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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] procfs: use an enum for possible hidepid values
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 14:16:30 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLKqKso-FGDfr=2_xu+k15Lz-T9CgT_4ZvEEeZ9G1+LzA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1484572984-13388-2-git-send-email-djalal@gmail.com>

On Mon, Jan 16, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote:
> From: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com>
>
> Previously, the hidepid parameter was checked by comparing literal
> integers 0, 1, 2. Let's add a proper enum for this, to make the checking
> more expressive:
>
>         0 → HIDEPID_OFF
>         1 → HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS
>         2 → HIDEPID_INVISIBLE
>
> This changes the internal labelling only, the userspace-facing interface
> remains unmodified, and still works with literal integers 0, 1, 2.
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Acked-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com>

Andrew, can you take this? It's a sensible cleanup to drop literals in
favor of defines.

-Kees

> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c                | 8 ++++----
>  fs/proc/inode.c               | 2 +-
>  fs/proc/root.c                | 3 ++-
>  include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 6 ++++++
>  4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 8e7e61b..cd8dd15 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -729,11 +729,11 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>         task = get_proc_task(inode);
>         if (!task)
>                 return -ESRCH;
> -       has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1);
> +       has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS);
>         put_task_struct(task);
>
>         if (!has_perms) {
> -               if (pid->hide_pid == 2) {
> +               if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
>                         /*
>                          * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
>                          * consistent with each other.  If a process
> @@ -1725,7 +1725,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
>         stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
>         task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
>         if (task) {
> -               if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 2)) {
> +               if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) {
>                         rcu_read_unlock();
>                         /*
>                          * This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists,
> @@ -3179,7 +3179,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
>              iter.tgid += 1, iter = next_tgid(ns, iter)) {
>                 char name[PROC_NUMBUF];
>                 int len;
> -               if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, 2))
> +               if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE))
>                         continue;
>
>                 len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d", iter.tgid);
> diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
> index 842a5ff..5d9bafb 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
>
>         if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
>                 seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid));
> -       if (pid->hide_pid != 0)
> +       if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF)
>                 seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid);
>
>         return 0;
> diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
> index 1988440..b90da88 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/root.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/root.c
> @@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
>                 case Opt_hidepid:
>                         if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
>                                 return 0;
> -                       if (option < 0 || option > 2) {
> +                       if (option < HIDEPID_OFF ||
> +                           option > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
>                                 pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
>                                 return 0;
>                         }
> diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
> index 34cce96..c2a989d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ struct pidmap {
>
>  struct fs_pin;
>
> +enum { /* definitions for pid_namespace's hide_pid field */
> +       HIDEPID_OFF       = 0,
> +       HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
> +       HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
> +};
> +
>  struct pid_namespace {
>         struct kref kref;
>         struct pidmap pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES];
> --
> 2.5.5
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2017-02-13 22:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-01-16 13:23 [PATCH v4 0/2] procfs/tasks: introduce per-task procfs hidepid= field Djalal Harouni
2017-01-16 13:23 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] procfs: use an enum for possible hidepid values Djalal Harouni
2017-02-13 22:16   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-02-15  0:34     ` Andrew Morton
2017-02-15  8:56       ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-16 13:23 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] procfs/tasks: add a simple per-task procfs hidepid= field Djalal Harouni
2017-01-16 18:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-01-17  9:54     ` Lafcadio Wluiki
     [not found]   ` <CAEiveUfDvSoW9Hy2Y_uxU2YQ+vR8OvXMqRhxAANTGG7QaQbJeg@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]     ` <CALCETrWEGLhEHO_6sTXreVyWFVsEeYmZSrLNNXx-ma5gd+nTQQ@mail.gmail.com>
2017-01-18 22:50       ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-18 23:35         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-19 13:53           ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-19 19:52             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-20 15:56               ` Lafcadio Wluiki
2017-01-20 16:33               ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-21  0:53                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-23 11:46                   ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-23 20:07                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-26 13:20                       ` Djalal Harouni
2017-02-10 14:40                   ` Lafcadio Wluiki
2017-02-10 16:18                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-20 15:44           ` Lafcadio Wluiki
2017-02-10 23:44           ` Kees Cook
2017-02-13 19:01             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-02-13 19:15               ` Kees Cook
2017-02-14  4:11                 ` Christian Kujau

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