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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>,
	Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>,
	Lars Persson <larper@axis.com>, Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>,
	Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	"open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	qat-linux@intel.com, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 13/14] rxrpc: Prepare to remove VLA usage for SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK
Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 13:30:33 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jK7iRv1HE7JgW95vTgg5vhye4dxjfoQyN3G7HZzp7nZhA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLUME9cjntUUed9EYukzEaODDzqRmtGht=uu7YVAG2WWg@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Jul 12, 2018 at 1:23 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 12, 2018 at 8:11 AM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
>> On Wed, Jul 11, 2018 at 10:36 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> Two uses of SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() will trigger FRAME_WARN warnings
>>> (when less than 2048) once the VLA is no longer hidden from the check:
>>>
>>> net/rxrpc/rxkad.c:398:1: warning: the frame size of 1152 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> net/rxrpc/rxkad.c:242:1: warning: the frame size of 1152 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>>
>>> This bumps the affected objects by 20% to silence the warnings while
>>> still providing coverage is anything grows even more.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>>
>> (adding David Howells to cc)
>>
>> I don't think these are in a fast path, it should be possible to just use
>> skcipher_alloc_req() instead of SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() here.
>> From what I can tell, neither of the two are called in atomic context, so
>> you should be able to use a GFP_KERNEL allocation.
>
> Sure, I can do that instead.

Actually, I think this can actually be adjusted to just re-use the
stack allocation, since rxkad_verify_packet() finishes one before
doing another in rxkad_verify_packet_1():

diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index 278ac0807a60..d6a2e7cab384 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -316,10 +316,10 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call,
  */
 static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
                                 unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
-                                rxrpc_seq_t seq)
+                                rxrpc_seq_t seq,
+                                struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
        struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
-       SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
        struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
        struct scatterlist sg[16];
        struct sk_buff *trailer;
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call
*call, struct sk_buff *skb,
        case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
                return 0;
        case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
-               return rxkad_verify_packet_1(call, skb, offset, len, seq);
+               return rxkad_verify_packet_1(call, skb, offset, len, seq, req);
        case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
                return rxkad_verify_packet_2(call, skb, offset, len, seq);
        default:


-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2018-07-12 20:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-11 20:36 [PATCH v4 00/14] crypto: Remove VLA usage Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] crypto: xcbc: " Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] crypto: cbc: " Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] crypto: shash: " Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] dm integrity: " Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] crypto: ahash: " Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] dm verity fec: " Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] crypto alg: Introduce generic max blocksize and alignmask Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] crypto: qat: Remove VLA usage Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] crypto: shash: Remove VLA usage in unaligned hashing Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] kbuild: Introduce FRAME_WARN_BUMP_FLAG Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] treewide: Prepare to remove VLA usage for AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK Kees Cook
2018-07-12 16:02   ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-07-12 20:17     ` Kees Cook
2018-07-12 21:38       ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-07-13  0:40     ` Herbert Xu
2018-07-13  3:33       ` Kees Cook
2018-07-13  3:44         ` Herbert Xu
2018-07-13  5:17           ` Kees Cook
2018-07-13  5:20             ` Herbert Xu
2018-07-13  6:00               ` Kees Cook
2018-07-13 10:14                 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-07-15  4:28                   ` Kees Cook
2018-07-17 20:59                     ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-07-18 14:50                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-18 15:19                         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-18 15:33                           ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-07-18 15:33                             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-19  2:51                           ` Kees Cook
2018-07-19  2:55                             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-19  3:09                               ` Kees Cook
2018-07-19  3:13                                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-19 14:54                                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-19 18:44                                     ` Kees Cook
2018-07-13  6:16       ` Kees Cook
2018-07-13  6:22         ` Herbert Xu
2018-07-14  3:07           ` Kees Cook
2018-07-15  2:44             ` Herbert Xu
2018-07-15  2:59               ` Kees Cook
2018-07-16  0:01                 ` Herbert Xu
2018-07-16  3:39                   ` Kees Cook
2018-07-16  7:24                     ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] crypto: ahash: Remove " Kees Cook
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] rxrpc: Prepare to remove VLA usage for SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK Kees Cook
2018-07-12 15:11   ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-07-12 20:23     ` Kees Cook
2018-07-12 20:30       ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-07-12 21:15         ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-07-12 21:38           ` Kees Cook
2018-07-12 21:28   ` David Howells
2018-07-12 21:34     ` Kees Cook
2018-07-12 22:05   ` David Howells
2018-07-11 20:36 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] crypto: skcipher: Remove " Kees Cook

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