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From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jens.wiklander@linaro.org,
	corbet@lwn.net, dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, daniel.thompson@linaro.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, tee-dev@lists.linaro.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 10:11:34 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE=Ncrb63dQLe-nDQyO9OPv7XjwM_9mzL9SrcLiUi2Dr10cD4A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1564489420-677-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org>

Hi,

Interesting, I wrote something similar and posted it to the lists a while back:
https://github.com/jkrh/linux/commit/d77ea03afedcb5fd42234cd834da8f8a0809f6a6

Since there are no generic 'TEEs' available, I implemented the same
thing as a generic protocol translator. The shared memory binding for
instance already assumes fair amount about the TEE and how that is
physically present in the system. Besides, the help from usage of shm
is pretty limited due to the size of the keydata.


--
Janne




On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 3:26 PM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
> to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is
> an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
>
> This series also adds some TEE features like:
>
> Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE.
>
> Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for
> cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access
> TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents.
>
> Rest of the patches from #4 to #6 adds support for TEE based trusted keys.
>
> This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be
> found here [1].
>
> Also, this patch-set is dependent on generic Trusted Keys framework
> patch-set [2].
>
> [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082
> [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/18/284
>
> Changes in v2:
> 1. Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2.
> 2. Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3.
> 3. Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
>
> Sumit Garg (6):
>   tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm
>   tee: enable support to register kernel memory
>   tee: add private login method for kernel clients
>   KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
>   doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys
>   MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
>
>  Documentation/security/keys/index.rst       |   1 +
>  Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst |  93 +++++++++
>  MAINTAINERS                                 |   9 +
>  drivers/tee/optee/call.c                    |   7 +
>  drivers/tee/tee_core.c                      |   6 +
>  drivers/tee/tee_shm.c                       |  16 +-
>  include/keys/trusted-type.h                 |   3 +
>  include/keys/trusted_tee.h                  |  66 +++++++
>  include/linux/tee_drv.h                     |   1 +
>  include/uapi/linux/tee.h                    |   8 +
>  security/keys/Kconfig                       |   3 +
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile         |   3 +-
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c    | 282 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c        |   3 +
>  14 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst
>  create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h
>  create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c
>
> --
> 2.7.4
>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-31  7:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-30 12:23 [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 1/6] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 2/6] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg
2019-08-08 22:26   ` [Tee-dev] " Stuart Yoder
2019-08-09  5:36     ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 3/6] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 5/6] doc: keys: Document usage of " Sumit Garg
2019-07-30 12:23 ` [RFC v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for " Sumit Garg
2019-07-31  7:11 ` Janne Karhunen [this message]
2019-07-31 10:21   ` [RFC v2 0/6] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 13:58     ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01  6:21       ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01  7:40         ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01  7:59           ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:00             ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01 10:40               ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 10:26   ` Sumit Garg
2019-07-31 11:02     ` Janne Karhunen
2019-07-31 14:23       ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01  6:36         ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01  6:50           ` [Tee-dev] " Rouven Czerwinski
2019-08-01  7:30             ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01  7:58               ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-01  8:30                 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-08-01 10:27                   ` Sumit Garg
2019-08-04 20:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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