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
==================================================================
Call Trace:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3888/0x5140
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3310
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801d8d69088 by task syz-executor214/4551
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:51 [inline]
should_fail.cold.4+0xa/0x1a lib/fault-inject.c:149
__should_failslab+0x124/0x180 mm/failslab.c:32
should_failslab+0x9/0x14 mm/slab_common.c:1522
slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:423 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3378 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x2af/0x760 mm/slab.c:3552
__d_alloc+0xc0/0xd30 fs/dcache.c:1638
d_alloc_anon fs/dcache.c:1742 [inline]
d_make_root+0x42/0x90 fs/dcache.c:1934
fuse_fill_super+0x120e/0x1e20 fs/fuse/inode.c:1131
mount_nodev+0x6b/0x110 fs/super.c:1210
fuse_mount+0x2c/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1192
mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1267
vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2518 [inline]
do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2848
ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3064
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3078 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3075 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3075
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x447cb9
RSP: 002b:00007f7a75bca918 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000447cb9
RDX: 00000000004b08d6 RSI: 0000000020000340 RDI: 00000000004c7485
RBP: 000000000000a001 R08: 00007f7a75bca930 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
CPU: 1 PID: 4551 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #44
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
__lock_acquire+0x3888/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3310
lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
down_write+0x87/0x120 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:70
fuse_kill_sb_anon+0x50/0xb0 fs/fuse/inode.c:1200
deactivate_locked_super+0x97/0x100 fs/super.c:316
mount_nodev+0xfa/0x110 fs/super.c:1212
fuse_mount+0x2c/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1192
mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1267
vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2518 [inline]
do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2848
ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3064
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3078 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3075 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3075
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x447cb9
RSP: 002b:00007f7a75bca918 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000447cb9
RDX: 00000000004b08d6 RSI: 0000000020000340 RDI: 00000000004c7485
RBP: 000000000000a001 R08: 00007f7a75bca930 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
CPU: 0 PID: 4580 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #44
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Allocated by task 4551:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
Call Trace:
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x152/0x780 mm/slab.c:3620
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:512 [inline]
fuse_fill_super+0xc92/0x1e20 fs/fuse/inode.c:1096
mount_nodev+0x6b/0x110 fs/super.c:1210
fuse_mount+0x2c/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1192
mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1267
vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2518 [inline]
do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2848
fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:51 [inline]
should_fail.cold.4+0xa/0x1a lib/fault-inject.c:149
ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3064
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3078 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3075 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3075
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 8:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kfree+0xd9/0x260 mm/slab.c:3813
__rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:173 [inline]
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2675 [inline]
invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2930 [inline]
__rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897 [inline]
rcu_process_callbacks+0xa69/0x15f0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2914
__do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801d8d68dc0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
The buggy address is located 712 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8801d8d68dc0, ffff8801d8d691c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007635a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801d8d68040 index:0x0
compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000008100(slab|head)
__should_failslab+0x124/0x180 mm/failslab.c:32
raw: 02fffc0000008100 ffff8801d8d68040 0000000000000000 0000000100000007
should_failslab+0x9/0x14 mm/slab_common.c:1522
raw: ffffea00076407a0 ffffea00076335a0 ffff8801da800ac0 0000000000000000
slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:423 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3378 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x2af/0x760 mm/slab.c:3552
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801d8d68f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801d8d69000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff8801d8d69080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
__d_alloc+0xc0/0xd30 fs/dcache.c:1638
^
ffff8801d8d69100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801d8d69180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this bug report.
If you forgot to add the Reported-by tag, once the fix for this bug is
merged
into any tree, please reply to this email with:
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If you want to test a patch for this bug, please reply with:
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and provide the patch inline or as an attachment.
To mark this as a duplicate of another syzbot report, please reply with:
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If it's a one-off invalid bug report, please reply with:
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Note: if the crash happens again, it will cause creation of a new bug
report.
Note: all commands must start from beginning of the line in the email body.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in corrupted
2018-05-13 8:56 KASAN: use-after-free Read in corrupted syzbot
@ 2018-05-13 9:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-05-13 10:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Vyukov @ 2018-05-13 9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: syzbot
Cc: Andrew Morton, Greg Kroah-Hartman, hmclauchlan, LKML, Linux-MM,
Philippe Ombredanne, syzkaller-bugs, Thomas Gleixner,
Tetsuo Handa
On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 10:56 AM, syzbot
<syzbot+3417712847e7219a60ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following crash on:
>
> HEAD commit: 427fbe89261d Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/p..
> git tree: upstream
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=148eb017800000
> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=fcce42b221691ff9
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3417712847e7219a60ee
> compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
> syzkaller repro:https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1770c477800000
> C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14ecdbc7800000
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+3417712847e7219a60ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tetsuo,
This looks very similar to "KASAN: use-after-free Read in fuse_kill_sb_blk":
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/0NTQRcUYBgAJ
which you fixed with "fuse: don't keep dead fuse_conn at fuse_fill_super().":
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/W6pi8NdbBgAJ
However, here we have use-after-free in fuse_kill_sb_anon instead of
use_kill_sb_blk. Do you think your patch will fix this as well?
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> CPU: 0 PID: 4564 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #44
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> Google 01/01/2011
> ==================================================================
> Call Trace:
> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3888/0x5140
> kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3310
> Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801d8d69088 by task syz-executor214/4551
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
>
> fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:51 [inline]
> should_fail.cold.4+0xa/0x1a lib/fault-inject.c:149
> __should_failslab+0x124/0x180 mm/failslab.c:32
> should_failslab+0x9/0x14 mm/slab_common.c:1522
> slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:423 [inline]
> slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3378 [inline]
> kmem_cache_alloc+0x2af/0x760 mm/slab.c:3552
> __d_alloc+0xc0/0xd30 fs/dcache.c:1638
> d_alloc_anon fs/dcache.c:1742 [inline]
> d_make_root+0x42/0x90 fs/dcache.c:1934
> fuse_fill_super+0x120e/0x1e20 fs/fuse/inode.c:1131
> mount_nodev+0x6b/0x110 fs/super.c:1210
> fuse_mount+0x2c/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1192
> mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1267
> vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
> vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
> do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2518 [inline]
> do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2848
> ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3064
> __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3078 [inline]
> __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3075 [inline]
> __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3075
> do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> RIP: 0033:0x447cb9
> RSP: 002b:00007f7a75bca918 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000447cb9
> RDX: 00000000004b08d6 RSI: 0000000020000340 RDI: 00000000004c7485
> RBP: 000000000000a001 R08: 00007f7a75bca930 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> CPU: 1 PID: 4551 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #44
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> Google 01/01/2011
> Call Trace:
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
> FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
> name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
> print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
> kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
> kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
> __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
> __lock_acquire+0x3888/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3310
> lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
> down_write+0x87/0x120 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:70
> fuse_kill_sb_anon+0x50/0xb0 fs/fuse/inode.c:1200
> deactivate_locked_super+0x97/0x100 fs/super.c:316
> mount_nodev+0xfa/0x110 fs/super.c:1212
> fuse_mount+0x2c/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1192
> mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1267
> vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
> vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
> do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2518 [inline]
> do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2848
> ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3064
> __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3078 [inline]
> __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3075 [inline]
> __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3075
> do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> RIP: 0033:0x447cb9
> RSP: 002b:00007f7a75bca918 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000447cb9
> RDX: 00000000004b08d6 RSI: 0000000020000340 RDI: 00000000004c7485
> RBP: 000000000000a001 R08: 00007f7a75bca930 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 4580 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #44
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> Google 01/01/2011
> Allocated by task 4551:
> save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
> Call Trace:
> set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
> kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
> kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x152/0x780 mm/slab.c:3620
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
> kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:512 [inline]
> fuse_fill_super+0xc92/0x1e20 fs/fuse/inode.c:1096
> mount_nodev+0x6b/0x110 fs/super.c:1210
> fuse_mount+0x2c/0x40 fs/fuse/inode.c:1192
> mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1267
> vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
> vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
> do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2518 [inline]
> do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2848
> fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:51 [inline]
> should_fail.cold.4+0xa/0x1a lib/fault-inject.c:149
> ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3064
> __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3078 [inline]
> __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3075 [inline]
> __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3075
> do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> Freed by task 8:
> save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
> set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
> __kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
> kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
> __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
> kfree+0xd9/0x260 mm/slab.c:3813
> __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:173 [inline]
> rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2675 [inline]
> invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2930 [inline]
> __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897 [inline]
> rcu_process_callbacks+0xa69/0x15f0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2914
> __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
>
> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801d8d68dc0
> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
> The buggy address is located 712 bytes inside of
> 1024-byte region [ffff8801d8d68dc0, ffff8801d8d691c0)
> The buggy address belongs to the page:
> page:ffffea0007635a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801d8d68040 index:0x0
> compound_mapcount: 0
> flags: 0x2fffc0000008100(slab|head)
> __should_failslab+0x124/0x180 mm/failslab.c:32
> raw: 02fffc0000008100 ffff8801d8d68040 0000000000000000 0000000100000007
> should_failslab+0x9/0x14 mm/slab_common.c:1522
> raw: ffffea00076407a0 ffffea00076335a0 ffff8801da800ac0 0000000000000000
> slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:423 [inline]
> slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3378 [inline]
> kmem_cache_alloc+0x2af/0x760 mm/slab.c:3552
> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> ffff8801d8d68f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff8801d8d69000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>>
>> ffff8801d8d69080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>
> __d_alloc+0xc0/0xd30 fs/dcache.c:1638
> ^
> ffff8801d8d69100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff8801d8d69180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> ==================================================================
>
>
> ---
> This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>
> syzbot will keep track of this bug report.
> If you forgot to add the Reported-by tag, once the fix for this bug is
> merged
> into any tree, please reply to this email with:
> #syz fix: exact-commit-title
> If you want to test a patch for this bug, please reply with:
> #syz test: git://repo/address.git branch
> and provide the patch inline or as an attachment.
> To mark this as a duplicate of another syzbot report, please reply with:
> #syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report
> If it's a one-off invalid bug report, please reply with:
> #syz invalid
> Note: if the crash happens again, it will cause creation of a new bug
> report.
> Note: all commands must start from beginning of the line in the email body.
>
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> To view this discussion on the web visit
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> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in corrupted
2018-05-13 9:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov
@ 2018-05-13 10:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-05-13 10:32 ` Dmitry Vyukov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2018-05-13 10:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dvyukov, syzbot+3417712847e7219a60ee, miklos
Cc: akpm, gregkh, hmclauchlan, linux-kernel, linux-mm, pombredanne,
syzkaller-bugs, tglx
Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> This looks very similar to "KASAN: use-after-free Read in fuse_kill_sb_blk":
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/0NTQRcUYBgAJ
>
> which you fixed with "fuse: don't keep dead fuse_conn at fuse_fill_super().":
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/W6pi8NdbBgAJ
>
> However, here we have use-after-free in fuse_kill_sb_anon instead of
> use_kill_sb_blk. Do you think your patch will fix this as well?
Yes, for fuse_kill_sb_anon() and fuse_kill_sb_blk() are symmetrical.
I'm waiting for Miklos Szeredi to apply that patch.
static inline struct fuse_conn *get_fuse_conn_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
return sb->s_fs_info;
}
static struct file_system_type fuse_fs_type = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "fuse",
.fs_flags = FS_HAS_SUBTYPE,
.mount = fuse_mount,
.kill_sb = fuse_kill_sb_anon,
};
static struct file_system_type fuseblk_fs_type = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "fuseblk",
.mount = fuse_mount_blk,
.kill_sb = fuse_kill_sb_blk,
.fs_flags = FS_REQUIRES_DEV | FS_HAS_SUBTYPE,
};
static void fuse_kill_sb_anon(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
if (fc) {
down_write(&fc->killsb);
fc->sb = NULL;
up_write(&fc->killsb);
}
kill_anon_super(sb);
}
static void fuse_kill_sb_blk(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
if (fc) {
down_write(&fc->killsb);
fc->sb = NULL;
up_write(&fc->killsb);
}
kill_block_super(sb);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in corrupted
2018-05-13 10:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
@ 2018-05-13 10:32 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-05-13 10:47 ` Tetsuo Handa
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Vyukov @ 2018-05-13 10:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: syzbot, Miklos Szeredi, Andrew Morton, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
hmclauchlan, LKML, Linux-MM, Philippe Ombredanne, syzkaller-bugs,
Thomas Gleixner
On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 12:20 PM, Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>> This looks very similar to "KASAN: use-after-free Read in fuse_kill_sb_blk":
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/0NTQRcUYBgAJ
>>
>> which you fixed with "fuse: don't keep dead fuse_conn at fuse_fill_super().":
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/W6pi8NdbBgAJ
>>
>> However, here we have use-after-free in fuse_kill_sb_anon instead of
>> use_kill_sb_blk. Do you think your patch will fix this as well?
>
> Yes, for fuse_kill_sb_anon() and fuse_kill_sb_blk() are symmetrical.
> I'm waiting for Miklos Szeredi to apply that patch.
Thanks for confirming. Let's do:
#syz fix: fuse: don't keep dead fuse_conn at fuse_fill_super().
> static inline struct fuse_conn *get_fuse_conn_super(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> return sb->s_fs_info;
> }
>
> static struct file_system_type fuse_fs_type = {
> .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> .name = "fuse",
> .fs_flags = FS_HAS_SUBTYPE,
> .mount = fuse_mount,
> .kill_sb = fuse_kill_sb_anon,
> };
>
> static struct file_system_type fuseblk_fs_type = {
> .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> .name = "fuseblk",
> .mount = fuse_mount_blk,
> .kill_sb = fuse_kill_sb_blk,
> .fs_flags = FS_REQUIRES_DEV | FS_HAS_SUBTYPE,
> };
>
> static void fuse_kill_sb_anon(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
>
> if (fc) {
> down_write(&fc->killsb);
> fc->sb = NULL;
> up_write(&fc->killsb);
> }
>
> kill_anon_super(sb);
> }
>
> static void fuse_kill_sb_blk(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn_super(sb);
>
> if (fc) {
> down_write(&fc->killsb);
> fc->sb = NULL;
> up_write(&fc->killsb);
> }
>
> kill_block_super(sb);
> }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in corrupted
2018-05-13 10:32 ` Dmitry Vyukov
@ 2018-05-13 10:47 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-05-13 11:56 ` Dmitry Vyukov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2018-05-13 10:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dvyukov
Cc: syzbot+3417712847e7219a60ee, miklos, akpm, gregkh, linux-kernel,
linux-mm, pombredanne, syzkaller-bugs, tglx
Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 12:20 PM, Tetsuo Handa
> <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> > Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> >> This looks very similar to "KASAN: use-after-free Read in fuse_kill_sb_blk":
> >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/0NTQRcUYBgAJ
> >>
> >> which you fixed with "fuse: don't keep dead fuse_conn at fuse_fill_super().":
> >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/W6pi8NdbBgAJ
> >>
> >> However, here we have use-after-free in fuse_kill_sb_anon instead of
> >> use_kill_sb_blk. Do you think your patch will fix this as well?
> >
> > Yes, for fuse_kill_sb_anon() and fuse_kill_sb_blk() are symmetrical.
> > I'm waiting for Miklos Szeredi to apply that patch.
>
>
> Thanks for confirming. Let's do:
>
> #syz fix: fuse: don't keep dead fuse_conn at fuse_fill_super().
>
Excuse me, but that patch is not yet applied to any git tree. Isn't the rule that
If you forgot to add the Reported-by tag, once the fix for this bug is merged into any tree, please reply to this email with:
#syz fix: exact-commit-title
? That's the reason I keep
KASAN: use-after-free Read in fuse_kill_sb_blk
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a07a680ed0a9290585ca424546860464dd9658db
report "open()" table but I want keyword column available in the "open()" table
so that we can announce that "patch is proposed and waiting for review" state.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in corrupted
2018-05-13 10:47 ` Tetsuo Handa
@ 2018-05-13 11:56 ` Dmitry Vyukov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dmitry Vyukov @ 2018-05-13 11:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: syzbot, Miklos Szeredi, Andrew Morton, Greg Kroah-Hartman, LKML,
Linux-MM, Philippe Ombredanne, syzkaller-bugs, Thomas Gleixner
On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 12:47 PM, Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>> On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 12:20 PM, Tetsuo Handa
>> <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
>> > Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>> >> This looks very similar to "KASAN: use-after-free Read in fuse_kill_sb_blk":
>> >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/0NTQRcUYBgAJ
>> >>
>> >> which you fixed with "fuse: don't keep dead fuse_conn at fuse_fill_super().":
>> >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/4C4oiBX8vZ0/W6pi8NdbBgAJ
>> >>
>> >> However, here we have use-after-free in fuse_kill_sb_anon instead of
>> >> use_kill_sb_blk. Do you think your patch will fix this as well?
>> >
>> > Yes, for fuse_kill_sb_anon() and fuse_kill_sb_blk() are symmetrical.
>> > I'm waiting for Miklos Szeredi to apply that patch.
>>
>>
>> Thanks for confirming. Let's do:
>>
>> #syz fix: fuse: don't keep dead fuse_conn at fuse_fill_super().
>>
> Excuse me, but that patch is not yet applied to any git tree. Isn't the rule that
>
> If you forgot to add the Reported-by tag, once the fix for this bug is merged into any tree, please reply to this email with:
> #syz fix: exact-commit-title
Sorry, the doc is not 100% precisely express the situation. I think
this was discussed several times, but the info is scattered.
What matters in the end is that syzbot discovers the commit using the
title in the tested trees. For example, consider that a commit is
merged into some sub-sub-system tree, its commit title can still
change (for example, an upper subsystem maintainer decided to fix it
up, unlikely, but possible), or the commit can be simply dropped if
upper subsystem maintainer does not like it.
On the other hand, for significant portion of commits once they are
just mailed we are reasonably sure that they will appear upstream
under the original title.
So the full situation is more like:
First you need to decide if you want to deal with this bug sooner or
later (we usually want to deal with them sooner).
If you want to deal with it sooner, the criteria is that you are
"reasonably sure that the commit will reach upstream under this
title", for whatever reason. If it turns out to be wrong, then we will
need to get back to it later and fix up commit title.
If you want to deal with it later, then you can wait till it reaches
upstream and then use syz fix with the actual title.
So I did "syz fix" in the hope that the commit will be taken upstream
as-is, and we don't need to get back to it later.
It also has a useful consequence that the commit that at least was
_meant_ to fix it is recorded on mailing lists. So if it's not fixed
after 3 months, we can find the commit and check if it was forgotten
or renamed or something else.
What do you think of this update to docs:
https://github.com/dvyukov/syzkaller/commit/90075c45aa4422c4656020a3c4e1d6d7a04424ed
Does it make situation clearer?
> ? That's the reason I keep
>
> KASAN: use-after-free Read in fuse_kill_sb_blk
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a07a680ed0a9290585ca424546860464dd9658db
>
> report "open()" table but I want keyword column available in the "open()" table
> so that we can announce that "patch is proposed and waiting for review" state.
I wonder if marking the bug with "syz fix" is actually the right way
to handle this. There will be a note about the commit that is supposed
to fix this for both humans reading the email thread and syzbot. Then,
on dashboard it will go to "fix pending" state, which clearly
distinguishes them from other "open" bugs. And we can see that the
commit is still not present in any tested trees by looking at the last
column (Patched: 0/6). I was also thinking of recording time when "syz
fix" command was issued and then marking bugs with red if "syz fix"
was issued more than X months ago, but syzbot still has not discovered
the commit in any trees (useful for detecting typos in commit titles,
or renamed commits).
When we issue such command, we could say something like "Tentatively
marking this as fixed with: ..." to make it clear what happens.
What do you think?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2018-05-13 11:56 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-05-13 8:56 KASAN: use-after-free Read in corrupted syzbot
2018-05-13 9:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-05-13 10:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-05-13 10:32 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-05-13 10:47 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-05-13 11:56 ` Dmitry Vyukov
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