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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at, moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at,
	Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>,
	michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at,
	Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/23] x86, kaiser: unmap kernel from userspace page tables (core patch)
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 20:07:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUx-3bXEsZSuaSBkEf7r+MmGoOb9fM8A3eGQpwq0qc2HA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171123003447.1DB395E3@viggo.jf.intel.com>

On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 4:34 PM, Dave Hansen
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> These actions when dealing with a user address *and* the
> PGD has _PAGE_USER set.  That way, in-kernel users of low addresses
> typically used by userspace are not accidentally poisoned.

This seems sane.

> +/*
> + * Take a PGD location (pgdp) and a pgd value that needs
> + * to be set there.  Populates the shadow and returns
> + * the resulting PGD that must be set in the kernel copy
> + * of the page tables.
> + */
> +static inline pgd_t kaiser_set_shadow_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KAISER
> +       if (pgd_userspace_access(pgd)) {
> +               if (pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp)) {
> +                       /*
> +                        * The user/shadow page tables get the full
> +                        * PGD, accessible from userspace:
> +                        */
> +                       kernel_to_shadow_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
> +                       /*
> +                        * For the copy of the pgd that the kernel
> +                        * uses, make it unusable to userspace.  This
> +                        * ensures if we get out to userspace with the
> +                        * wrong CR3 value, userspace will crash
> +                        * instead of running.
> +                        */
> +                       pgd.pgd |= _PAGE_NX;
> +               }
> +       } else if (pgd_userspace_access(*pgdp)) {
> +               /*
> +                * We are clearing a _PAGE_USER PGD for which we
> +                * presumably populated the shadow.  We must now
> +                * clear the shadow PGD entry.
> +                */
> +               if (pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp)) {
> +                       kernel_to_shadow_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
> +               } else {
> +                       /*
> +                        * Attempted to clear a _PAGE_USER PGD which
> +                        * is in the kernel porttion of the address
> +                        * space.  PGDs are pre-populated and we
> +                        * never clear them.
> +                        */
> +                       WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> +               }
> +       } else {
> +               /*
> +                * _PAGE_USER was not set in either the PGD being set
> +                * or cleared.  All kernel PGDs should be
> +                * pre-populated so this should never happen after
> +                * boot.
> +                */
> +       }
> +#endif
> +       /* return the copy of the PGD we want the kernel to use: */
> +       return pgd;
> +}
> +

The more I read this code, the more I dislike "shadow".  Shadow
pagetables mean something specific in the virtualization world and,
more importantly, the word "shadow" fails to convey *which* table it
is.  Unless I'm extra confused, mm->pgd points to the kernelmode
tables.  So can we replace the word "shadow" with "usermode"?  That
will also make the entry stuff way clearer.  (Or I have it backwards,
in which case "kernelmode" would be the right choice.)  And rename the
argument.

That confusion aside, I'm trying to wrap my head around this.  I think
the description above makes sense, but I'm struggling to grok the code
and how it matches the description.  May I suggest an alternative
implementation?  (Apologies for epic whitespace damage.)

/*
 * Install an entry into the usermode pgd.  pgdp points to the kernelmode
 * entry whose usermode counterpart we're supposed to set.  pgd is the
 * desired entry.  Returns pgd, possibly modified if the actual entry installed
 * into the kernelmode needs different mode bits.
 */
static inline pgd_t kaiser_set_usermode_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) {
  VM_BUG_ON(pgdp points to a usermode table);

  if (pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp)) {
    /* Install the pgd as requested into the usermode tables. */
    kernelmode_to_usermode_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;

    if (pgd_val(pgd) & _PAGE_USER) {
      /*
       * This is a normal user pgd -- the kernelmode mapping should have NX
       * set to prevent erroneous usermode execution with the kernel tables.
       */
      return __pgd(pgd_val(pgd) | _PAGE_NX;
    } else {
      /* This is a weird mapping, e.g. EFI.  Map it straight through. */
      return pgd;
    }
  } else {
    /*
     * We can get here due to vmalloc, a vmalloc fault, memory
hot-add, or initial setup
     * of kernelmode page tables.  Regardless of which particular code
path we're in,
     * these mappings should not be automatically propagated to the
usermode tables.
     */
    return pgd;
  }
}

As a side benefit, this shouldn't have magical interactions with the
vsyscall page any more.

Are there cases that this would get wrong?

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2017-11-23  4:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-11-23  0:34 [PATCH 00/23] [v4] KAISER: unmap most of the kernel from userspace page tables Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 01/23] x86, kaiser: disable global pages by default with KAISER Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 02/23] x86, kaiser: prepare assembly for entry/exit CR3 switching Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 03/23] x86, kaiser: introduce user-mapped per-cpu areas Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 04/23] x86, kaiser: mark per-cpu data structures required for entry/exit Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 05/23] x86, kaiser: unmap kernel from userspace page tables (core patch) Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  4:07   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-11-26 16:10     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-26 16:24       ` Dave Hansen
2017-11-26 16:29         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-05  4:16   ` Yisheng Xie
2018-01-05  5:18     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05  6:16       ` Yisheng Xie
2018-01-05  6:29         ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05 11:49           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-05 18:19           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05 19:00             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05 19:03             ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05 19:17               ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05 19:18                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05 19:55                 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-05 21:07                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05 21:14                   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05 21:29                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-05 22:48                     ` Hugh Dickins
2018-01-06  4:54             ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-06  6:06               ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-06  6:28                 ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-06  6:53                   ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-06  7:55                     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-06  8:42                       ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-06  7:51                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-06 17:22                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 06/23] x86, kaiser: allow NX poison to be set in p4d/pgd Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 07/23] x86, kaiser: make sure static PGDs are 8k in size Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 08/23] x86, kaiser: map cpu entry area Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 09/23] x86, kaiser: map dynamically-allocated LDTs Dave Hansen
2017-11-23 19:42   ` Eric Biggers
2017-11-23 20:12     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 10/23] x86, kaiser: map espfix structures Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:34 ` [PATCH 11/23] x86, kaiser: map entry stack variables Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  3:31   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 15:37     ` Dave Hansen
2017-11-23 15:55       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 12/23] x86, kaiser: map virtually-addressed performance monitoring buffers Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 13/23] x86, mm: Move CR3 construction functions Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 14/23] x86, mm: remove hard-coded ASID limit checks Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 15/23] x86, mm: put mmu-to-h/w ASID translation in one place Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 16/23] x86, pcid, kaiser: allow flushing for future ASID switches Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 17/23] x86, kaiser: use PCID feature to make user and kernel switches faster Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 18/23] x86, kaiser: disable native VSYSCALL Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 19/23] x86, kaiser: add debugfs file to turn KAISER on/off at runtime Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 20/23] x86, kaiser: add a function to check for KAISER being enabled Dave Hansen
2017-11-25  1:23   ` Eduardo Valentin
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 21/23] x86, kaiser: un-poison PGDs at runtime Dave Hansen
2017-11-25  1:17   ` Eduardo Valentin
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 22/23] x86, kaiser: allow KAISER to be enabled/disabled " Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  0:35 ` [PATCH 23/23] x86, kaiser: add Kconfig Dave Hansen
2017-11-23  7:23 ` [PATCH 00/23] [v4] KAISER: unmap most of the kernel from userspace page tables Ingo Molnar
2017-11-23  7:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-23  7:32   ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-23 15:02     ` Dave Hansen
2017-11-23 16:20 ` Dave Hansen
2017-11-24  6:35   ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24  6:41     ` Dave Hansen
2017-11-24  7:33       ` Ingo Molnar

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