From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kcov: convert kcov.refcount to refcount_t
Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 10:52:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+a6-YyrwZ9qX+yhhMuoPoZ5=B-NKxkn-EyFqijNBf4N+g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACT4Y+bWgcS=c=KrthWyyjjBpc72DEK-=czLYK8=SkmOsZ_-jg@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 1:51 PM Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 11:27 AM Elena Reshetova
> <elena.reshetova@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference
> > counters with the following properties:
> > - counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set()
> > - a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero
> > - once counter reaches zero, its further
> > increments aren't allowed
> > - counter schema uses basic atomic operations
> > (set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.)
> >
> > Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided
> > refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows
> > and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows
> > can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable.
> >
> > The variable kcov.refcount is used as pure reference counter.
> > Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations.
> >
> > **Important note for maintainers:
> >
> > Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c
> > have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic
> > counterparts.
> > The full comparison can be seen in
> > https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon
> > in state to be merged to the documentation tree.
> > Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides
> > enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in
> > some rare cases it might matter.
> > Please double check that you don't have some undocumented
> > memory guarantees for this variable usage.
> >
> > For the kcov.refcount it might make a difference
> > in following places:
> > - kcov_put(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only
> > provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success
> > vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart
>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
>
> Thanks for improving this.
>
> KCOV uses refcounts in a very simple canonical way, so no hidden
> ordering implied.
>
> Am I missing something or refcount_dec_and_test does not in fact
> provide ACQUIRE ordering?
>
> +case 5) - decrement-based RMW ops that return a value
> +-----------------------------------------------------
> +
> +Function changes:
> + atomic_dec_and_test() --> refcount_dec_and_test()
> + atomic_sub_and_test() --> refcount_sub_and_test()
> + no atomic counterpart --> refcount_dec_if_one()
> + atomic_add_unless(&var, -1, 1) --> refcount_dec_not_one(&var)
> +
> +Memory ordering guarantees changes:
> + fully ordered --> RELEASE ordering + control dependency
>
> I think that's against the expected refcount guarantees. When I
> privatize an atomic_dec_and_test I would expect that not only stores,
> but also loads act on a quiescent object. But loads can hoist outside
> of the control dependency.
>
> Consider the following example, is it the case that the BUG_ON can still fire?
>
> struct X {
> refcount_t rc; // == 2
> int done1, done2; // == 0
> };
>
> // thread 1:
> x->done1 = 1;
> if (refcount_dec_and_test(&x->rc))
> BUG_ON(!x->done2);
>
> // thread 2:
> x->done2 = 1;
> if (refcount_dec_and_test(&x->rc))
> BUG_ON(!x->done1);
+more people knowledgeable in memory ordering
Unfortunately I can't find a way to reply to the
Documentation/core-api/refcount-vs-atomic.rst patch review thread.
The refcount_dec_and_test guarantees look too weak to me, see the
example above. Shouldn't refcount_dec_and_test returning true give the
object in fully quiescent state? Why only control dependency? Loads
can hoist across control dependency, no?
> > Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/kcov.c | 9 +++++----
> > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
> > index c2277db..051e86e 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kcov.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kcov.c
> > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> > #include <linux/debugfs.h>
> > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > #include <linux/kcov.h>
> > +#include <linux/refcount.h>
> > #include <asm/setup.h>
> >
> > /* Number of 64-bit words written per one comparison: */
> > @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ struct kcov {
> > * - opened file descriptor
> > * - task with enabled coverage (we can't unwire it from another task)
> > */
> > - atomic_t refcount;
> > + refcount_t refcount;
> > /* The lock protects mode, size, area and t. */
> > spinlock_t lock;
> > enum kcov_mode mode;
> > @@ -228,12 +229,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_switch);
> >
> > static void kcov_get(struct kcov *kcov)
> > {
> > - atomic_inc(&kcov->refcount);
> > + refcount_inc(&kcov->refcount);
> > }
> >
> > static void kcov_put(struct kcov *kcov)
> > {
> > - if (atomic_dec_and_test(&kcov->refcount)) {
> > + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&kcov->refcount)) {
> > vfree(kcov->area);
> > kfree(kcov);
> > }
> > @@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ static int kcov_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep)
> > if (!kcov)
> > return -ENOMEM;
> > kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_DISABLED;
> > - atomic_set(&kcov->refcount, 1);
> > + refcount_set(&kcov->refcount, 1);
> > spin_lock_init(&kcov->lock);
> > filep->private_data = kcov;
> > return nonseekable_open(inode, filep);
> > --
> > 2.7.4
> >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-21 9:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-16 10:27 [PATCH] kcov: convert kcov.refcount to refcount_t Elena Reshetova
2019-01-16 12:51 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-21 9:52 ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2019-01-21 11:45 ` Andrea Parri
2019-01-21 12:29 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-21 14:44 ` Andrea Parri
2019-01-21 13:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-21 16:05 ` Alan Stern
2019-01-21 17:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-22 9:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-22 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-25 9:02 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-01-25 10:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-27 18:41 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-01-28 8:33 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-28 9:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-21 11:51 ` Andrea Parri
2019-01-21 12:38 ` Mark Rutland
2019-01-21 12:42 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-21 14:07 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-01-21 17:07 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-31 10:03 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-01-31 10:06 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-01-31 10:09 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-01-31 10:33 ` Dmitry Vyukov
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