Re: [PATCH v2 14/33] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 14/33] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 14:51:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=Vmp70auiTCZCtjhsC_vwnqPLsz_wn12cWd2iU-T5By8g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231121220155.1217090-15-iii@linux.ibm.com>

On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 11:02 PM Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing
> kmsan_slab_free() to poison the freed memory, and by preventing
> init_object() from unpoisoning new allocations. The usage of
> memset_no_sanitize_memory() does not degrade the generated code
> quality.
>
> There are two alternatives to this approach. First, init_object()
> can be marked with __no_sanitize_memory. This annotation should be used
> with great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the
> function, and any shadow writes will be lost. Even though this is not a
> concern with the current init_object() implementation, this may change
> in the future.
>
> Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset() calls.
> The downside is that init_object() is called from
> free_debug_processing(), in which case poisoning will erase the
> distinction between simply uninitialized memory and UAF.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>  mm/kmsan/hooks.c |  2 +-
>  mm/slub.c        | 10 ++++++----
>  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
> index 7b5814412e9f..7a30274b893c 100644
> --- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
> +++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
>                 return;
>
>         /* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
> -       if (unlikely(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)))
> +       if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
>                 return;
>         /*
>          * If there's a constructor, freed memory must remain in the same state
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 63d281dfacdb..169e5f645ea8 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -1030,7 +1030,8 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val)
>         unsigned int poison_size = s->object_size;
>
>         if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
> -               memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
> +               memset_no_sanitize_memory(p - s->red_left_pad, val,

As I wrote in patch 13/33, let's try to use __memset() here (with a
comment that we want to preserve the previously poisoned memory)