From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2015 11:12:07 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKNpty2cTJNTzYALtF3hZWwwh4+tZespPcYQAcJrYo8JQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150604171501.GI3160@smitten>
On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 10:15 AM, Tycho Andersen
<tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 04, 2015 at 09:44:36AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 3:09 PM, Tycho Andersen
>> <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> > This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
>> > with seccomp enabled.
>> >
>> > One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
>> > via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
>> > itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
>> > prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.
>> >
>> > This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
>> > a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
>> > filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
>> > they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
>> > processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
>> > ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
>> > this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
>> > that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.
>> >
>> > Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
>> > installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
>> > seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
>> > process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
>> > filters resumed as well.
>> >
>> > v2 changes:
>> >
>> > * require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
>> > * drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
>> > * change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
>> > as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
>> > detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
>> > disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.
>>
>> This feature gives me the creeps, but I think it's okay.
>
> :D
>
>> Could it be
>> further restricted so that the process doing the suspension is already
>> ptracing the target?
>
> As far as I understand it you do have to PTRACE_{ATTACH,SEIZE} to the
> target before setting options in general. Is that not what you mean
> here?
Ah, true, yes. Okay, ignore me. I was thinking about the mechanism for
setting the flag wrong. :)
-Kees
>
> The rest of the changes sound good, I'll make those and resend.
>
>>
>> Thanks for working on this!
>
> Thanks for the review.
>
> Tycho
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-06-04 18:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-06-03 22:09 [PATCH v2] seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume Tycho Andersen
2015-06-04 16:44 ` Kees Cook
2015-06-04 17:15 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-06-04 18:12 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2015-06-04 18:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2015-06-04 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2015-06-04 18:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2015-06-04 21:05 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-06-05 21:16 ` Oleg Nesterov
2015-06-05 21:26 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-06-09 21:22 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-06-09 21:45 ` Kees Cook
2015-06-09 21:52 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-06-09 22:06 ` Kees Cook
2015-06-09 22:13 ` Tycho Andersen
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