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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	"ebiggers@google.com" <ebiggers@google.com>,
	"herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"jpoimboe@redhat.com" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	"jannh@google.com" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 11:01:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jK108afSxMp6qtcdEr-D-ONz80L0C_4p2oLsMsDWvK=zw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4C6A4D7@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com>

On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 10:51 AM Reshetova, Elena
<elena.reshetova@intel.com> wrote:
> base: Simple syscall: 0.1761 microseconds
> get_random_bytes (4096 bytes per-cpu buffer): 0.1793 microsecons
> get_random_bytes (64 bytes per-cpu buffer): 0.1866 microsecons

The 4096 size seems pretty good.

> Below is a snip of what I quickly did (relevant parts) to get these numbers.
> I do initial population of per-cpu buffers in late_initcall, but
> practice shows that rng might not always be in good state by then.
> So, we might not have really good randomness then, but I am not sure
> if this is a practical problem since it only applies to system boot and by
> the time it booted, it already issued enough syscalls that buffer gets refilled
> with really good numbers.
> Alternatively we can also do it on the first syscall that each cpu gets, but I
> am not sure if that is always guaranteed to have a good randomness.

Populating at first syscall seems like a reasonable way to delay. And
I agree: I think we should not be too concerned about early RNG state:
we should design for the "after boot" behaviors.

> diff --git a/lib/percpu-random.c b/lib/percpu-random.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..3f92c44fbc1a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/lib/percpu-random.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/percpu.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
> +
> +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_buffer, stack_rand_offset) __latent_entropy;
> +
> +
> +/*
> + *    Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow
> + *    to start the prandom_u32() engine.
> + */
> +static int __init stack_rand_offset_init(void)
> +{
> +    int i;
> +
> +    /* exctract bits to out per-cpu rand buffers */
> +    for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
> +        struct rnd_buffer *buffer = &per_cpu(stack_rand_offset, i);
> +        buffer->byte_counter = 0;
> +        /* if rng is not initialized, this won't extract us good stuff
> +         * but we cannot wait for rng to initialize either */
> +        get_random_bytes(&(buffer->buffer), sizeof(buffer->buffer));

Instead of doing get_random_bytes() here, just set byte_counter =
RANDOM_BUFFER_SIZE and let random_get_byte() do the work on a per-cpu
basis?

> +
> +    }
> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +late_initcall(stack_rand_offset_init);
> +
> +unsigned char random_get_byte(void)
> +{
> +    struct rnd_buffer *buffer = &get_cpu_var(stack_rand_offset);
> +    unsigned char res;
> +
> +    if (buffer->byte_counter >= RANDOM_BUFFER_SIZE) {
> +        get_random_bytes(&(buffer->buffer), sizeof(buffer->buffer));
> +        buffer->byte_counter = 0;
> +    }
> +
> +    res = buffer->buffer[buffer->byte_counter];
> +    buffer->buffer[buffer->byte_counter] = 0;
> +    buffer->byte_counter ++;
> +     put_cpu_var(stack_rand_offset);
> +    return res;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(random_get_byte);

Otherwise, sure, looks good. I remain worried about info leaks of the
percpu area causing pain down the road, but we find a safer way to do
this, we can do it later.

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-30 18:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-15  6:09 [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall Elena Reshetova
2019-04-15  7:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-15  8:44   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-16  7:34     ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-16 11:10       ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-16 12:08         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-16 12:45           ` David Laight
2019-04-16 15:43             ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-04-16 16:07               ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-16 16:47               ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-17  9:28                 ` David Laight
2019-04-17 15:15                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-04-17 15:40                     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-17 15:53                     ` David Laight
2019-04-24 11:42                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-24 13:33                         ` David Laight
2019-04-25 11:23                           ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-26 11:33                         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-26 14:01                           ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-04-26 17:44                             ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-26 18:02                               ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-04-27 13:59                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29  8:04                               ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-26 18:34                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29  7:46                               ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-29 16:08                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-30 17:51                                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-30 18:01                                     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-05-01  8:23                                     ` David Laight
2019-05-02  8:07                                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-01  8:41                                     ` David Laight
2019-05-01 23:33                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02  8:15                                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-02  9:23                                         ` David Laight
2019-05-02 14:47                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 15:08                                             ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-02 16:32                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 16:43                                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-03 16:40                                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 16:34                                               ` David Laight
2019-05-02 16:45                                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-03 16:17                                                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-03 16:40                                                     ` David Laight
2019-05-03 19:10                                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06  6:47                                                         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-06  7:01                                                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-08 11:18                                                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-08 11:32                                                         ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-08 13:22                                                           ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-09  5:59                                                             ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-09  7:01                                                               ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-09  8:43                                                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-11 22:45                                                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-12  0:12                                                                     ` Kees Cook
2019-05-12  8:02                                                                       ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-12 14:33                                                                         ` Kees Cook
2019-05-28 12:28                                                                           ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-28 13:33                                                                             ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-05-29 10:13                                                                               ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-29 10:51                                                                                 ` David Laight
2019-05-29 18:35                                                                                 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-29 18:37                                                                                 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-29 11:41                                                                                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-07-30 18:07                                                                                     ` Kees Cook
2019-08-01  6:35                                                                                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-09  7:03                                                               ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-06  7:32                                               ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-29  7:49                             ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-26 17:37                           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-04-17  6:24               ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-16 18:19           ` Reshetova, Elena
     [not found] <20190408061358.21288-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com>
2019-04-08 12:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-08 13:30   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-08 16:21     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-10  8:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-10  9:00     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-10 10:17       ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-10 10:24       ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-10 14:52         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-12  5:36           ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-12 21:16             ` Andy Lutomirski

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